Reward Processing and Anhedonia by Slaney, Chloe L
                          
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been





Reward Processing and Anhedonia
General rights
Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License.   A
copy of this may be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode  This license sets out your rights and the
restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.
Take down policy
Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research.
However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of
a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity,
defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
•	Your contact details
•	Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
•	An outline nature of the complaint















A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with 
the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Faculty of Life Sciences. 
 











































Anhedonia – a diminished interest or pleasure in activities - is a core self-
reported symptom of depression which is poorly understood and often 
resistant to conventional treatments. Advances in preclinical neuroscience 
suggest that anhedonia may be due to impairments in one or more sub-
components of reward processing: motivation, sensitivity and/or learning. 
However, the precise deficits remain elusive. This thesis contributes to 
understanding the relationship between anhedonia and reward-related 
behaviour by (1) developing novel methods to assess sub-components of 
reward processing and (2) examining multiple aspects of reward 
processing using a battery of behavioural tasks in a non-clinical 
population with higher levels of anhedonia and in a depressed population.   
We provide proof-of-concept for two new behavioural paradigms designed 
to assess: reward motivation (physical effort exerted for reward: Joystick-
Operated Runway Task; JORT) and reward learning and memory (based 
on a procedurally similar rodent task). Using a battery of tasks based on 
rodent assays, we found evidence that different components of reward 
may also be dissociable in humans. In a non-clinical population, higher 
levels of anhedonia were associated with reduced sensitivity to detect 
reward (Sweet Taste Test) and aberrant effort-based decision-making 
(Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task). Interestingly, people who had 
reduced sensitivity did not also display aberrant effort-based decision-
making lending support for the presence of sub-groups. We did not find 
evidence of reduced motivation on a simple effort-for-reward task (JORT). 
In the depressed population, we did not find clear evidence of 
dysfunctional reward processing on any paradigms. However, this study is 
a preliminary study (due to COVID-19) and requires further follow-up 
before strong conclusions can be drawn.  
In summary, our findings support the hypothesis that anhedonia is a 
heterogeneous symptom. Going forward, there is a critical need for the 
development and validation of novel translational assays and for further 
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Glossary of key terms 
 
Term Description 
Anhedonia “Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, 






Sheehan et al., 1998) 
A brief neuropsychiatric diagnostic interview for 




National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH) 
Organisation dedicated to research into mental 
illnesses, which is part of the National Institute 
of Health in the United States.  
 
 
National Institute for 
Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE) 
guidelines 
Evidence-based recommendations for health 
and social care in England. 
Open Science Framework 
(OSF) 
Free online tool (by Centre for Open Science) 
that encourages open dissemination of 
research: researchers can upload and share pre-
registrations of studies, papers and preprints, 
study data and code. 
 
Preclinical research Research conducted prior to human work. Here, 
it specifically refers to animal research - 
typically conducted with rodents. 
 
Prolific Academic An online platform for recruiting participants to 
studies (prolific.co). Currently, enables access to 
more than 70,000 participants worldwide. 
 
Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) 
 
Research framework proposed by the NIMH to 
classify and investigate mental illness. 
Encourages researchers to take a dimensional 
approach (i.e., not to focus on diagnostic 
categories) and to integrate across methods 
(e.g., self-report, behaviour, brain imaging). 
 
Translational research Research that can be conducted across species 
(animals and humans). Aims to promote 





















1.1. Overview  
In this thesis, I examine how anhedonia relates to behavioural measures 
of reward processing, with a particular focus on translational paradigms. 
In this general introduction, I will briefly discuss Major Depressive 
Disorder (the context in which anhedonia has mostly been studied due to 
its high prevalence and severity in this disorder), how anhedonia has 
traditionally been measured (using subjective questionnaires) and recent 
attempts to understand anhedonia using objective translational measures 
of reward processing. Following this, I will conclude with some gaps in the 
current literature, and how this thesis will contribute to these gaps.  
1.2. Major Depressive Disorder 
1.2.1. Diagnostic criteria 
Worldwide, mental health disorders are diagnosed based on a 
constellation of self-reported symptoms present over a defined period of 
time (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health Organization., 
2018). The two most commonly used classification systems for diagnosing 
mental health conditions are the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD; World Health Organization., 2018) and the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Whilst the ICD is used internationally to classify a 
range of health disorders, the DSM is specific to psychiatric disorders and 
is predominantly used for research and clinical practice in the United 
States (Clark et al., 2017). These diagnostic manuals are not finished 
products; new editions are released over time that aim to reflect 
advances in research. However, for most disorders, including major 
depressive disorder (herein referred to as depression), there are few 
changes to criteria across editions (Cooper, 2018; Regier et al., 2013). 
The diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode (MDE) using the 
latest versions of the ICD (ICD-11) and the DSM (DSM-5) are similar. For 




symptoms (depressed mood and/or anhedonia) alongside other 
symptoms (e.g., fatigue, sleep disturbances) nearly every day, for a 
period of at least 2-weeks (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In 
total, the individual must report at least five symptoms (see Table 1.1). 
The main difference between the two systems in the diagnosis of a MDE is 
that the (1) the ICD-11 includes ten possible symptoms whereas the 
DSM-5 includes nine (hopelessness being the additional symptom in the 
ICD-11) and (2) the ICD-11 includes a “bereavement exclusion” which is 
no longer present in the DSM-5 (Stein et al., 2020). In the DSM-5, 
hopelessness was introduced but within the criterion of depressed mood 
(see Table 1.1) and the bereavement exclusion was replaced by a note 
stating that clinical judgement is required when diagnosing MDE following 
significant loss (Uher et al., 2014). Depression can also be characterised 






Table 1.1 DSM-5 criteria for a Major Depressive Episode (adapted from American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week period and represent a change from previous 
functioning; at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) anhedonia.  
1. Depressed mood  
Most of the day, nearly every day as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful). 
2. Anhedonia  
Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation). 
3. Weight loss or gain 
Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of > 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day. 
4. Insomnia or hyposomnia  
Nearly every day. 
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation  
Nearly every day. 
6. Fatigue or loss of energy 
Nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt  
Nearly every day; guilt may be delusional. 
8. Decreased concentration 
Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or observed by others).  
9. Thoughts of death/suicide 
Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide.  
Additional requirements: (1) Symptoms must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning, (2) episode not 
attributable to physiological effects of a substance or another medical condition, (3) episode not better explained by schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, schizophreniform 
disorder, delusional disorder, or other schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders and (4) there has never been a manic episode or a hypomanic episode. 




1.2.2. Prevalence and importance 
Depression is a debilitating and often recurrent mental illness, affecting 
approximately 300 million people worldwide (~ 4.4% population)(WHO, 
2017). In England, the estimated 12-month prevalence rate of depression 
is 3.3% or 7.8% when including people with mixed-depression and 
anxiety (McManus et al., 2009). In terms of lifetime prevalence in 
England, depression is the most frequently diagnosed mental illness, with 
approximately 19% of adults (13% men, 24% women) reporting that 
they had received a diagnosis of depression at some point during their life 
(2014 Health Survey for England; Bridges, 2014). It is important to note 
that these surveys are sent to private houses in England (i.e., they are 
not distributed in hospitals, prisons, sheltered housing or to the 
homeless), and thus it is possible that the prevalence of depression is 
higher. Whilst prevalence estimates across countries have been shown to 
vary considerably (Kessler et al., 2003; Kessler & Bromet, 2013), a 
consistent finding across countries is that women have a higher risk of 
depression compared to men (Kessler & Bromet, 2013). 
The high prevalence of depression is very concerning, especially when 
taking into consideration its enormous impact on the individual, society 
and the economy. Depression significantly affects a person’s quality of life 
and is associated with a higher risk of early death. For example, 
depression is associated with an increased risk of suicide (Beautrais, 
2000). In the UK, suicide is the leading cause of death for both males and 
females between the ages of 5 to 34 (Office for National Statistics, 2019). 
Not only does depression increase a person’s risk of suicide (Bachmann, 
2018), it is also associated with a higher risk of a wide range of physical 
disorders when compared to healthy controls (Farmer et al., 2008) 
including hypertension (odds ratio: 2.20), gastric ulcer (odds ratio: 4.31), 
type 2 diabetes (odds ratio: 2.06) and myocardial infarction (odds ratio: 
2.70; as reported in Farmer et al., 2008), which in turn are associated 
with an increased risk of mortality (Abbafati et al., 2020). Furthermore, in 
England (2007) the estimated yearly service cost for depression was £1.7 




(Mccrone et al., 2008). The high prevalence of depression and its huge 
impact on society has made understanding depression and its treatment a 
major public health priority (World Health Organization, 2020). 
1.2.3. Treatments for depression  
The most commonly offered treatments for depression are psychological 
therapy and/or antidepressants. Based on the current National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence guidelines (NICE, 2009), the 
recommended treatment for an individual varies depending on the 
severity of their depression. For mild-to-moderate depression, low-
intensity psychosocial interventions (supported self-help), physical 
activity and/or computerised cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) are 
recommended (NICE, 2009). Whereas, for moderate-to-severe 
depression, a first-line antidepressant (e.g., selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor; SSRI such as citalopram, sertraline) combined with a high 
intensity psychological therapy (e.g., individual CBT, behavioural 
activation therapy) is recommended (NICE, 2009). If there is little 
response following an SSRI, the clinician may propose that the patient try 
a higher dose of the current SSRI, a different SSRI or a different class of 
antidepressants (e.g., serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor, 
tricyclic antidepressant or monoamine oxidase inhibitor)(NICE, 2009). In 
the case of treatment-resistant patients, brain stimulation such as 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) may be offered (NICE, 2009). Alternative 
treatments not included in the guidelines (but approved by NICE) are 
repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation and vagus nerve stimulation 
(NICE, 2015, 2020b). Despite the range of available treatments for 
depression, it is important to note that the precise therapeutic 
mechanisms of action for available treatments remains poorly understood 
and commonly prescribed antidepressants were discovered 
serendipitously (Robinson, 2018).  
There are also other promising treatment options emerging for 
treatment-resistant depression, but these are not currently recommended 




stimulation (DBS; electrodes implanted into the brain to deliver electrical 
stimulation) in regions such as the nucleus accumbens and subcallosal 
cingulate reduce symptoms of depression (Bewernick et al., 2010; 
Mayberg et al., 2005). More recently, studies have shown that ketamine 
reduces symptoms of depression within hours and has lasting effects in 
treatment-resistant patients (Murrough et al., 2013). Whilst esketamine 
(isomer of ketamine) has been approved for licensing in the United States 
for treatment-resistant depression, it is not currently recommended by 
NICE (NICE, 2009). The reason why these treatments are not currently 
recommended by NICE is because of limited evidence on their efficacy, 
safety and/or cost-effectiveness (NICE, 2020a). 
Whilst there are effective treatments available for depression, there are 
problems with current interventions. Firstly, current pharmacological and 
psychological treatments are not effective for many people. For example, 
up to ~ 50% people do not fully respond (defined as ≥ 50% symptom 
reduction) to conventional antidepressants (Fava & Davidson, 1996). A 
naturalistic study of nearly 3,000 patients with depression reported that 
only ~30% patients achieved remission (near absence of symptoms) 
following an SSRI treatment of citalopram (47% responded in total; 
Trivedi et al., 2006). Moreover, for moderate-to-severe depression, both 
cognitive therapy and antidepressants show limited efficacy in terms of 
response rate (43% and 50%) and remission rates (40% and 46%; 
DeRubeis et al., 2005). Secondly, even when people do respond or show 
remission of symptoms, there is a high risk of relapse and recurrence 
(DeRubeis et al., 2008; Vitiello et al., 2011). This suggests that available 
treatments may help in suppressing, but not curing symptoms (DeRubeis 
et al., 2008). Thirdly, conventional antidepressants have been reported to 
have a delayed onset of action (Godlewska & Harmer, 2020; Harmer & 
Cowen, 2013). This means that it can take several weeks (~ 4 – 6 weeks) 
after treatment onset before patients report a clear alleviation of their 
symptoms (Frazer & Benmansour, 2002; Taylor et al., 2006). As finding 
an effective treatment for an individual usually takes trial-and-error of 
several treatments (Cuijpers et al., 2020), this is time-consuming, 




antidepressants can have a range of side effects including sexual 
dysfunction, gastrointestinal disturbance, emotional blunting (Robinson, 
2018), and increase suicide risk during early treatment (Healy & 
Whitaker, 2003). Therefore, although conventional antidepressants are 
effective for some individuals, the poor treatment response, delayed 
onset of action and side effects emphasize the need for new effective 
treatments.  
Pharmaceutical companies have invested heavily in the development of 
effective novel treatments with limited success (Belzung, 2014). Several 
factors have contributed to this failure, a chief one being a poor 
mechanistic understanding of depression. It is likely that the development 
of better treatments will require insight into the mechanisms 
underpinning this disorder. 
1.2.4. Causes of depression (the ‘why’ and the ‘how’) 
In the last 50 years, a significant amount of research has sought to 
identify the causes and development of depression. As it is not the focus 
of this thesis, it is only briefly mentioned here. 
Despite earlier nature-versus-nurture debates, it is now widely thought 
that depression is caused by both genetic and environmental factors. For 
example, a meta-analysis of five twin studies reported the heritability of 
depression to be 37% (Sullivan et al., 2000), leaving 63% attributable to 
an individual’s environment. The diathesis-stress model tries to account 
for this complexity, proposing that depression is the result of a complex 
interaction between vulnerability factors during early development (such 
as genetics, early life stress) and stressful life events (such as divorce, 
job loss, infection)(Robins & Block, 1989). The complex interaction 
between these genetic and environmental factors result in neurobiological 
and psychological changes, which are thought to be involved in the 




In terms of the development and maintenance of depression, a number of 
neurobiological theories of depression have been proposed. Arguably, the 
most widely researched neurobiological theory is the monoamine 
hypothesis, which associates depression with a depletion of 
neurotransmitters in the central nervous system (e.g., serotonin, 
norepinephrine and dopamine; see Willner et al., 2013). Whilst there is 
evidence in support of this theory, the delayed onset of action of drugs 
which enhance monoamine levels (Harmer & Cowen, 2013; Taylor et al., 
2006) and their failure to alleviate symptoms in many patients (Fava & 
Davidson, 1996) has led some researchers to consider other theories.  
More recently, other neurobiological theories have been proposed such as 
altered stress response and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, 
neurocircuitry changes, neurotrophic deficits associated with neuron, 
dendrite and/or synapse loss, altered circadian rhythms, inflammation 
and vitamin D deficiency (for reviews see Hasler, 2010 and Jesulola et al., 
2018). It is important to note that most work investigating the 
neurobiological mechanisms of depression, particularly within animal 
research, has focused on antidepressant mechanisms (Rot et al., 2009), 
despite the fact that conventional antidepressants often supress (as 
opposed to cure) symptoms and are not effective for many people with 
depression (DeRubeis et al., 2005, 2008; Fava & Davidson, 1996).  
Cognitive theories of depression have also been proposed to play a key 
role in the development and maintenance of depression. Prominent 
psychological theories of depression include cognitive affective biases 
(CAB) and dysfunctional reward processing (Admon & Pizzagalli, 2015; 
Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Robinson et al., 2016). The CAB theory, based on 
earlier work by Aaron Beck (Beck, 1979), proposes that people with 
depression exhibit negative biases in their attention, memory and 
interpretation of ambiguous information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Dysfunctional reward processing is also gaining traction as a promising 
potential mechanism involved in the development of depression 
(Halahakoon et al., 2020; Nielson et al., 2020). Overall, whilst often 




mutually exclusive, instead they likely interact with each other in the 
development of depression.  
Nevertheless, these theories face several challenges. This includes the 
problem of inferring causality and the problem of heterogeneity. One 
challenge has been the difficulty in discerning whether factors are causal, 
correlates or consequences of depression (Nielson et al., 2020). To 
address this question, longitudinal data is required to examine depression 
over time. An additional challenge is the considerable heterogeneity 
present in depression (discussed in more detail in section 1.2.5). For 
example, whilst there is increasing support for the causal role of 
inflammation in depression (Osimo et al., 2020), only around 25-50% of 
patients with depression have elevated, or persistently low, levels of 
inflammation (Osimo et al., 2019). Therefore, whilst inflammation 
appears to play an important causal role in depression, this may only be 
the case for a sub-group of patients. 
1.2.5. Heterogeneity problem: moving away from 
traditional diagnostic criteria 
As just mentioned, a critical and widely recognised problem in the 
research and treatment of depression is its heterogeneity. The vast 
majority of depression research focuses on clinical diagnostic categories 
(DSM-5, ICD-11), posing questions such as “what are the biomarkers of 
depression” or “what treatments are effective for depression?” (Fried & 
Nesse, 2015). These questions are all based on the underlying notion that 
depression is a unitary homogeneous disorder (Fried & Nesse, 2015). 
However, people with the same diagnosis of depression can vary 
considerably in their aetiology, symptom profile, comorbidity (presence of 
co-occurring disorders) and treatment response (Treadway & Zald, 2011). 
For example, two people can have the same diagnosis of depression 
whilst only having one symptom in common (Treadway & Zald, 2011). 
This is not surprising considering that there are apparently 227 different 
ways in which a person could meet criteria for depression (Zimmerman et 




depression research have led many to reconsider the view that 
depression is a single condition:  
“To declare that all those satisfying the DSM criteria for the 
diagnosis of major depression are suffering from the same 
disorder seems like magical thinking… It may be politically 
important to utter such simplifications to doctors in general 
medical setting, but it is a convenient fiction (Goldberg, 2011)” 
Consequently, if depression is not a single unitary condition, research 
relying solely on diagnostic categories may obscure insights and hinder 
progress (Fried & Nesse, 2015). This is crucial because a biomarker or 
treatment, which may be relevant and effective for a sub-group of 
individuals, may be masked when examined in a large heterogeneous 
group. Unfortunately, despite awareness that depression is unlikely to be 
a single entity, it has been difficult for researchers to move away from 
using diagnostic categories for various reasons (e.g., required use in 
funding applications and the lack of a clear alternative approach; Clark et 
al., 2017).  
To address this limitation in research, the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) introduced the Research Domain Criteria project in 2009 
(RDoC; Insel et al., 2010). In brief, the RDoC proposes a new approach 
to classifying mental illnesses in research, encouraging researchers to 
move away from traditional diagnostic categories (DSM/ICD) to a 
dimensional approach focusing on psychological processes or symptoms 
(Clark et al., 2017; Cuthbert, 2014). As a starting point, it proposed five 
research domains of human functioning (positive valence, negative 
valence, cognitive systems, social processes, arousal systems; see 
Cuthbert 2014 for more details), which has since been expanded to six 
domains (sensorimotor systems being the additional domain). Using 
these six domains, it aims to integrate research across multiple levels of 
analysis (e.g., self-report, behaviour, physiology, neural circuits, cells, 
molecules and genes; Dillon et al., 2014). Focusing on symptoms or 




may aid the development of targeted treatments. This is because unlike 
diverse clinical groups, a psychological process (or symptom) is more 
likely to have a distinct behavioural and neurobiological basis that can be 
targeted by treatments (Thomsen et al., 2015). One crucial symptom, 
which is thought to be closely aligned with the positive valence domain 
and is often neglected by current treatments, is anhedonia (Cuthbert, 
2014; McMakin et al., 2012; Uher et al., 2012).  
1.3. Anhedonia 
1.3.1. What is anhedonia? 
The word anhedonia was created in 1896 by the French psychologist 
Théodule-Armand Ribot. It was defined as a “loss of pleasure”, deriving 
from the Greek words “an-” (without) and “hedone” (pleasure). Ribot 
invented this term to name a condition observed in psychiatric patients: 
“She…would play with her doll but could not be brought to show any 
delight in it; could not be drawn out of her apathetic sadness. Things 
which previously made her shriek with laughter now left her uninterested” 
(as reported in Snaith et al., 1995). Since then, psychologists have 
continued to use this term to refer to the symptom reported by patients 
with mental health conditions, particularly depression. 
However, it is now recognised that the original definition of anhedonia 
(loss of pleasure) may not accurately reflect this condition (Husain & 
Roiser, 2018). For example, it is rare for people to show a complete 
absence of pleasure (Snaith et al., 1995). Instead, most people with 
anhedonia show reduced pleasure but may still attain pleasure from a 
limited number of sources (Ho & Sommers, 2013; Meehl, 1990; Snaith et 
al., 1995). More importantly, it became apparent that a broader deficit 
may be present in these patients (Snaith et al., 1995). For example, 
people with anhedonia may experience deficits in consummatory pleasure 
(pleasure experienced in the present) and/or deficits in their anticipatory 




In the diagnostic manuals, the word “anhedonia” is not used but this 
condition is acknowledged as a symptom of many disorders including 
depression and schizophrenia. For example, it is a cardinal symptom of 
depression defined as a “markedly diminished interest or pleasure, in all, 
or almost all, activities most of the day nearly every day” (DSM-5; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This diagnostic definition also 
acknowledges that broader pleasure impairments may be experienced by 
depressed patients. Throughout this thesis, the word “anhedonia” refers 
to this broad self-reported condition (i.e., not the original definition 
restricted to the loss of pleasure).  
1.3.2. Reconceptualization of anhedonia 
The definition and concept of anhedonia is widely debated and still 
evolving within the research literature. In particular, progress in affective 
neuroscience has led to an expansion in the definition and 
conceptualisation of anhedonia. Two definitions which have been 
proposed within the field are those of Treadway & Zald (Treadway & Zald, 
2011) and Thomsen et al. (Thomsen et al., 2015; see Table 1.2). 
An important difference between these definitions is the precise pleasure 
components proposed to be dysfunctional in people who self-report 
anhedonia. For example, both suggest that anhedonia may involve 
motivational and/or consummatory deficits, but differ in their third deficit: 
a decisional impairment in the Treadway definition and learning 
impairment in the Thomsen definition. Arguably, addressing which 
components are relevant to anhedonia will require careful dissection of 
components (preferably using objective measures) linked to self-reported 
anhedonia assessments. In this respect, there is a promising literature 
developing objective measures of reward processing, see section 1.4.5.  
A similarity between these definitions is that they both acknowledge the 
heterogeneity within anhedonia (i.e., the presence of sub-groups; 
Thomsen et al., 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2011) when considering reward 




anhedonia is important and could have critical implications for treatment. 
Specifically, it suggests that whilst patients may appear similar at a self-
report symptomatic level, they may differ in their underlying impairments 
(e.g., some patients may experience impairments in motivation to obtain 
pleasure whilst others may experience deficits in consummatory 
pleasure)(Husain & Roiser, 2018). Whilst this is not necessarily a new 
idea (Klein, 1974), many studies to date have considered anhedonia to be 
a unitary construct. In my opinion, to address whether self-reported 
anhedonia is composed of distinct sub-groups, studies will need to 
demonstrate dissociations between different pleasure components in the 
same sample of people. For example, a similar approach has been taken 
in the field of memory: initially, memory was considered to be a single 
unitary system which was measured using a single task (learning and 
recalling a list of words or paragraphs of prose; Baddeley, 1984); 
however, this field has since demonstrated dissociations between 
different memory components (e.g., episodic versus semantic memory) 
by careful measurement of these components within the same sample of 
patients reporting memory deficits (Temple & Richardson, 2004; Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997). Following this example, I think that the definition 
of anhedonia and its conceptualisation will become clearer as we refine 
measurements of distinct components of pleasure within the same 
individuals.  
Table 1.2 Proposed definitions of anhedonia, modified from (Slaney et al., 2018) 
Dates Definition Author 
1896 Loss of pleasure Ribot 
1974 Consummatory vs anticipatory anhedonia Klein  
2013 “Markedly diminished interest or pleasure” DSM-5 
2011 Consummatory, motivational and decisional 
anhedonia 
Treadway & Zald  
2015 “Impairments in the ability to pursue, 
experience and/or learn about pleasure, which 
is often, but not always accessible to conscious 
awareness” 
Thomsen, Whybrow 





As a final remark, it is important to realise that the fractionation of the 
concept of anhedonia goes beyond the distinction between pleasure 
components impaired (e.g., consummatory versus anticipatory). 
Specifically, this fractionation includes the state-versus-trait dichotomy 
(fluctuating symptom or a stable trait), dimensional versus categorical 
debate (variable symptom within the normal population or an all-or-
nothing clinical condition), domains of pleasure impaired (domain-
specific: social versus physical) and its specificity to pleasure (deficit in 
pleasure or global flattening). For a recent review discussing this evolving 
conceptualisation, see (De Fruyt et al., 2020).  
To summarise, the definition and concept of anhedonia is evolving, 
particularly in the field of neuroscience. This has led to the proposal of 
new definitions of anhedonia based on advances in research. In this 
thesis, the working definition of anhedonia is: diminished self-reported 
pleasure, which may be driven by reduced appetitive motivation, 
consummatory experience and/or learning. Here, I focus on anhedonia as 
the subjective experience, the underlying cause of which may be due to 
objective changes in the reward system.  
1.3.3. Prevalence and importance 
Anhedonia is very common in depression. However, its estimated 
prevalence varies considerably depending on how it is measured (Husain 
& Roiser, 2018). For example, prevalence estimates of anhedonia within 
depression are much higher when a single question is used to assess the 
presence of anhedonia (~ 80 – 90%; Haarasilta et al., 2001; Zimmerman 
et al., 2015), compared to when anhedonia questionnaires are used (~ 
37% based on cut-offs indicating clinically significant levels of anhedonia; 
Pelizza & Ferrari, 2009). Anhedonia is also common in other conditions 
such as Schizophrenia (45%; Pelizza & Ferrari, 2009), Parkinson’s disease 
(46%; Lemke et al., 2005) and Alzheimer’s (61%; Lopez et al., 2003), as 




Although anhedonia is prevalent across many disorders, it is reported to 
be most severe in depression (Trøstheim et al., 2020). For example, a 
meta-analysis comparing severity of anhedonia (using an anhedonia 
questionnaire) across six disorders (major depression, bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia, substance use disorders, Parkinson’s disease and chronic 
pain) found that whilst anhedonia scores were higher in all disorders 
compared to healthy controls, anhedonia scores in major depression were 
considerably higher (Trøstheim et al., 2020). 
As well as being highly prevalent, anhedonia predicts poor response to 
antidepressants (McMakin et al., 2012; Uher et al., 2012). For example, 
in a sample of 811 adults with moderate-to-severe depression, anhedonia 
(measured as low interest, activity, enjoyment and indecisiveness) 
strongly predicted poor improvement from antidepressants on multiple 
depression questionnaires (Uher et al., 2012). Importantly, this prediction 
was independent of a person’s severity of depression, the type of 
antidepressant used and the outcome measure (Uher et al., 2012). 
Consequently, there is clearly a critical need for novel treatments 
targeting anhedonia.  
1.3.4. How is anhedonia measured: subjective measures 
Traditionally, anhedonia has been assessed using subjective measures 
such as questionnaires and clinical interviews. In many studies and in 
clinical practice, anhedonia is measured using a few questions on a 
depression scale (Beck Depression Inventory-II, Beck et al., 
1996)(Treadway & Zald, 2011). However, relying on a few questions to 
measure a construct such as anhedonia can lead to poor reliability. As a 
result, several anhedonia questionnaires have been developed. The most 
widely used anhedonia questionnaires are the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure 
Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995), Revised Chapman Physical Anhedonia 
Scale (CPAS; Chapman et al., 1976), Revised Chapman Social Anhedonia 
Scale (CSAS; Chapman et al., 1976) and the Fawcett-Clark Pleasure 




There are similarities across these scales but there are also some 
important differences. As these scales will be used as self-report 
measures of anhedonia in this thesis, I will discuss similarities and 
differences here (see Rizvi et al., 2016 for a detailed review). Broadly, 
key differences between measures include (1) the disorder it was 
validated to measure anhedonia in (depression or schizophrenia), (2) 
conceptualisation of anhedonia (state versus trait, physical versus social, 
consummatory versus anticipatory), (3) cultural considerations and (4) 
psychometric properties (as summarised in Rizvi, 2015; Rizvi et al., 
2016). 
Most anhedonia questionnaires were initially validated in depressed 
populations (FCPS, SHAPS). In contrast, the Chapman scales were 
developed for patients with schizophrenia (CPAS, CSAS). Since their initial 
development, these scales have also been validated in other populations 
(see Table 1.3). It is important to check the populations in which a scale 
has been validated in as a failure to do so may reduce the confidence in 
conclusions and result in measurement error (Dowrick et al., 2015).  
These questionnaires also diverge in their conceptualisation of anhedonia. 
First, they differ in whether they assess anhedonia as a state (a 
fluctuating symptom: SHAPS, FCPS) or trait (stable construct over time: 
CPAS; Rizvi, 2015; Rizvi et al., 2016). This is likely based on the different 
disorders in which these scales were initially developed (with depression 
often thought to be more episodic in nature). Nevertheless, it is likely 
that trait anhedonia is reflected at least to some degree in many state 
measures, as many state questionnaires (including the SHAPS) do not ask 
participants to compare their current state to a baseline level (Winer et 
al., 2019). A second consideration is the domain in which anhedonia is 
experienced (e.g., physical versus social; Rizvi et al., 2016; Winer et al., 
2019). The majority of anhedonia scales focus on physical anhedonia 
(FCPS, SHAPS, CPAS; i.e., deficits in experiencing pleasure from physical 
activities such as eating). In contrast, the CSAS was designed specifically 
to measure social anhedonia (i.e., deficits in experiencing pleasure from 




consummatory pleasure (FCPS, SHAPS; Leventhal et al., 2006; Rizvi et 
al., 2016). This is important as it is now widely recognised that anhedonia 
may not be specific to deficits in consummatory pleasure (Thomsen et al., 
2015; Treadway & Zald, 2011). Whilst some scales do include questions 
that ask about other pleasure deficits (e.g., motivation and anticipation of 
future pleasure), they often conflate these into a single summary score. 
The scales also vary in their cultural relevance (Leventhal et al., 2006; 
Rizvi et al., 2016). Unlike the FCPS and CPAS, the SHAPS is more 
generalisable across cultures (Leventhal et al., 2006; Rizvi et al., 2016). 
Specifically, the FCPS and CPAS reference pleasurable activities that are 
either culturally dependent and/or outdated, see Table 1.3 for examples. 
The outdated nature of the CPAS is not too surprising given that this 
questionnaire was created in the 1970s.  
In terms of validity, two factors are important: convergent and 
discriminant validity. Convergent validity is how well a measure correlates 
with other measures attempting to address the same construct. 
Discriminant validity ensures that a measure does not correlate too highly 
with other measures that address a different (but often related) construct 
(Rizvi et al., 2016). For example, anhedonia scales would ideally correlate 
with each other (at least to some degree), but would not correlate too 
highly with measures assessing anxiety, depression and apathy (Rizvi, 
2015). Broadly, across different studies, these scales have shown at least 
adequate convergent and discriminant validity (although see Leventhal et 
al., 2006; Treadway et al., 2009). However, discriminant validity from 
apathy measures is less clear as few studies have included both in the 
same population (Husain & Roiser, 2018). 
In sum, traditional self-report measures of anhedonia vary across many 
factors (Rizvi et al., 2016). Whilst they have all demonstrated adequate 
validity, they have been criticised for being outdated and focusing on 
consummatory pleasure (Rizvi et al., 2016). In an attempt to address 
these limitations, new scales have been developed such as the Temporal 




of two subscales designed to tease apart consummatory pleasure from 
anticipatory pleasure. Whilst promising, these scales have not yet been 
validated to the same degree as traditional questionnaires (Rizvi et al., 
2016). Moreover, it is not yet clear whether we can adequately tease 
apart these different pleasure components using self-report measures 



























Describe yourself as you have 
been during most of your adult 
life. 
Response: true or false 




“I always find organ music dull and 
unexciting” 
“I have usually found love making to 








Describe yourself as you have 
been during most of your adult 
life. 
Response: true or false 
Trait Both Social Good 40 
items 
“Just being with friends can make me 
feel really good” 
“Making new friends isn’t worth the 









How much you agree or disagree 
with each statement in the last few 
days. 
Response: 4-point scale (strongly 










“I would enjoy a cup of tea, coffee or 
my favourite drink” 
 
“I would enjoy my favourite television 











Rate imagined hedonic reactions to 
hypothetical pleasurable situations 
Response: 5-point scale  












“You are skiing down a mountain very 
fast while still in good control of 
yourself” 
“You sit watching a beautiful sunset in 











How true that statement is for you 
in general. 
Response: 6-point scale (very false 





Physical Good 18 
items 
“The smell of freshly cut grass is 
enjoyable to me” 
 





 1.3.5. Limitations of subjective measures 
Anhedonia questionnaires provide an important insight into a person’s 
subjective experience, which is crucial in mood disorders. However, there 
are limitations of over-relying on questionnaires to measure anhedonia, 
which I will now outline. 
Arguably, one of the biggest limitations of self-measures is their failure to 
provide a mechanistic understanding of a condition. Specifically, they 
cannot reveal the behavioural, cognitive, or neurobiological dysfunctions 
that underpin a condition. To make progress in the diagnosis and 
treatment of many conditions, including anhedonia, it is likely that we will 
need to look beyond the “surface manifestation” reported by patients 
(Husain & Roiser, 2018).  
Another limitation of anhedonia questionnaires is their reliance on patient 
insight (Chong et al., 2016) and conscious experience. Some of the 
impairments underpinning anhedonia may not be consciously accessible 
(see section 1.4.3; Berridge et al., 2009). Thus, whilst questionnaires 
may shed light on conscious impairments in anhedonia, they will not 
provide a full picture of the condition (Thomsen, 2015).  
A further limitation of these questionnaires is that they are likely 
confounded by a person’s memory of an event (i.e., recall bias; Solhan et 
al., 2009; Zald & Treadway, 2017). For example, Ecological Momentary 
Assessment (EMA) studies, which assess an individual’s experience in 
their natural environment, only moderately correlate with retrospective 
affective questionnaires (Solhan et al., 2009). This poor retrospective 
account questions a person’s ability to accurately remember their in-the-
moment experience of pleasure.  
Finally, questionnaires hinder our ability to conduct translational research, 
as they cannot be applied in animal studies (Aylward et al., 2019). In this 
thesis, translational research refers to the use of procedurally similar 
measures that can be applied across species (i.e., in both human and 
rodent studies). This is a big limitation, as research in rodents is critical 
for gaining insight into the neurobiology of anhedonia and in the 




rodent studies use objective behavioural tasks to measure anhedonia, 
human studies still rely on questionnaires (Emslie et al., 2002; Lavretsky 
et al., 2020; Trivedi et al., 2006). The difference in measurements across 
species may partly account for the failure to develop effective 
pharmacological drugs for psychiatric conditions (Aylward et al., 2019; 
Belzung, 2014). Thus, there is a need for measures that can be used in 
both preclinical and clinical research to bridge this gap.  
In sum, whilst questionnaires provide a valuable insight into a patient’s 
subjective experience, there are several limitations to over-relying on 
these measures. As a result, there is a need for objective measures that 
will complement the subjective measures currently used in clinical 
practice.  
1.3.6. The need for objective measures in anhedonia 
research 
Despite the clear importance of anhedonia, the psychological and 
neurobiological basis of this condition remains poorly understood (J. A. 
Cooper et al., 2018). This is, at least partly, due to the over-reliance on 
questionnaires to measure this symptom. In line with the RDoC (see 
section 1.2.5), there is a need for objective measures to be used 
alongside self-report measures (Husain & Roiser, 2018). Few studies have 
attempted to objectively characterize the precise impairments using 
laboratory-based measures (Pizzagalli et al., 2008). However, there has 
been an increased interest in this field, with reward processing deficits 
emerging as a promising mechanism underpinning anhedonia 
(Halahakoon et al., 2020). 
1.4. Reward Processing  
1.4.1. Definition of a reward  
Broadly, the term “reward” refers to an appetitive stimulus which has the 
potential to get us to approach it (Schultz, 2015). It is important to note 
that it is not the inherent properties of a stimulus that makes it 
rewarding, but rather our behavioural response to it (Schultz, 2015). 




static, and their ability to influence our behaviour can vary depending on 
our internal state and external environment (i.e., they are context 
dependent; Schultz, 2015). For example, you may seek out and gain 
pleasure from food when you are hungry, but this may not be the case 
after a finishing a three-course meal. Thus, whilst rewards have the 
capacity to drive behaviour and induce pleasure, their ability to do so 
depends on several internal and external factors (Schultz, 2015). 
1.4.2.  Types of reward   
A common but possibly crude distinction used within the literature is that 
of primary versus secondary rewards (Lawn, 2016; Rizvi et al., 2016; 
Sescousse et al., 2013; Wolke, 2018). Primary rewards are innate and 
critical for survival and procreation (e.g., food, water and sex), whereas 
secondary rewards are learnt through their association with primary 
rewards (e.g., money). Nevertheless, there are some rewards that do not 
neatly fit into these two categories such as music, art and social feedback 
(Lawn, 2016; Mas-Herrero et al., 2013; Thomsen, 2015).  
In human research, the majority of studies use monetary rewards due to 
it being universally valued and easily manipulated. Moreover, primary 
rewards (e.g., food), are arguably more variable between individuals 
(people have preferences for different types of food) and within 
individuals (dependent upon the physiological state of the individual), 
making them more challenging to use in human experiments. In contrast, 
preclinical studies use primary rewards in behavioural tasks such as food 
or liquids (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). It is unclear whether these 
different types of rewards are processed similarly in the brain (Sescousse 
et al., 2013). One meta-analysis reported that whilst primary and 
secondary rewards engage a common neural system, secondary rewards 
activate additional regions (Sescousse et al., 2013). Thus, the type of 
reward is an important consideration for behavioural studies, and in 
particular cross-species translational research which often use different 




1.4.3.  Reward processing: wanting, liking and learning 
Reward processing (i.e., our ability to recognise and engage with rewards 
in our environment) is vital for our survival, reproduction and well-being. 
Crucially, reward processing is not a unitary construct (Berridge et al., 
2009; Thomsen, 2015). Accumulating evidence suggests that it is 
composed of at least three different sub-components: motivation to 
obtain rewards (“wanting”), consumption of rewards ( “liking”) and 
learning what predicts reward (“learning”; Berridge et al., 2009). These 
components broadly map onto the three different stages of pleasure: 
appetitive, consummatory and remembering  (Thomsen et al., 2015). 
Preclinical studies have shown that these sub-components can be 
dissociated behaviourally, and that they have partially dissociable neural 
systems (Berridge et al., 2009). Importantly, it has been proposed that in 
humans these components have both a conscious component (which may 
be assessed using self-report measures) and an unconscious component 
(which may only be accessible using objective measures; Berridge et al., 
2009; Thomsen et al., 2015).  
The first evidence for a dissociation between reward components came 
from preclinical studies by Berridge and Robinson (Berridge & Robinson, 
1998). In their seminal rodent studies, they were able to demonstrate a 
dissociation between behavioural measures that assess “wanting” 
(measured as choice preference, consumption or operant effortful 
responses for food) and “liking” (measured as orofacial reactions to 
sucrose such as tongue protrusions; Berridge & Robinson, 1998). Using 
these different behavioural tasks, they demonstrated that whilst 
dopamine depletion did not alter “liking” of sucrose, it did reduce 
“wanting” of sucrose (Berridge et al., 1989), suggesting that dopamine 
plays a critical role in “wanting” but not “liking”. Subsequent work from 
lesion and electrode stimulation studies demonstrated that the neural 
systems mediating “wanting” are neurochemically and anatomically 
diverse, whereas “liking” is generated by “hedonic hotspots” which are 
anatomically small (e.g., embedded in the ventral pallidum, nucleus 
accumbens, orbitofrontal cortex and insula) and neurochemically 




Berridge & Kringelbach, 2015; Morales & Berridge, 2020 for reviews). 
Thus, whilst “wanting” depends heavily on dopamine, “liking” is more 
reliably linked to opioid and endocannabinoid pathways (Dillon et al., 
2014). This distinction has also been extended to distinguish “reward 
learning”, which is dissociable from “wanting” (see Berridge et al., 2009).  
Since then, researchers have further fractionated reward processing into 
smaller components (Husain & Roiser, 2018). For example, theoretically it 
has been divided into many sub-components, including but not limited to: 
anticipation, decision-making, motivation, sensitivity, learning and 
memory. The precise components are debated and unfortunately there 
has been a lack of consistent terminology within the literature (e.g., 
Husain & Roiser, 2018; Rizvi et al., 2016; Rzepa et al., 2017; Treadway & 
Zald, 2013). Nevertheless, research that attempts to dissociate different 
components of reward processing will help to refine this construct and 
subsequently aid terminology. Similar to preclinical work and research in 
other fields (such as memory), this effort will require studies to 
demonstrate dissociations between components (e.g., using a battery of 
behavioural tasks).  
1.4.4. Reward processing deficits in anhedonia  
Increasing evidence suggests that anhedonia is related to aberrant 
reward processing (Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Treadway et al., 2009). 
However, as discussed above, reward processing is not a unitary 
construct (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). Given the fractionation of reward 
processing, a pivotal question that arises is precisely what aspects of 
reward processing are altered in people with anhedonia. As these 
different components are suggested to differ neurochemically and 
neuroanatomically (Berridge et al., 2009), this could have important 
implications for treatment. For example, a patient with dysfunctional 
reward motivation may respond better to a dopaminergic drug than a 
patient with a deficit in the experience of reward (Thomsen, 2015; 
Treadway & Zald, 2011). To address this question, there is a need for 
behavioural measures in humans that dissociate different sub-




dissociating reward components (Berridge et al., 2009), translating 
behavioural tasks from animals to humans may be a promising approach. 
1.4.5.  Translational research  
Animal models are a key tool for investigating the biological mechanisms 
which underpin anhedonia (via direct brain manipulations to enable causal 
inference)(Robinson, 2016; Treadway & Zald, 2013). They are also used 
in the discovery and development of novel pharmacological treatments 
(Robinson, 2016). Unfortunately, despite a large investment from 
pharmaceutical companies, antidepressants that appear promising in 
preclinical trials have frequently failed to demonstrate efficacy in clinical 
trials (Belzung, 2014; Garner, 2014). There are many possible reasons 
for this unsuccessful drug development (Belzung, 2014; Garner, 2014). 
However, one important factor which has been proposed is the 
discrepancy in how depression and its symptoms are measured in 
preclinical and clinical research (Aylward et al., 2019; Badre et al., 2015; 
Garner, 2014). Whilst clinical studies rely on self-report measures, 
preclinical studies rely on behavioural outcomes. At present, most 
behavioural measures used in preclinical depression trials (forced swim 
test, tail suspension test) cannot be applied in humans (Porsolt et al., 
1977; Steru et al., 1985). However, studies have started to use 
behavioural measures that can be applied in both human and rodent 
research (Aylward et al., 2019; Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Treadway et al., 
2009).  
This is particularly the case in the field of reward processing, with tasks 
being designed that attempt to tap into different domains of reward-
related behaviour (Young & Markou, 2015). Examples of some promising 
translational paradigms are included in Table 1.4. It is important to note 
that there are several components of reward processing that do not yet 
have translational assays such as reward anticipation and memory 
(Robinson, 2018; Slaney et al., 2018; see Table 1.4). It is also worth 
highlighting that some of these assays, such as the Judgement Bias Task 
(Hales et al., 2016), have only very recently been developed into human 




already demonstrated promising cross-species findings in relation to 
depression (Aylward et al., 2019; Hales et al., 2014). Overall, this field is 
still in its primacy and demonstrating translational validity of these assays 
is a challenging and evolving process. Nevertheless, the development of 
objective measures that can be used in both human and rodent research 
opens up an exciting research avenue that may help bridge the gap 
between clinical and preclinical research (Aylward et al., 2019; Der-
Avakian & Pizzagalli, 2018; Pike et al., 2021).  
 
Table 1.4. Translational reward processing tasks and gaps in the literature 
(modified from Slaney et al., 2018) 
Reward component Human Task Rodent Task 
Motivation Progressive Ratio 
EEfRT 
Progressive Ratio 
Effort-based choice tasks 
Sensitivity Sweet Taste Test  Sucrose Preference Test 
Learning 
 
Probabilistic (RBPRT, PSST, PRLT) 
Pavlovian conditioning 
Probabilistic (RBPRT, PSST, PRLT) 
Pavlovian conditioning 
Anticipation N/A Successive contrast tasks 
Memory N/A Reward Learning Assay 
Affective Bias Test 
Decision-making EEfRT 
Judgement bias task 
Effort-based choice task 
Judgement bias task 
 
 
Relevant to this thesis, I will now discuss the behavioural evidence for 
reward processing deficits in people with anhedonia using translational 
tasks, focussing on the three main components of reward: reward 
motivation, reward sensitivity and reward learning. To ensure clarity, I 
have provided a definition of each component in Table 1.5. Due to the 
limited number of studies that measure anhedonia and its severity (using 
Abbreviations: EEfRT, Effort-Expenditure for Rewards Task; RBPRT, Response Bias Probabilistic Reward Task; PSST, 




anhedonia questionnaires; Thomsen et al., 2015), I will include evidence 
from clinical disorders in which anhedonia is prevalent, focusing on 
depression. It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive review. 
Instead, I will discuss human tasks that have, or have the potential to be, 
translated across species (see Halahakoon et al., 2020 and Thomsen, 
2015 for reviews). I will then discuss gaps in the current literature, before 
outlining the aims of this thesis. 
 
Table 1.5. Glossary 
 
1.4.5.1. Reward motivation 
Reward motivation can be defined as the “incentive or desire to act or 
accomplish goals” (Der-Avakian et al., 2016). In behavioural studies, this 
is often operationalised as willingness to exert effort for reward (Chong et 
al., 2016). Based on preclinical rodent tasks, human reward motivation 
tasks have recently been developed that measure (1) effort-related 
choice (i.e., decision-making) or (2) effort-expended for reward (Hodos, 
1961; Salamone et al., 2018). In humans, the three most commonly used 
behavioural tasks are the Effort Expenditure for Reward Task (EEfRT; 
Treadway et al., 2009), the Progressive Ratio Task (PRT; Strauss et al., 
2016) and the Handgrip task (Cléry-Melin et al., 2011).  
The most commonly used reward motivation task in humans is the EEfRT 
(Treadway et al., 2009). This is an effort-based decision-making task, 
based on a procedurally similar rodent task (Salamone et al., 2018). In 
the EEfRT, participants must choose between a high effort/high reward 
option (100 button presses within 21 seconds for $1.24 to $4.30) and a 
Reward component Definition 
Reward motivation “Incentive or desire to act, or accomplish 
goals” 
Reward sensitivity Consummatory experience of reward  
Reward learning  Ability to learn and remember stimulus-
response and action-response associations in 




low effort/low reward option (30 button presses within 7 seconds for $1; 
Treadway et al., 2009). Trials also contain a visible probability cue which 
indicates the probability of the trial being a “win” trial: 12%, 50%, 88%. 
Participants are informed that two “win” trials will be paid to them at the 
end of the task. In this task, motivation is operationalised as choice 
preference, with an increased bias towards the high-effort option 
indicating increased reward motivation. Initial validation of this task 
demonstrated that acute administration of amphetamine increased bias 
towards the high-effort option in both humans and rats, providing some 
translational validity (Bardgett et al., 2009; Soder et al., 2020; Wardle et 
al., 2011).  
People with depression and schizophrenia also show a reduced bias 
towards the high-effort option compared to healthy controls (Tran et al., 
2020; Treadway et al., 2012; Wang & Gorenstein, 2013). Specifically, 
they were less likely to use information provided about the reward (such 
as the magnitude and probability of receiving the reward) to inform their 
choices (Yang et al., 2014). Importantly, in healthy volunteers, self-
reported trait anhedonia was associated with reduced choice for the high-
effort option (Treadway et al., 2009). These data have been used to 
support the claim that anhedonia is related to impairments in reward 
motivation. Nevertheless, there are potential confounds of this task that 
should also be ruled out such as delay and probability discounting (Chong 
et al., 2016). This means that individuals may show a reduced preference 
for the high-effort option not because they are less willing to exert effort 
for it, but rather because it takes longer to complete or has a lower 
probability of success. Furthermore, this task requires complex decision-
making, which may be less appropriate for psychiatric populations who 
may have impaired information processing (i.e., tapping into cognitive 
ability rather than reward motivation; Chong et al., 2016).  
Another reward motivation task, based on the gold-standard task used to 
measure reward motivation in rodents, is the PRT (Hodos, 1961). In this 
task, participants must perform exponentially more operant responses 
(e.g., button presses) to obtain the same amount of reward over 




participant will exert for a reward (referred to as their “breakpoint”) is 
used as a measure of their motivation. This breakpoint is interpreted as 
the point at which the participant no longer perceives a given reward to 
be “worth the effort”. In healthy controls, people display a higher 
breakpoint for higher value rewards, providing initial validation for this 
task as a measure of reward motivation (Roane et al., 2001).  
Previous studies have shown that people with depression and bipolar 
disorder have a decreased breakpoint for monetary rewards compared to 
healthy controls, suggesting impairments in reward motivation 
(Hershenberg et al., 2016). In people with schizophrenia, a lower 
breakpoint was also associated with higher levels of avolition and 
anhedonia on a negative symptom scale (Strauss et al., 2016). Despite 
studies in clinical populations showing reduced reward motivation on this 
task (Hershenberg et al., 2016), some animal models of depression which 
attempt to induce depressive-like states (maternal separation and chronic 
mild stress) have failed to find a similar reduction in breakpoint (Barr & 
Phillips, 1998; Shalev & Kafkafi, 2002; although see Olausson et al., 
2013) questioning the translational validity of this task. It is important to 
note that unlike the rodent version, most of the human versions of this 
task require an additional explicit choice (accept or reject a trial) to be 
made prior to initiating the trial, which may contribute to the discrepancy 
observed across species. Moreover, the PRT fails to account for some 
important potential confounds such as delay intolerance and motor 
impairments. This means that a decreased breakpoint may not reflect a 
reduced willingness to exert effort for reward but rather intolerance to 
wait for reward or poorer motor ability; Chong et al., 2016).  
Another task used to measure reward motivation is the handgrip task 
(Cléry-Melin et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2008). Unlike previous tasks, it 
does not have a procedurally similar rodent task. However, as it has a 
clear behavioural output and has the potential for translation, it is 
discussed here. In this task, participants are asked to squeeze on a 
handheld dynamometer in response to different reward magnitudes (1 
cent, 10 cents or 1 euro). Participants are informed that the stake that 




trial. Reward motivation is measured as an individual’s physical force 
exerted on the handgrip. To my knowledge, no studies have examined 
anhedonia in relation to performance on this task and only one study has 
examined depression. Unlike healthy controls, people with depression did 
not exert more effort for the high compared to low reward trials (Cléry-
Melin et al., 2011). This supports the claim that people with depression 
have reduced reward motivation. Unlike the EEfRT, this task is less 
complex and therefore may better account for potential confounds such 
as impaired information processing. However, this study included a 
hospitalised inpatient population with severe depression. Consequently, it 
is unclear whether this deficit is specifically related to the symptom of 
anhedonia or instead reflects other symptoms or a global dysfunction. It 
is important to note that the majority of studies that have continued to 
use this apparatus have adapted the task to measure decision-making 
(e.g., alternative choice, accept vs reject trials).  
Although not based on rodent tasks, there are two other studies worth 
mentioning that have examined reward motivation and anhedonia. 
Sherdell et al. (2012) found that increased anticipatory anhedonia (items 
on a depression scale) predicted decreased motivation to view humorous 
cartoons on an effort-based choice task. Also, using a button pressing 
task in depressed adolescents, Rzepa & McCabe (2019) found that higher 
anticipatory anhedonia (TEPS – anticipatory scale) was associated with a 
decreased number of button presses to receive chocolate (although see 
Rzepa et al., 2017; Rzepa & McCabe, 2019). Given that there are 
important differences in reward processing in adolescence, it would be 
important to try to replicate this finding in adults (Galvan, 2010; 
Halahakoon et al., 2020). Together, these two findings support the theory 
that anhedonia is related to reduced motivation. 
In summary, few studies to date have objectively measured reward 
motivation impairments in relation to anhedonia (Pessiglione et al., 
2018). Instead, most studies have examined clinical diagnostic groups 
such as depression. Moreover, the majority of studies have focused on 




absolute physical effort-expenditure for reward sparse (see Halahakoon et 
al., 2020 for a recent review mentioning this). 
1.4.5.2. Reward sensitivity 
Reward sensitivity is defined as the consummatory experience of reward. 
Attempts to translate reward sensitivity tasks from rodents to humans 
have proven difficult (Thomsen, 2015). Nevertheless, some attempts 
have been made such as the sweet taste test. 
The sweet taste test is based on the gold-standard measure of reward 
sensitivity in rodents, the Sucrose Preference Test (Willner et al., 1987). 
This task measures an animals ability to detect, and demonstrate a 
preference for, a weak sucrose solution over water (Willner et al., 1987). 
Although different variations have been used in humans, they typically 
require participants to report the intensity and pleasantness of different 
sucrose concentrations. The measurement of both intensity and 
pleasantness is in line with the rodent task, whereby a reduced sucrose 
preference could be due to either a decreased ability to detect sucrose 
(i.e., altered intensity) and/or decreased experience of pleasure from 
sucrose (i.e., altered pleasantness).  
People with depression have often displayed similar pleasantness ratings 
of sucrose compared to healthy controls (Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin 
et al., 1998; Dichter et al., 2010). However, in one study in healthy 
volunteers, self-reported anhedonia was associated with reduced liking of 
a high concentration of sucrose (Bedwell et al., 2019). Taken together, it 
is unclear whether anhedonia is related to reduced liking on a sweet taste 
test. There has also been discrepancy between studies measuring sucrose 
intensity. Compared to healthy controls, some studies have reported 
poorer detection of sucrose in people with depression (Amsterdam et al., 
1987; Berlin et al., 1998), whilst others have reported no clear difference 
between groups (Dichter et al., 2010). Similarly, Bedwell et al. (2019) 
reported that sucrose sensitivity did not correlate with anhedonia. There 
are several factors which could account for these conflicting findings. One 




measure intensity and pleasantness, may not be sensitive enough to 
reliably detect impairments (McCabe, 2018).  
Although not based on rodent tasks, it is of relevance to note that human 
paradigms used to measure hedonic capacity have also found conflicting 
findings in depressed participants (Allen et al., 1999; Berenbaum & 
Oltmanns, 1992; Dunn et al., 2004; Renneberg et al., 2005; Sloan et al., 
2001; Treadway & Zald, 2011; Trémeau et al., 2005). These studies 
typically asked participants to rate their experience (pleasantness, 
emotional response or arousal) of positively valanced stimuli such as 
faces/films or examined physical responses (facial expressions, heart 
rate) to positively valanced stimuli. Additionally, McCabe and colleagues 
reported that adolescents with symptoms of depression (Rzepa et al., 
2017) displayed blunted neural responses whilst tasting chocolate, 
despite not differing on self-report measures (liking and intensity of 
chocolate after tasting it). This is important as it could further support the 
possibility that point scales have inadequate sensitivity to detect 
differences (McCabe, 2018). 
In summary, there is some evidence for reward sensitivity impairments in 
people with depression (Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin et al., 1998), 
although this finding is not always replicated (Dichter et al., 2010). One 
reason for this discrepancy may be their over-reliance on point scales and 
the failure to assess anhedonia and its severity. To date, there has been 
difficulty measuring reward sensitivity in humans using translational 
tasks. 
1.4.5.3. Reward learning and memory 
In this thesis, reward learning and memory refers to the ability to learn 
and remember stimulus-response and/or action-response associations in 
an attempt to maximise future rewards. Three translational reward 
learning tasks are the Response Bias Probabilistic Reward Task (RBPRT; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2005) the Probabilistic Stimulus Selection Task (PSST; 





The Response Bias Probabilistic Reward Task (RBPRT) was developed to 
measure an individual’s tendency to adjust their behaviour in order to 
maximize future reward (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Unlike most of the tasks 
mentioned so far, this task was initially developed in humans and then 
translated to rodents (Der-Avakian et al., 2013; Kangas et al., 2020) and 
more recently marmosets (Wooldridge et al., 2020) using procedurally 
similar paradigms. In the human version, participants are asked to report 
the length (short or long) of an ambiguous, briefly presented, mouth (100 
ms) on a schematic face. Unknown to the participant, there is an 
asymmetric reinforcement ratio (3:1): correctly choosing one mouth 
length (“rich stimulus”) has a higher probability of reward feedback (3 
times more) than correctly choosing the other mouth length (“lean 
stimulus”) (Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Whitton, Reinen, et al., 2020). The 
outcome on this task is response bias (i.e., bias towards choosing the 
mouth most frequently associated with reward feedback, regardless of 
accuracy). Healthy volunteers developed a bias towards choosing the 
“rich” stimulus which was associated with a higher probability of reward 
(Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Pharmacological manipulations in human and 
rodent studies have demonstrated similar response biases (nicotine 
withdrawal resulted in reduced bias), providing some translational validity 
(Barr et al., 2008; Der-Avakian et al., 2013; Pergadia et al., 2014). 
People with depression and bipolar disorder show a reduced response bias 
compared to healthy controls on the RBPRT (Pizzagalli et al., 2008; Vrieze 
et al., 2013), indicating reduced responsiveness to reward feedback in 
these patients. Moreover, the reduced bias in depressed patients persists 
following the remission of symptoms (Petchell, 2013), suggesting it could 
be an underlying endophenotype. Importantly, the reduced bias in 
depressed patients was particularly pronounced in those with higher trait 
anhedonia, which may suggest that this deficit is particularly related to 
anhedonia (Pizzagalli et al., 2008). Whilst this task is promising, it is 
difficult to discern whether a reduced bias on the task reflects 
impairments in reward learning and/or hedonic response (Huys et al., 




cannot learn about the cue-reward association, or because they are not 
sensitive to the reward feedback. 
Another task which measures reward learning is the PSST (Frank et al., 
2004), which also has a similar rodent version (Trecker et al., 2012). In 
the human task, participants must choose between one of two letters 
presented in pairs (A+B, C+D, E+F). In each pair, one of the letters has a 
higher probability of receiving a correct response. For example, the 
probability ratios are: A+B (80:20), C+D (70:30), E+F (60:40). 
Therefore, participants should learn to choose the letters A, C and E more 
often than B, D and F. In the test phase, participants are presented with 
novel combinations of pairs, all of which include the letter A (high 
probability of reward) or B (high probability of no reward). In the test 
phase, no feedback is provided. Reward learning is operationalised as 
bias towards the letter A (punishment learning is also measured as bias 
away from B). Healthy volunteers have demonstrated learning from 
reward and punishment on this task (Frank et al., 2004). People with 
depression, Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia show impairments in 
reward learning on this task, when compared to healthy controls (Chase 
et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2004; Waltz et al., 2007). However, it is 
important to consider the limitations of this task. One important limitation 
of this task is its complexity. For example, follow-up studies have failed to 
show adequate learning during training on this task and have failed to 
replicate the finding in Parkinson’s disease (Grogan et al., 2017).  
The Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task (Cools et al., 2002) also 
measures learning and sensitivity to positive and negative feedback. The 
rodent version of this task is procedurally similar (Bari et al., 2010). In 
the human version, participants are presented with a pair of abstract 
stimuli that have different reward contingencies. For example, one 
stimulus has a high probability of positive feedback (80% green smiley 
face) and a low probability of negative feedback (20% red sad face), 
whereas the other stimulus has the opposite contingencies (80% 
negative, 20% positive). Therefore, participants must learn which 
stimulus is associated with a higher probability of positive feedback. 




reverse, which means that the image that was previously associated with 
a higher probability of positive feedback is now associated with a higher 
probability of negative feedback (and vice versa). Outcomes of interest 
include reversal learning and sensitivity to positive (“win-stay”) and 
negative feedback (“lose-shift”). People with depression show 
impairments on this task, although the precise deficits (reversal learning, 
hyposensitivity to reward, hypersensitivity to punishment) varies across 
studies (Dombrovski et al., 2010; Mukherjee et al., 2020; Murphy et al., 
2003; Robinson et al., 2012; Tavares et al., 2008), although see 
(Brolsma et al., 2020).  
In summary, there is some evidence that people with depression show 
impairments in reward learning. The evidence for reward learning deficits 
being specific to the symptom of anhedonia is sparse. To date, these 
tasks have all focused on learning within a single test session (i.e., over a 
short period of time: ~ 20 minutes; Wimmer et al., 2018). There are few 
behavioural tasks available that measure reward learning and memory 
over multiple days. This is a missing gap in the literature: in animal 
studies and in our everyday life we often learn and consolidate 
information over longer time periods (Wimmer et al., 2018).  
1.5. Gaps in the Literature 
Despite progress in the field of anhedonia and reward processing, there 
are several gaps in the current literature that need to be addressed.  
First, there are few reward processing tasks that measure specific sub-
components of reward in humans (motivation, sensitivity or learning; 
Keren et al., 2018; Thomsen, 2015). If we are to gain a clearer 
understanding of the taxonomy of reward processing and its dysfunction 
in anhedonia, we need to have behavioural tasks that assess different 
components (Husain & Roiser, 2018).  
Second, most studies investigating anhedonia compare people with 
depression to healthy controls (McCabe, 2018). This is surprising, as only 
37% people with depression exhibit significant levels of anhedonia 
(Pelizza & Ferrari, 2009). Thus, comparing people with depression to 




There is a need for studies to directly measure anhedonia and its severity 
using anhedonia questionnaires (Der-Avakian & Markou, 2012; McCabe, 
2018). This may help to address whether reward dysfunctions are specific 
to anhedonia or related to other symptoms of depression (Nielson et al., 
2020).  
Finally, few studies have assessed several reward components using a 
battery of tasks in the same sample. Instead, most studies have 
examined anhedonia and reward processing using a single anhedonia 
questionnaire and/or single task, respectively. This may have led to 
incomplete conclusions (Nielson et al., 2020). For example, it is unclear 
whether anhedonia reflects a generalised reward deficit (individuals with 
poorer reward sensitivity also have poorer reward motivation) or specific 
deficits (there are sub-groups of anhedonia patients with different 
impairments). Employing a battery of tasks (ideally tasks with rodent 
analogues to facilitate translation) and self-report measures will enable us 
to investigate dissociations between reward processes and therefore 
provide a more holistic understanding of anhedonia (Husain & Roiser, 
2018; Nielson et al., 2020). In the following, I will describe the aims of 
this thesis, and link them to the gaps in the literature. 
1.6. Aims of this thesis 
Chapter 2: Provide proof-of-concept for a novel reward motivation 
task which measures physical effort-expenditure for reward in a 
non-clinical population.  
The most commonly used human reward motivation tasks measure effort-
based decision-making (i.e., choice), predominantly using the EEfRT. As 
this may be distinct from effort-expenditure for reward (i.e., action; 
Lockwood et al., 2017), there is a need for behavioural tasks that 
measure this aspect of reward motivation in humans (Halahakoon et al., 
2020; Strauss et al., 2016). This is necessary for future studies aiming to 
delineate the precise motivational deficits related to anhedonia. 
Chapter 3: Examine different components of reward processing 




behavioural tasks in a non-clinical population with high versus 
low anhedonia.  
To date, most studies have examined only one sub-component of reward 
(e.g., motivation) using a single task. Using a battery of behavioural 
tasks designed to probe different reward components (e.g., motivation, 
sensitivity) is necessary to demonstrate that these sub-domains can be 
dissociated in people, and to understand whether anhedonia is related to 
a general reward deficit or specific to certain reward components (Husain 
& Roiser, 2018; Nielson et al., 2020). Whilst anhedonia is a clinical 
symptom, it can be observed to varying degrees in the typical population 
(Franken et al., 2007). The advantage of examining anhedonia in non-
clinical populations is that they are less likely to experience comorbidity, 
take psychiatric medications and experience cognitive deficits; all of 
which can confound the interpretation of clinical data (Harvey et al., 
2007).  
Chapter 4: Develop a translational reward learning and memory 
task in humans based on a procedurally similar rodent task.  
To date, few translational tasks are available that assess distinct 
components of reward -- especially in relation to reward memory. Here, I 
focus on developing a novel computerised human task based on a rodent 
task: the reward learning assay (RLA; Robinson, 2018), which has shown 
important deficits in putative rodent models of depression (Robinson, 
2018; Stuart et al., 2019). Unlike most of the human tasks available in 
the literature (Wimmer et al., 2018), this task measures reward learning 
and memory over 5 days, analogous to the rodent task. 
Chapter 5: Examine the three main components of reward 
processing (reward sensitivity, reward motivation and reward 
learning and memory) using a battery of tasks in the same 
population of people who meet criteria for depression. 
This study was designed to address the three main components of reward 
processing in people experiencing depression using a battery of 
translational behavioural tasks and anhedonia questionnaires. Whilst the 




versus healthy controls, secondary analyses were planned to examine 
whether anhedonia could be a moderating or mediating factor. This 
extends the findings from Chapter 3, by examining a population with 
clinical levels of anhedonia. Due to COVID-19, this study had to be 
stopped and data collection to the pre-registered sample size was not 
possible. However, here I present the data collected so far as a 
preliminary data set. 
Thus, in relation to the gaps in the literature stated above, Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4 contribute to the first gap in the literature (lack of behavioural 
tasks measuring distinct components of reward) by developing a reward 
motivation task (Chapter 2) and a reward learning and memory task 
(Chapter 4) in humans. Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 address the second 
(lack of studies directly assessing anhedonia and its severity using 
anhedonia questionnaires) and third gaps (lack of studies employing a 
battery of tasks and self-report measures in the same population) in the 
literature by employing a battery of behavioural tasks and anhedonia 
measures in the same population of people with either higher levels of 
anhedonia in a non-clinical population (Chapter 3) or a depressed 





 Chapter 2: Joystick-Operated 
Reward Runway Task (proof-of-
concept) 
 
Chapter Aim: Provide proof-of-concept for a novel reward motivation 
task that measures physical effort expenditure for reward: the Joystick-
Operated Reward Runway Task (JORT). 
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Self-reported deficits in motivation are common in many psychiatric and 
neurological disorders and are associated with a diminished quality of life 
(Benito-León et al., 2012; Husain & Roiser, 2018). Currently available 
treatments fail to effectively address this debilitating symptom (Strauss 
et al., 2014). In line with the RDoC, there is a need for behavioural 
paradigms that objectively measure motivation in humans (Horan et al., 
2015; Treadway et al., 2009). This may provide a better understanding of 
the precise mechanisms underlying self-reported symptoms (e.g., 
symptoms of apathy, anergia, fatigue), allow us to dissociate reward 
motivation deficits from other reward deficits and enable us to more 
appropriately target treatments (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Husain & 
Roiser, 2018).  
2.1.1. Subjective measures of motivation 
In clinical practice, motivation is typically assessed using self-report 
questionnaires and clinical interviews (Husain & Roiser, 2018). This 
includes scales such as the BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), Lille Apathy 
Rating Scale (Sockeel et al., 2006), Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES; Marin 
et al., 1991) and the Apathy Scale (Starkstein et al., 1992). Clinically, 
these scales are useful as they help clinicians to identify that a patient is 
experiencing problems in motivation (Pessiglione et al., 2018). However, 
as mentioned in section 1.3.5, there are limitations of over-relying on 
questionnaires. First, they require patient insight which may be 
compromised in some patients (Pessiglione et al., 2018). Secondly, they 
are usually validated in either patient populations or healthy controls, not 
both (Chong et al., 2016; Weiser & Garibaldi, 2015). Thirdly, they do not 
provide a mechanistic understanding of the underlying deficit (Husain & 
Roiser, 2018). Finally, they may lack the sensitivity to detect slight 
motivational impairments (Chong et al., 2016). To address these 
limitations, one approach is to employ objective measures of motivation 




2.1.2. Objective measures of motivation  
There is a vast preclinical animal literature examining motivation using 
objective behavioural tasks (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Salamone et al., 
2018). In these studies, motivation is operationalised as the willingness 
to overcome costs (usually physical effort) to obtain a reward (food 
pellets; Chong et al., 2016). These behavioural tasks can broadly be 
divided into those that measure effort-based choice (Salamone et al., 
1994), or more commonly, by measuring the amount of physical effort 
exerted for a reward (e.g., progressive ratio task; Hodos, 1961; 
Pessiglione et al., 2018), see Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1 Reward motivation tasks commonly used in rodents: effort-based 
choice task and progressive ratio (amount of effort exerted for reward) 
 
Recently, there have been attempts to develop similar behavioural tasks 
in humans (as discussed in section 1.4.5.1; see Chong et al., 2016; 
Pessiglione et al., 2018 for reviews). However, there are gaps in the 
current human literature: (1) there are very few standardised motivation 
tasks, as highlighted in the RDoC (NIMH, 2016) and (2) most tasks have 
focused on measuring effort-based choice (i.e. decision-making; EEfRT), 
with few tasks measuring physical effort exerted for reward (Chong et al., 




based decision-making tasks have provided useful insights into choice 
behaviour (Treadway et al., 2009), it is important to also develop tasks 
based purely on physical effort for reward as it is often the only 
dependent outcome in many preclinical operant reward motivation tasks 
(Beierholm et al., 2013) and it is less likely to be confounded by cognitive 
ability or cognitive effort (see Cooper et al., 2018).  
2.1.3. Study Aim 
To address this gap, the aim of this study was to provide proof-of-concept 
for a novel reward motivation task: the Joystick-Operated Reward 
Runway Task (JORT). The JORT was originally developed as an objective 
measure of fear and anxiety based on a rodent runway task (see Perkins 
et al., 2009). Here, we modified the JORT to measure a person’s physical 
effort-expenditure for reward. In this task, participants must push on a 
force-sensing joystick (PS-JS1, Psyal, London, UK) to chase and catch an 
onscreen target. Trials vary in the amount of reward on offer (points: 0, 
10, 100, 1,000) and effort required to win (50, 80, 100, 120% of a 
person’s maximum calibrated force). Additionally, participants completed 
self-report measures to assess motivation (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 
1994), depression symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory-II; Beck et al., 
1996) and anhedonia symptoms (Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale 
Revised; Chapman et al., 1976). Based on previous literature (see section 
1.4.5.1), we predicted that participants will exert more physical force for 
higher, compared to lower, reward trials.  
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-five participants took part in this study. Eligibility criteria were 
aged ≥ 18 years, fluent in English, good mental, and physical health with 
no current or previous diagnosis of a psychiatric illness (self-reported). 
Participants were recruited via internal posters within the University of 
Bristol. All participants were reimbursed £10 for their time and were 





Ethics approval was obtained from the Faculty of Biomedical Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol. All participants 
provided written informed consent. 
For this proof-of-concept study, a target sample size of 20 participants 
was chosen based on our previous experience with this type of task and a 
power calculation (G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007) indicating that 19 
participants provided sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium-to-large 
effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.28; ANOVA: Repeated measures, within 
factors). However, due to some participants meeting an a priori exclusion 
criteria for this study (achieving trials designed to be impossible; see 
section 2.3.2), the sample size was increased to 25 participants during 
recruitment to account for this (prior to data analysis). Given that the 
purpose of developing this task was for later use in a clinical study, we 
were interested in detecting a medium-to-large effect size in a non-
clinical population to ensure a reasonable comparison baseline to which 
the clinical populations would be compared. Target sample size was 20 
participants; achieved sample size for the primary outcome (average 
force) was 18 participants. 
2.2.2. Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task (JORT) 
The JORT measures a person’s willingness to exert physical effort to 
achieve a goal (Perkins et al., 2009; PH-JS1, Psyal, London). On each 
trial in this reward version, there is a cursor (representing the participant) 
located along a runway and a cue in the top left-hand corner of the 
screen which indicates the number of points on offer: 0, 10, 100 or 1,000 
points, see Figure 2.2. There is also a cue indicating the cumulative total 
number of points won in the top right-hand corner of the screen. This is 
followed by the presentation of a target (black dot), located ahead of the 
participant, which accelerates away from the participant along a straight 
forward trajectory (i.e., the runway) until it leaves the screen (if not 
caught up with). To win the points on offer, the participant is required to 
push the joystick to chase and catch up with the target. The force applied 
on the joystick determines the speed at which the participants cursor 




of points on offer (0, 10, 100 and 1,000 points; visible to the participant) 
and the minimum effort required to win (50, 80, 100 or 120% of their 
maximum calibrated force; not visible to the participant). If the 
participant catches the target, they receive feedback that they have won 
the number of points on offer. If they fail to catch the target, they do not 
receive any feedback. Trials end either upon catching the target or after 7 
seconds. The inter-trial interval varies pseudo-randomly between 3 and 7 
seconds. After each trial, the next trial automatically starts. Force applied 



















Figure 2.2 An example trial on the Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task (JORT) The green dot (representing the participant) is 
initially displayed with a cue indicating the number of points on offer. This is followed by the presentation of the target (a black dot). 




Participants completed 2 blocks of 48 trials (96 total). Each block 
consisted of an equal number of reward-effort combinations (N = 3), 
except for one combination where only 2 trials were presented due to 
experimenter error (0 points - 80% effort in second block). There was a 
short break in between each block. All participants completed the same 
pre-randomised order of trials.  The order of the trials was fixed across 
participants for practical reasons. The task is currently programmed using 
a script which indicates the start time, end time and effort required on 
each trial individually. Using this current version, running the task without 
a fixed order of trials would require creating multiple scripts for each 
participant.  
Prior to the task, participants were given standardised verbal instructions, 
completed a calibration phase followed by four practice trials. In the 
calibration phase, participants are asked to push the joystick as hard as 
they can five times whenever the word “GO” is presented on the screen 
(Perkins et al., 2009). The apparatus measures 0 – 500 newtons of force 
exerted on the joystick (Perkins et al., 2009). A participant’s maximum 
calibrated force is determined by their peak force reached during the 
calibration phase. This is used to standardise the amount of effort 
required across participants. In the practice trials, participants encounter 
each reward and effort level to familiarise themselves with the task. 
Participants were informed that the total number of points won during 
one of the two blocks (chosen randomly) directly corresponded to the 
amount of money they would win (i.e., performance-based pay of up to 
£5).  
Payment is based on performance on the task. Specifically, it was 
calculated as the number of points won on a block (chosen at random) 
multiplied by 0.0005005 (rounded to the nearest integer). This divided 
the maximum reward on offer (£5) by the maximum number of 
obtainable points (9990 points) such that the amount won was 
proportional to performance. If participants achieved over 9990 points, 




The task is programmed in C++ by Psyal (http://www.psyal.com/) and 
includes modifiable parameters. In this version, the following parameters 
were used: acceleration of the target dot (pixels per frame) is 0.03 and 
maximum speed (pixels per frame) is 10.  These parameters were chosen 
following piloting to ensure that the 50% effort trials were always 
obtainable, and the 120% effort trials were not obtainable. Effort trials 
refer to the minimum amount of effort required to catch up with the 
target dot. For example, 50% effort scales the target dot to 50% of the 
participants maximum force and therefore their velocity in the task.  
The primary outcome of interest was relative average force. Secondary 
outcome variables were maximum force and reaction time. For relative 
average force and maximum force, mean force was divided by a 
participant’s personal maximum force to standardise performance. Trials 
where no force was exerted were included as 0 in the average force and 
maximum force; and were excluded from the mean reaction time 
calculations. Reaction time on a given trial is the difference between the 
time at which force was exerted (> 2 N) and stimulus onset (when the 
target appeared).  
2.2.3. Self-report questionnaires 
Behavioural Inhibition System and Behavioural Activation System Scales 
(BIS/BAS) 
The BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994) was used to measure the two 
motivational systems: motivation to avoid aversive outcomes and 
motivation to pursue appetitive outcomes, respectively (Carver & White, 
1994). This questionnaire asks participants to report whether they agree 
or disagree with statements using a 4-point scale which ranges from 1 
(very true for me) to 4 (very false for me). The scale has four subscales. 
One subscale measures the BIS (7-items). The other subscales measure 
different aspects of the BAS: reward responsiveness, drive, and fun 
seeking. A higher score indicates higher BIS or BAS, respectively. 




The BDI-II was used to measure symptoms of depression (Beck et al., 
1996). This questionnaire asks participants to report symptoms they have 
experienced over the last 2 weeks (Beck et al., 1996). Specifically, it 
contains 21 questions which are answered on a 4-point scale which 
ranges from 0 (no symptom present) to 3 (severe symptom). Total scores 
range from 0 to 63 (higher scores indicate increased severity of 
depression). The BDI-II has good convergent validity with the revised 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (r = .66 to .75), high internal 
consistency (α = ~ 0.9) and good test-retest reliability (range: .73 to 
.96; see Wang & Gorenstein, 2013). Due to experimenter error, one 
response option to the “changes in appetite” question was not available 
“3a. I have no appetite at all”. 
Anhedonia (Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale; CPAS) 
The CPAS (Chapman et al., 1976) was used to measure trait anhedonia. 
This questionnaire contains 61 statements which are rated on a 2-point 
true-false scale. Total scores range from 0 to 61 (higher scores indicate 
higher anhedonia symptoms). It was originally developed to measure 
anhedonia in Schizophrenia and has demonstrated good test-retest 
reliability (r = .74 to .86; Blanchard et al., 1998) and has some 
convergent validity with the SHAPS (Treadway et al., 2009). 
2.2.4. Procedure 
All participants were given the information sheet and provided informed 
written consent before completing the JORT. In between the two blocks 
on the JORT, participants completed the self-report questionnaires: CPAS, 
(Chapman et al., 1976), BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) and the BIS/BAS 
(Carver & White, 1994). The experimenter remained out of sight and did 
not speak during testing, unless the participant required clarification on 
the task. All participants were tested individually. Upon completion of the 
study, participants were verbally debriefed and final consent was 




2.2.5. Data Analysis 
Python 3.6 and prism 8 were used to extract and visualise the data, 
respectively. Analyses were performed in SPSS 24 (IBM). Tests of ANOVA 
assumptions included checking for sphericity (Mauchly’s Test), normality 
of the residuals (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and histograms) and potential 
outliers (scores 3 times greater than the interquartile range in any trial 
type, examined via boxplots). Greenhouse-Geiser statistics corrections 
were applied where Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was p < .05. Sensitivity 
analysis with any statistical outliers removed was conducted. All post-hoc 
comparisons were Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. As this 
study was explorative at this stage (proof-of-concept), inferential 
statistics should be interpreted cautiously.  
Primary analyses. Three dependent variables were considered: relative 
average force, maximum force, and reaction time. For each, a 2 x 4 x 4 
(block x effort x reward) ANOVA was conducted. The within-subject’s 
factors were block (2 levels: first or second), effort (4 levels: 50%, 80%, 
100%, 120% of a participant’s maximum calibrated force) and reward (4 
levels: 0, 10, 100 or 1,000 points). Potential co-variates (main effects of 
age and sex) were checked. 
Exclusion Criteria. Based on a priori criterion, participants who succeeded 
in over 75% trials were excluded from the analysis. This criterion was 
chosen as these participants must have achieved the 120% effort trials 
(designed to be impossible) and were therefore deemed to have not 
successfully reached their maximum force during the calibration phase. 
This was considered to be important as a previous pilot study (N = 20) 
revealed that when the task was too easy (required 50% effort), 
participants did not exert more force for higher reward trials, a finding 
which is in line with the law of least effort (i.e., people exert the least 
amount of effort required). 
Exploratory analyses. Spearman’s correlations were calculated to examine 
the association between performance on the JORT and self-report 





2.3.1. Participant characteristics 
Twenty-five participants aged 18-39 years (12 female, mean age: 23.2 
and SD: 5.3) took part in the study. 
2.3.2. Exclusion criteria 
Based on a priori criteria, seven participants succeeded in over 75% trials 
and were excluded from the analysis (N = 7). Achieving > 75% trials 
suggests that these participants achieved trials designed to be impossible 
(120% effort) and therefore did not achieve their maximum force during 
the calibration trials. A total of 18 participants were included in the 
analysis for relative average force and maximum force (mean age = 
21.89, SD = 4.04, 7 females). For reaction time, a total of 16 participants 
were included in the analysis (N = 2 had missing data due to no response 
on 0-point trials).  
2.3.3. Data Assumptions 
Residuals for some trial types were not normally distributed based on 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (maximum 5/32), thus caution must be taken in 
interpretation. Nevertheless, ANOVA is relatively robust to slight 
violations to the assumption of normality (Field, 2005). Statistical outliers 
were identified: relative average force (N = 3), relative maximum force 
(N = 1) and reaction time (N = 0). Removal of the outliers did not affect 
the findings, and therefore data will be presented with these participants 
retained in the analysis. 
2.3.4. Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task 
Relative Average Force. There was strong evidence of a main effect of 
reward, F(1.10,18.76) = 8.91, p =.006, np2 = .34, see Figure 2.3. Participants 
exerted more force for higher reward magnitudes: 0 (M = 56.20, SE = 
3.94), 10 (M = 63.36, SE = 1.58), 100 (M = 65.70, SE = 1.44) and 1000 
(M = 69.21, SE = 1.61) points. Polynomial contrasts revealed evidence 
that this effect was linear (p = .005). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 




magnitudes (ps ≤ .032), except between 0 points and 10 points (p = 
.172) and with weaker evidence of a difference between 0 and 100 points 
(p = .079). There was weak evidence of a main effect of block, F(1,17) = 
4.60, p = .047, np2 =.21. Participants exerted more force in the first block 
(M = 65.19, SE = 1.68) compared to the second block (M = 62.05, SE = 
2.12). There was strong evidence of a main effect of effort, F(1.62,27.59) = 
34.65, p < .001, np2 = .67. Participants exerted more force for higher 
effort trials: 50% (M = 56.11, SE = 1.47), 80% (M = 65.30, SE = 1.29), 
100% (M = 67.68, SE = 2.21) and 120% (M = 65.38, SE = 2.47). 
Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed participants exerted 
less force on the 50% effort trials compared to all other effort trials (ps < 
.001) and less force on 120% effort trials compared to 100% effort trials 
(p = .043). There was no evidence of a difference between 80% and 
100% effort trials (ps ≥ .37). There was weak evidence of a block x 
reward interaction, F(1.85,31.5) = 3.35, p = .051, np2 = .17. Bonferroni-
corrected simple effects analysis revealed participants exerted less force 
in the second block compared to the first block on 0-point trials (p = 
.037), with weaker evidence of a difference between other reward 
magnitudes (ps ≥ .054). There was weak evidence of an effort x reward 
interaction, F(3.06,51.95) = 2.87, p = .044, np2 = .15, with the effect of 
reward being largest on 120% effort trials. There was no evidence of 
other interactions (ps ≥ .46). Re-running the analysis with 3 statistical 
outliers excluded weakened the evidence for the main effect of block (p = 
.24). Re-running the analysis with age and sex as potential covariates 
revealed weak evidence of a main effect of sex (p = .092): males exerted 
a higher relative force (M = 66, SE = 2) than females (M = 60, SE = 3). 
Re-running the analysis with all participants included (N = 25) weakened 
the evidence for the main effect of block (p = .15) and effort x reward 
interaction (p = .75) but improved the block x reward interaction (p = 
.007). 
Relative Maximum Force. There was strong evidence of a main effect of 
reward, F(1.11, 18.86) = 9.26, p = .006, np2 = .35, see Figure 2.3. 
Participants exerted a higher maximum force for higher reward 




(M = 94.32, SE = 2.56) and 1000 (M = 98.73, SE = 2.94) points. 
Polynomial contrasts revealed evidence that this effect was linear (p = 
.004). Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed evidence of a 
difference in maximum force exerted between 0 and 1000 points (p = 
.030), 10 and 100 points (p = .011) and 10 and 1000 points (p = .006). 
There was also weak evidence of a difference between 0 and 100 points 
(p = .050) and 100 and 1000 points (p = .071), but no clear evidence of 
a difference between 0 and 10 points (p = .12). There was strong 
evidence of a main effect of effort, F(3,51) = 16.38, p < .001, np2 = .49. 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed evidence of a 
difference between maximum force exerted on 50% effort trials and all 
other effort trials (ps ≤ .005) and weak evidence of a difference between 
100% and 120% effort trials (p = .062), but no clear evidence of a 
difference between other effort trials (ps = 1.0). There was no clear 
evidence of other main effects or interactions (ps ≥ .103). There was one 
outlier, re-running the analysis with this outlier removed did not 
qualitatively change the findings. Re-running the analysis with age and 
sex as potential covariates revealed weak evidence of a main effect of sex 
(p = .078) with males exerting a higher maximum force (M = 95, SE = 3) 
than females (M = 85, SE = 4). Re-running the analysis with all 
participants included (N = 25) did not change the findings but a block x 
reward interaction was revealed (p = .016). 
Reaction Time. There was strong evidence a main effect of reward, 
F(1.51,22.65) = 8.91, p = .003, np2 = .37, see Figure 2.3. Participants were 
quicker to respond to higher reward magnitudes: 0 (M = 493 ms, SE  = 
25), 10 (M = 462 ms, SE = 19), 100 (M = 463 ms, SE = 20) and 1000 (M 
= 442 ms, SE = 17) points. Polynomial contrasts revealed evidence that 
this effect was linear (p = .003). Bonferroni corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed participants were quicker to respond to 1000 points 
compared to other points (ps ≤ .022) and weak evidence of a difference 
between 0 and 10 points (p = .050). There was no evidence of a 
difference between other reward magnitudes (ps ≥ .31). There was 
strong evidence of a main effect of block, F(1,15) = 16.30, p = .001, np2 = 




SE = 19) compared to the second block (M = 481 ms, SE = 21). There 
was evidence of a main effect of effort, F(3,45) = 4.76, p = .006, np2 = .24. 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons revealed evidence of a 
difference in reaction time between 50% and 80% trials (mean difference 
= 17 ms, p = .036) and weak evidence of a difference between 80% and 
120% effort trials (p = .058). There was no evidence of a difference 
between other effort trials (ps ≥ .17). There was evidence of an effort x 
reward interaction, F(3.29, 49.35) = 4.01, p =.01, np2 = .21. There was 
evidence of a block x effort x reward interaction, F(3.46, 51.96) = 3.36, p = 
.02, np2 = .18. Re-running the analysis with age and sex as potential 
covariates revealed evidence of a main effect of sex (p = .006): males 
(431 ms; N = 11) had quicker reaction times than females (540 ms; N = 
5). Re-running the analysis with all participants (N = 22) included did not 










Figure 2.3 Proof-of-concept for the JORT: For higher reward magnitudes, participants exerted a higher average force (A; N = 18), maximum force (B; N 




2.3.5. Self-report measures   
Participant characteristics and distribution of self-report measures appear 
in Table 2.1.  





To facilitate correlation analyses, individual slopes (force exerted across 
the four reward magnitudes) were extracted for each participant (as 
reported in Pfister et al., 2013). There was no clear evidence of a 
correlation between self-report measures and JORT slopes for relative 
average force (ps ≥ .17), maximum force (ps ≥ .12) or reaction time (ps 
≥ .06). Re-running the analysis with all participants included did not 
change this finding. 
  
  
Variable Number Mean  SD 
Age 18 21.9  4.0 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 17 7.5  5.1 
BIS 18 22.2  3.1 
BAS Total 18 41.2 4.5 
BAS – drive 18 11.1  2.3 
BAS – fun seeking 18 12.6  1.6 
BAS – reward responsiveness 18 17.6  2.2 
CPAS 18 13.3 4.7 
Abbreviations: BIS, Behavioural Inhibition System; BAS, Behavioural Activation System; CPAS, 
Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale. Note: there was missing data for one participant on the BDI-II 







Figure 2.4. Profile of force applied by one participant on their last low (0 point; A) and high (1000 point; B) reward trial which required 
100% effort. Green line indicates the time at which target dot appeared, blue line indicates the time at which the participant started to 
apply force and red line indicates the time at which the target disappeared. Note: This is not a representative trial, it is shown for 






The aim of this chapter was to provide proof-of-concept for a novel 
reward motivation task in a non-clinical population: the JORT. In this 
task, participants must push on a force-sensing joystick to chase and 
catch an onscreen target for different reward amounts. It was predicted 
that participants will exert more physical force for higher reward trials 
compared to lower reward trials. Participants did exert a linear increase in 
physical force (average and maximum force) for higher reward trials. 
Participants also had a linear decrease in reaction times for higher reward 
trials. This suggests that this task based purely on physical effort could 
provide a novel measure of reward motivation. 
There are few behavioural tasks that assess reward motivation in humans 
(see section 1.4.5.1; Dean, 2019). To date, most human studies have 
measured reward motivation using effort-based decision-making tasks, 
predominantly using the EEfRT (Dean, 2019; Halahakoon et al., 2020; 
Lawn et al., 2016). Whilst the EEfRT has revealed important findings in 
patient populations (Treadway et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2014), a potential 
confound of this task is its cognitive demands (Bonnelle et al., 2015). In 
the EEfRT, participants are required to make a decision by weighing up 
the costs (amount of effort required), benefits (amount of reward on 
offer) and probability of getting the reward. As a result, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether deficits in this task reflect impaired reward motivation 
or instead reflect general cognitive impairments (Bonnelle et al., 2015; J. 
A. Cooper et al., 2019; Dean, 2019). For example, Whitton and 
colleagues (2020) found that better working memory using a digit span 
task predicted increased choice for the high effort/high reward option (on 
high probability trials) on the EEfRT (Whitton, Merchant, et al., 2020). 
This is an important consideration for clinical studies as patients may 
have deficits in cognition (J. A. Cooper et al., 2019). In comparison to the 
EEfRT, the JORT is a simpler reward motivation task based on physical 
amount of effort exerted for reward which does not require any explicit 
decision-making (Bonnelle et al., 2015). Specifically, participants have to 




reward). Thus, compared to effort-based choice tasks, the simplicity of 
the JORT means it may provide a more specific measure of physical effort 
related to reward (Bonnelle et al., 2015).  
In the current literature, there are two other behavioural tasks designed 
to measure the amount of physical effort exerted for reward: the 
Progressive Ratio Task (PRT) and the handgrip task (Schmidt et al., 
2008; as discussed in section 1.4.5.1). Whilst promising, these tasks 
have not yet been validated to the same degree as the EEfRT and have 
lacked standardisation across studies. For example, whilst the handgrip 
task was initially developed to measure physical force exerted for reward 
(Cléry-Melin et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2008), subsequent studies using 
this task have employed explicit decision-making versions whereby a 
participant must accept or reject a trial based on the effort required and 
reward on offer (Bonnelle et al., 2015). Similarly, most versions of the 
PRT used in the human literature have also included an additional explicit 
choice (accept or reject a trial). This has resulted in a lack of studies 
demonstrating validity of the original effort for reward tasks. Additionally, 
concerns have been raised regarding the potential confounds on the PRT 
such as temporal discounting and motor ability (Chong et al., 2016). This 
means that a decreased breakpoint may not reflect a reduced willingness 
to exert physical effort for reward, but rather intolerance to wait for 
reward or poorer motor ability (Chong et al., 2016). Therefore, although 
promising, physical effort for reward tasks that have been used in the 
literature have not yet been validated to the same degree as effort-based 
decision-making tasks.  
In this study, performance on the JORT did not correlate with self-report 
measures. In particular, it may be surprising that there was no correlation 
between the JORT and the BAS, which is designed to measure motivation 
to approach appetitive outcomes (Carver & White, 1994). However, 
caution should be taken when interpreting this finding given that the 
study has a small sample size. Future studies with larger samples will be 
required to address whether self-report measures of motivation relate to 




2.4.1. Strengths and Limitations  
A key strength of this task is its simplicity. Compared to effort-based 
choice tasks, the JORT has the advantage of being less cognitively 
demanding. Consequently, performance on this task may better account 
for potential confounds such as cognitive deficits and cognitive effort 
impairments (Bonnelle et al., 2015; J. A. Cooper et al., 2019; Dean, 
2019). This is particularly important when investigating motivational 
deficits in patient populations who have impairments in cognitive 
processing (Chong et al., 2016).  
Another strength is that the task accounts for other potential confounds 
such as delay intolerance. In most tasks (PRT and EEfRT), effort is also 
associated with an increased delay (time taken to obtain the reward; 
Pessiglione et al., 2018). This is problematic because reduced 
performance on the task may not reflect reduced willingness to exert 
effort, but rather intolerance to delay. An advantage of the JORT is that 
the time spent on trials is kept roughly the same and therefore 
performance is less likely to be influenced by temporal discounting.  
One limitation of this task is the potential confound of fatigue. As this 
task is physically demanding, over time participants may exert less effort 
on the task as a result of fatigue (tiredness), as opposed to reduced 
motivation. Whilst an important consideration, fatigue could also be of 
interest when assessing reward motivation in many clinical disorders. For 
example, some patients may be willing to exert physical effort for reward 
in normal circumstances but may be less willing once they have already 
exerted some effort (i.e., reduced motivation may become more apparent 
as energy is decreased). To check the effects of fatigue on this task, a 
basic analysis can involve comparing performance between the two blocks 
of trials. Doing this, we found weak evidence of a main effect of block on 
average force (p = .047) and strong evidence of a main effect of block on 
reaction time (p = .001), and thus the effect of block should be 
considered in future studies. Alternatively, one could also include trial 




The purpose of the calibration phase was to determine a participant’s 
maximum force, which was later used to standardise the amount of effort 
required on the task. However, many participants (7/25) did not 
successfully achieve their maximum force during the calibration phase. 
Possible reasons for this include the lack of visual feedback (the 
participants received no visual feedback on the force they were exerting 
on the joystick) and the lack of incentive during the calibration phase. To 
address this limitation, in subsequent chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 
5), we altered the calibration such that a person’s maximum force was 
calculated as their peak force reached during the calibration phase or 
practice trials (whichever was highest). 
2.4.2. Future Directions  
Future studies are needed to validate the JORT as a measure of reward 
motivation. When developing a new test, there are four quality criteria 
that must be met: standardisation, sensitivity of task to individual 
differences, validity (face, construct and predictive), and test-retest 
reliability (Diederich & Giffroy, 2006). Here, I provide some face validity 
and in Chapter 3 I provide some construct validity (this task correlates 
with performance on a different reward motivation task: EEfRT). Further 
studies are needed to assess test-retest reliability and predictive validity. 
Specifically, predictive validity could be examined using pharmacological 
manipulations (such as dopaminergic drugs) and/or examining clinical 
populations who report deficits in motivation (such as apathy) to examine 
the tasks sensitivity to detect disease. Validation of behavioural tasks to 
the same extent as questionnaires is necessary for interpreting results 
and having a useful measurement tool. 
Another area for future research is to incorporate motivation to avoid loss 
using this task. Here, the task measured motivation to obtain a reward. 
Arguably, the other side of this coin is motivation to avoid aversive 
outcomes. Whilst not the focus of this study, future studies could benefit 
from including avoidance trials whereby participants must push on the 
joystick to avoid being caught by a pursuing cursor, which would result in 




when examining disorders such as apathy, which may not be specific to 
the reward/pleasure domain. Therefore, assessing aversive motivation 
alongside reward motivation may provide a more holistic insight into the 
specific motivation deficits present in patients (specific to reward or a 
global motivation deficit).  
In summary, this study provides proof-of-concept for a novel reward 
motivation task which provides a simple measure of physical effort 
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Anhedonia, a markedly diminished interest or pleasure in activities (DSM-
5), is a core self-reported symptom of depression that responds poorly to 
currently available treatments (Uher et al., 2012). Despite its importance, 
the behavioural and neurobiological basis of anhedonia remains elusive 
(J. A. Cooper et al., 2018). This may, at least in part, be due to the over-
reliance on questionnaires to measure this symptom. Objective measures, 
particularly those that can be used in both clinical and preclinical 
research, may improve our mechanistic understanding of anhedonia and 
aid the development of targeted treatments (Der-Avakian & Markou, 
2012; Thomsen, 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2011).  
One way to objectively measure anhedonia is behaviourally (see section 
1.4.5). Specifically, anhedonia may be due to dysfunction in one or more 
components of reward processing: motivation to obtain reward 
(“wanting”), consumption of reward (“liking”) and/or learning what 
predicts reward (“learning”) (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Thomsen, 
2015). Despite advancements in preclinical research demonstrating that 
these components are dissociable (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Berridge 
et al., 2009), few studies have tried to dissociate different components of 
reward in people and relate them to questionnaire measures of anhedonia 
(McCabe, 2018). It is important to dissociate the precise components 
related to anhedonia because it may provide an objective biomarker that 
could be used in the development and testing of new treatments. To aid 
translational research, translating behavioural tasks from animals to 
humans may be a promising approach (Der-Avakian et al., 2016).  
Although there has been progress in the field of anhedonia and reward 
processing (see section 1.4.5), there are gaps in the current literature 
that need to be addressed. First, most studies compare people with 
depression to healthy controls. Whilst anhedonia is a core symptom of 
depression, it is possible to have a diagnosis of depression without 
anhedonia. Therefore, depression and anhedonia should not be used 
interchangeably. Instead, in line with the RDoC, there is a need for 




questionnaires (Cuthbert, 2014; McCabe, 2018). Second, most studies 
examine only one component of reward (e.g., motivation) using one task. 
However, a battery of tasks designed to probe different components of 
reward (e.g., motivation, sensitivity) in the same population is needed to 
assess whether these components can be dissociated in people, and 
whether anhedonia is related to a general reward deficit (dysfunction 
across components of reward) or is specific to certain domains of reward 
processing (Husain & Roiser, 2018; Nielson et al., 2020). Third, most 
human studies examining reward motivation use effort-based decision-
making tasks (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Treadway et al., 2009). As 
preclinical studies commonly measure reward motivation as the amount 
of physical effort exerted for reward (e.g., PRT), studies should examine 
whether the amount of physical effort exerted for reward is related to 
anhedonia. This will enable a more fine-grained understanding of the 
reward motivation deficits in anhedonia and may inform preclinical 
research. 
3.1.1. Study Aim 
To address these gaps, the aim of this study was to examine different 
components of reward processing (reward motivation and sensitivity) 
using a battery of behavioural tasks in a non-clinical population who have 
high versus low symptoms of anhedonia (measured using the SHAPS). 
Although anhedonia is a clinical symptom, it can be observed to varying 
degrees in the typical population (Franken et al., 2007). Translational 
tasks were used to assess effort-based decision-making (EEfRT; 
Treadway et al., 2009) and reward sensitivity (Sweet Taste Test). This 
study also included a novel physical effort-for-reward task (JORT; see 
Chapter 2) to further examine motivational deficits in the absence of 
explicit decision-making. These tasks were selected based on their 
potential to dissociate reward components and their potential for cross-
species research. All participants also completed multiple self-report 
measures of anhedonia: SHAPS (Snaith et al., 1995), CPAS (Chapman et 
al., 1976) and TEPS (Gard et al., 2006). They also completed self-report 




Marin et al., 1991). Based on previous literature (section 1.4.5), we 
predicted that:  
H1: In the JORT, compared to individuals with low anhedonia, individuals 
with high anhedonia, will not exert more force for higher compared to 
lower reward magnitudes.  
H2: In the EEfRT, compared to individuals with low anhedonia, individuals 
with high anhedonia will make fewer high effort/high reward choices 
(under 50% probability).  
H3: In the Sweet Taste Test, compared to individuals with low anhedonia, 
individuals with high anhedonia will show a higher detection threshold 
(i.e., reduced perception).  
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Screening  
Individuals who scored high (score ≥ 25) or low (score < 18) on the 
SHAPS in a non-clinical population were invited to take part in this study 
(based on data from Suddell et al., unpublished data). Specifically, these 
individuals scored in the top and bottom 25th percentile on the SHAPS, 
which was administered online to 380 volunteers, see Figure 3.1. Due to 
initial difficulties recruiting, the lower cut-off was increased from a score 
of < 17 to < 18 (proposed in the pre-registration) on the SHAPS. For a 

































Not meet criteria  
(N = 216) 
 
Met SHAPS criteria (N = 164)  
Low anhedonia (N = 90) 
High anhedonia (N = 74) 
 
380 screened online 
(SHAPS, M = 20.81,  
SD = 4.42) 
 
Took part in study (N=101) 
Met SHAPS criteria when re-
tested at study visit (N = 66) 
34 low anhedonia 
(7M; 27F; Age M = 24) 
32 high anhedonia 
(17M; 15F; Age M = 23) 
No longer met same 
SHAPS criteria at study 
visit (N = 35) 
Figure 3.1 Distribution of scores on the SHAPS, dashed lines indicate 
SHAPS cut-offs (M = 20.81, SD = 4.4, N = 380). 




3.2.2. Participants  
A total of 101 participants (44 low anhedonia, 57 high anhedonia) met 
the online criteria and took part in this study. Of this group, 66 
participants (34 low anhedonia, 32 high anhedonia) still met the SHAPS 
criteria when re-tested on the SHAPS at the study visit. Only those who 
still met their criteria (high or low anhedonia) at the study visit were 
included in the primary analysis.  
Participants were recruited using advertisements within the University of 
Bristol and volunteer databases. Eligibility criteria were: aged ≥ 18 years, 
fluent in English, not suffering from a mental health condition or 
neurological illness (self-report), no current physical injuries, no allergy or 
intolerance to sugar, no disorder of taste or smell, not diabetic, not 
previously participated in a study using the JORT.  
Participants were reimbursed £20 for their time and received an 
additional performance-based pay (up to £5) based on their performance 
on one of the two reward motivation tasks (chosen randomly).  
Ethics approval was obtained from the Faculty of Biomedical Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of Bristol.  
3.2.3. Design 
This study was a between-participants design. It examined differences in 
behaviour performance in a non-clinical population with high vs low 
anhedonia symptoms.  
3.2.4. Sample Size Calculation  
There were sufficient resources to recruit a target sample size of 66 
participants (33/group). Using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007), an a priori 
power calculation indicated that 66 participants provided sufficient power 
(.9) to detect a medium effect (Cohen’s f = .25) at alpha = .05 with 
correlations among repeated measures (0.5) and non-sphericity 
correction (0.3334) (ANOVA: repeated measures, within-between 
interaction; based on the JORT). Given that we had limited information 




interpreted with appropriate caution given the possibility that the study is 
underpowered. Whilst the target sample size was 66, four participants 
were excluded from the JORT analysis (based on a prior criteria) resulting 
in an achieved sample size of 62 participants (33 low anhedonia, 29 high 
anhedonia). 
3.2.5. Behavioural Measures 
Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task (JORT) 
See chapter 2 for task details. The only difference between studies was 
how the maximum calibrated force was calculated. In this study, 
maximum calibrated force was calculated as the peak force exerted on 
the calibration or practice trials. This was done to reduce the number of 
participants successfully achieving more than 75% of trials and thus 
being excluded. This reduced the proportion of participants achieving over 
75% trials: chapter 2 (28% participants) vs current study (6% 
participants). This criterion (> 75% trials achieved) was chosen because 
these participants must have achieved trials that were designed to be 
impossible, suggesting that they did not successfully reach their 
maximum force during the calibration phase.  
Effort Expenditure for Reward Task (EEfRT) 
The EEfRT measures effort-based decision making (Treadway et al., 
2009). On each trial, participants are given a choice between an “easy” 
and “hard” task. In the hard task, participants must do 98 button presses 
within 21 seconds (using the little finger on their non-dominant hand) for 
58p - £2, see Figure 3.3. In the easy task, participants must do 30 button 
presses (using the index finger on their dominant hand) within 7 seconds 
for 50p. They have 5 seconds to make a choice, or they are randomly 
assigned to either task. Each trial also contains a probability cue which 
indicates the probability of winning money if they successfully complete 
the trial (referred to as “win trials”): 12%, 50% or 88%. This probability 
applies to both the easy and hard choices. There are an equal proportion 
of each probability across the experiment. Participants are told that two 




performance-based pay). All participants complete the trials in the same 
pre-randomised order.  
Prior to the task, participants are given standardised verbal and written 
instructions (as provided by Treadway et al., 2009). Following this, all 
participants complete three trials to assess their motor ability (i.e., finger 
tapping rate) where they press a button with the little finger of their non-
dominant hand for 21 seconds as fast as possible. This is done to 
determine figure tapping speed (i.e., the average number of button 
presses across the three trials). Following this, participants complete four 
practice trials.  
The only difference between the original task and this task is that I 
modified the payment in pounds such that the easy trial was worth 50p 
and the maximum amount on offer for the hard trial was £2. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of money on offer on each trial was 
approximately the same as the original task. The primary outcome in this 
task is proportion of hard-task choices.  
Sweet Taste Test  
A modified version of the Sweet Taste Test (Berlin et al., 1998) was used 
to measure threshold to detect sucrose. Here, on each trial, participants 
were given a concentration of sucrose delivered in 15 mL of water and 
Figure 3.3 Example trial on the Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT): fixation 
cross (1 s), choice period where the participant is informed about the probability of the 
trial being a “win trial” and reward magnitude of the hard task (5 s), “Ready” screen (1 
s), button pressing (7 s easy task or 21 s hard task), feedback as to whether the 
participant successfully completed the task followed by feedback as to whether they 




were asked to sip one mouthful of the solution, swish it around their 
mouth for approximately 5 seconds and then spit out the solution (Berlin 
et al., 1998). Following this, the participant was asked if they could 
detect the presence of sugar in the solution (Berlin et al., 1998). In 
between trials, participants were asked to sip one mouthful of water, 
swish it around their mouth for approximately 5 seconds and then spit 
this out. Prior to the task, participants were asked to complete two 
practice trials containing water. This was done to ensure that the 
participant was familiar with the procedure and to clean their palette. 
Seven concentrations of sugar were used (0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 5% w/v). 
A staircase method was employed which included five reversals. The first 
concentration administered was always the strongest concentration (i.e., 
5% sucrose) to ensure participants were aware of what to detect. A 
staircase method was used as it provides a fast determination of 
threshold. The detection threshold was calculated as the mean of the five 
boundaries (i.e., points at which they changed response from either 
detect to fail to detect or vice versa).  
3.2.6. Self-Report Measures 
Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS)   
The SHAPS (Snaith et al., 1995) is used as the primary measure of 
hedonic capacity in this study. It was administered during screening 
(online) and re-administered at the study visit. This is a 14-item 
questionnaire with a 4-point scale. It asks participants to report their 
ability to experience pleasure in the last few days (e.g., smell of freshly 
baked bread, being with family). A cut-off of > 2 has been suggested to 
provide the “best discrimination of normal and abnormal” (Snaith et al., 
1995). Whilst the original scoring algorithm coded each item as 
dichotomous, recent approaches have used continuous coding (each item 
scored as 1 - 4) to increase dispersion of the data (Franken et al., 2007). 
The psychometric properties of this continuous version have been 
supported (Franken et al., 2007): it has displayed adequate test-retest 
reliability over a 3-week interval (r = .70), internal consistency (a = .91; 




scales (Leventhal et al., 2006). I originally included the SHAPS as 
reported in the original paper (Snaith et al., 1995). However, due to poor 
test-retest reliability, I later changed the order or responses to be 
consistent (i.e., strongly agree as the top response for all questions).  
Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale (CPAS) 
The CPAS (Chapman et al., 1976) is used as a measure of trait 
anhedonia. Higher scores indicate higher trait anhedonia. See Chapter 2 
for more details.  
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS)  
The TEPS (Gard et al., 2006) aims to dissociate consummatory and 
anticipatory anhedonia. It contains two subscales which assess 
anticipatory (10-items) and consummatory (8-items) anhedonia on a 6-
point scale. Due to its recent development, this questionnaire has limited 
psychometric testing (Gard et al., 2006; Rizvi et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
it does appear to have good test-retest reliability (over a mean interval of 
6 weeks; r = .75 to .81), satisfactory convergent validity (FCPS and 
CPAS) and high discriminant validity (BDI) in a student population (Gard 
et al., 2006). Unlike other questionnaires, higher scores on the TEPS 
indicate lower levels of anhedonia. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) is used to measure symptoms of 
depression. Higher scores indicate increased symptoms of depression. 
See chapter 2 for more details.  
Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES) 
The AES (Marin et al., 1991) is an 18-item self-report questionnaire on a 
4-point scale which ranges from “Not at all True” to “Very True”. Scores 
range from 18-72, with higher scores indicating increased apathy 
symptoms. It has good test-retest reliability over a mean interval of 25 
days (r = .76; Marin et al., 1991). The self-reported version also has 




and some discriminant validity from self-reported depression (r = .42; 
Marin et al., 1991). 
 
Other information 
All participants provided demographic information (age, sex). Participants 
also answered questions regarding: smoking status (“do you currently 
smoke tobacco?”; 3 levels: yes daily, yes less than daily, not at all), 
income band (3 levels: low, medium, high) and financial worries (2 
levels: yes or no). Questions also had the option “prefer not to say”. 
3.2.7. Procedure 
Interested participants were sent the information sheet via email and 
asked to complete the online screening questionnaire – SHAPS (Snaith et 
al., 1995). Those who met the eligibility and screening criteria were 
invited to attend a two-hour test session at the University of Bristol.  
Upon arrival at the test session, participants provided written informed 
consent. All participants were tested individually. Participants completed 
the behavioural tasks in the following order: EEfRT, JORT and the Sweet 
Taste Test; which took approximately one hour. Participants then 
completed self-report measures: demographic form, SHAPS, CPAS, TEPS, 
BDI-II, AES. Upon completion, all participants were verbally debriefed.  
3.2.8. Data analyses 
Analyses were performed in SPSS 24 (IBM). Primary analyses were run 
on those who met the SHAPS cut-offs at the study visit (N = 66). Based 
on previous research, a priori potential co-variates were examined and 
their main effects retained in each model (Engqvist, 2005).  
3.2.8.1. Primary Analyses 
For the JORT, 2 x 4 mixed ANOVAs were conducted to examine 
differences between groups in relative average force, maximum force, 
and reaction time. The between-subjects factor was group (2 levels: high 




10, 100, 1000 points). Data were collapsed across effort and block, 
although analyses were also re-run as a full ANOVA (including block and 
effort) to explore any potential interactions with group. The primary 
outcome was relative average force.  
For the EEfRT, 2 x 3 mixed ANCOVAs were conducted to examine 
differences between groups in mean proportion of hard-task choices and 
reaction time. The between-subjects factor was group (2 levels: high and 
low anhedonia). The within-subjects factor was probability (3 levels: 
12%, 50%, 88%). Sex was included as a potential co-variate based on 
previous literature (Treadway et al., 2009). The primary outcome was 
mean proportion of hard-task choices.  
For the Sweet Taste Test, a univariate ANCOVA was conducted to 
examine differences between groups in detection threshold. Smoking 
status (3 levels: daily, less than daily, not at all) was included in the 
analysis as a potential co-variate based on previous literature (Sato et al., 
2002). 
Data were checked for normality (using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
histograms), homogeneity of variances (Levene’s) and potential outliers 
were examined via boxplots (scores 3 times greater than the interquartile 
range in any condition). Where there were substantial deviations from 
normality or heterogeneity of variances between groups, analysis was 
conducted on log transformed data (or square root transformed if 0 
values were present) only if this corrected the assumptions. Greenhouse-
Geiser statistics corrections were applied where Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity was p < .05. Sensitivity analysis with any statistical outliers 
excluded was conducted. Data are presented with all participants retained 
in the analysis. Where removal of outliers substantially affected the 
findings, results are also reported with outliers excluded. All post-hoc 
comparisons were Bonferroni-corrected. Partial eta-squared (np2 ) is 
reported as the effect size.  
3.2.8.2. Exploratory Analyses  
Correlations. Associations between performance on reward processing 




run using Spearman’s correlation (N = 101), due to non-normality of 
some variables. Additional Spearman’s correlations were run to 
investigate associations between behavioural tasks. As these were 
exploratory, no corrections for multiple comparisons were used. 
Generalised Estimating Equation (GEE) models (Zeger & Liang, 1986). To 
further assess the replicability of the results of Treadway et al. (2009), 
additional GEE models were applied to the EEfRT data. GEE models focus 
on data from individual trials (i.e., trial-level approach) rather than 
summary statistics (i.e., subject-level approach; Bryant et al., 2017; 
Wardle et al., 2011). In the EEfRT, this enables the inclusion of fixed 
parameters (e.g., anhedonia score), time-varying categorical parameters 
(e.g., probability: 12, 50, 88) and time-varying continuous parameters 
(e.g., reward magnitude of the hard-task choice)(Yang et al., 2014). 
GEEs also allow trial number to be included as a covariate to control for 
the effect of fatigue on choice (Treadway et al., 2012). An additional 
advantage of GEEs is that compared to general linear models (GLM; e.g., 
ANOVA), GEE models have less strict assumptions: (1) they do not 
require the dependent variable to be normally distributed and (2) they 
allow for correlated responses within a subject (see Ballinger, 2004 for a 
review). Overall, this enables GEE models to have increased power to 
detect effects compared to GLMs and may provide less biased parameter 
estimates (Ballinger, 2004; Lawn et al., 2016). 
Consistent with Treadway and colleagues (2009), the dependent variable 
was choice (binary outcome: easy or hard) and therefore a binary logistic 
model was employed. We also used an unstructured working correlation 
matrix (as reported in Treadway et al., 2009). All GEE models include: 
trial number, probability, reward magnitude (reward on offer for hard-
task choice), expected value (reward magnitude x probability) and trait 
anhedonia (score on CPAS; Treadway et al., 2009). The within-subjects 
factor was trial number (McCarthy et al., 2016). The quasi likelihood 











Table 3.1 Demographic data and questionnaire scores for participants in the high and low anhedonia group 
 
 Low Group High Group Group Difference 
 Mean SD Mean SD F p-value Post-hoc 
Age 24.0 5.1 22.8 8.6 .41 .52 n/a 
Males (N) 7 21% 17 53% X2 = 7.54 .006 H > L 
Smoke Status 2.7 0.7 2.7 0.6 X2 = .23 .89 n/a 
Income 2.3 0.6 2.2 0.6 X2 = .64 .73 n/a 
Money Concern  12 36% 16 50% X2 = 1.23 .27 n/a 
SHAPS 15.4 1.0 27.6 2.2 838.34 <.001 H > L 
CPAS 9.6 5.7 18.0 7.1 27.67 <.001 H > L 
TEPS – A 50.5 4.6 40.3 5.2 71.10 <.001 L > H 
TEPS – C 40.6 5.3 30.3 6.2 52.80 <.001 L > H 
BDI-II 6.4 5.5 11.4 7.6 9.41 .003 H > L 
Apathy Scale 24.6 4.4 32.4 6.2 33.74 <.001 H > L 
Abbreviations: current smoke status (1=daily,2=less than daily, 3=not at all); income (1=high…3=low); money concern, participants who reported yes to finance concerns; 
SHAPS, Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale; TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (A, anticipatory; C, consummatory); BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; n/a, not 




3.3.2. Primary Analyses 
3.3.2.1. Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task  
Four participants achieved over 75% trials and were excluded from the 
analysis. In total, 62 participants (33 low anhedonia, 29 high anhedonia) 
were included in the analysis.  
Data assumptions. For all outcomes, residuals for some trial types were 
not normally distributed (2/8). Transformations either did not improve 
normality (average and maximum force) or weakened homogeneity of 
variances (reaction time) and so analysis was done on non-transformed 
data. No outliers were identified for average or maximum force, one was 
identified for reaction time.  
Average force. There was strong evidence of a main effect of reward 
F(1.45,87.14) = 39.41, p <.001, np2 = .40. Participants exerted more force for 
higher reward magnitudes: 0 points (M = 51.79, SE = 2.05), 10 points (M 
= 60.34, SE = 1.52), 100 points (M = 64.09, SE = 1.16) and 1000 (M = 
66.48, SE = 1.12) points. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
revealed strong evidence of a difference between all reward magnitudes 
(ps ≤ .003). There was no evidence of a main effect of group (F(1,60) = 
.004, p = .95, np2 < .001; see Figure 3.4) or reward x group interaction 
(F(1.45,87.14) = .56, p = .52, np2 = .009).  
Maximum force. There was strong evidence of a main effect of reward 
F(1.47,88.08) = 36.85, p < .001, np2 = .38. Participants exerted a higher 
maximum force for higher reward magnitudes: 0 points (M = 73.90, SE = 
3.00), 10 points (M = 85.86, SE = 2.38), 100 points (M = 91.16, SE = 
1.91) and 1000 points (M = 94.08, SE = 1.89). Bonferroni-corrected 
pairwise comparisons revealed evidence of differences between all reward 
magnitudes (ps ≤ .006). There was no evidence of a main effect of group 
(F(1, 60) = .49, p = .49, np2 = .008; see Figure 3.4) or reward x group 
interaction (F(1.47,88.08) = .67, p = .47, np2 = .011).  
Reaction time. There was strong evidence of a main effect of reward, 
F(1.18,70.73) = 13.90, p < .001, np2 = .19. Participants were quicker to 




10 points (M = 477 ms, SE = 11), 100 points (M = 479 ms, SE = 11) and 
1000 points (M = 468 ms, SE = 11). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed evidence of a difference between all reward 
magnitudes (ps ≤ .024), except between 10 and 100 points (p = 1.0). 
There was no evidence of a main effect of group (F(1,60) = .86, p = .36, 
np2 =.014; see Figure 3.4) or reward x group interaction (F(1.18,70.73) = 
.049, p = .86, n2p = .001). There was one outlier that, when removed, 
did not change the findings overall but did strengthen the reward x group 
interaction, F(1.97,116.10) = 2.30, p =.106, np2 = .04. Note that re-running 
the analysis including sex as a covariate revealed strong evidence of a 
main effect of sex, F(1,59) = 13.98, p < .001, np2 = .19, with males being 
quicker to respond (M = 433 ms, SE = 17; N = 21) than females (M = 
515 ms, SE = 12; N = 41). Re-running the analysis with sex included in 
the model did not alter the lack of evidence of a main effect or interaction 
with group.  
Re-running all analyses (average force, maximum force, and reaction 
time) as full 2*4*4 ANOVAs still did not reveal any evidence of a main 





Figure 3.4. Differences between the high and low anhedonia group on the JORT 
for: (A) relative average force (N = 33 low, 29 high), (B) maximum force (N = 
33 low, 29 high) and (C,D) reaction time (ms). As there was evidence of a sex 
difference in reaction time on the JORT (p < .001), data are presented separately 
for (C) males (N = 6 low, 15 high) and (D) females (N = 27 low, 14 high). Error 
bars represent SEM. 
3.3.2.2. Effort Expenditure for Reward Task  
Consistent with Treadway (2009), only the first 50 trials were used. Trials 
in which the participant did not make a choice within the time limit were 
not included in the analysis (M = 49.20, SD = 1.90, range = 39 to 50).  
Data assumptions. For proportion of hard-task choices, there was 
heterogeneity of variances between groups for low probability trials (p = 
.009) and non-normality for the low probability (ps < .001) and high 
probability for the high group (p = .03). Transformations improved the 




on this, analysis is done on non-transformed data. One outlier was 
identified for proportion of hard task choices, none were identified for 
reaction time.  
Proportion of hard task choices. There was strong evidence of a main 
effect of probability, F(2,126) = 209.12, p < .001, np2 = .77. Participants 
chose the hard-task choice more often when the probability of winning 
was higher: low (M = 9.68, SE = 1.82), medium (M = 31.12, SE = 2.39) 
and high (M = 57.14, SE = 2.37). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed evidence of a difference between all probabilities 
(ps < .001). There was evidence of a main effect of group, F(1,63) = 4.45,  
p = .039, np2 = .066, the higher anhedonia group (M = 28.9, SE = 2.4) 
chose the hard-task choice less often than the low anhedonia group (M = 
36.4, SE = 2.6; see Figure 3.5). There was no evidence of other main 
effects or interactions (ps ≥ .57). However, removal of the outlier 
weakened the evidence of a main effect of group, F(1,62) = 2.64, p =.109, 
np2 = .041). Post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests revealed evidence of a 
difference between groups on low probability trials (p = .045), but this 
did not survive Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons. There 
was no evidence of a difference between groups on medium or high 
probability trials (ps ≥ .28).  
Reaction time. There was strong evidence of a main effect of probability, 
F(2,126) = 17.91,  p < .001, np2 = .22, see Figure 3.5. Participants were 
quicker to make a choice when there was a low probability of winning 
money: 12% (M = 1.72 seconds, SE = .06), 50% (M = 1.93 seconds, SE 
= .07) and 88% probability trials (M = 1.92 seconds, SE = 0.07). 
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed evidence of a difference 
between probability levels (ps < .001), except medium and high 
probability (p = .1). There was no clear evidence of other main effects or 





Figure 3.5 Difference between the high and low anhedonia group on the EEfRT 
across different probability levels: mean proportion of hard task-choices (A) and 
reaction time (B). N = 34 low and 32 high anhedonia. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Finger tapping speed. There was no evidence of a difference between the 
high (M = 98.54, SD = 9.49) and low (M = 97.23, SD = 9.92) anhedonia 
group in finger tapping speed prior to the task, t(64) = -.55, p = .58. 
Additionally, there was no evidence of a clear difference between groups 
in mean button pressing rate (i.e., button pressing speed) for the easy or 
hard task choices (ps ≥ .11). This suggests that any reduced proportion 
of hard-task choice in the high anhedonia group cannot be attributed to 
reduced motor ability.   
Trials completed. The mean percent of trials completed was 97.7% (SD = 
4.8, range = 72 – 100%). Additionally, I checked the number of 
participants who only chose the easy or hard-task to confirm that these 
participants did not drive the findings. In total, one participant only chose 
the easy task and there were no participants who only chose the hard 
task. Removal of this participant weakened the evidence of a main effect 
of group (p = .051). 
3.3.2.3. Sweet Taste Test  
Based on a priori criteria, participants who reported detection of sugar in 




not be calculated. This excluded 5 participants. In total, 61 participants 
(31 low anhedonia, 30 high anhedonia) were included in the analysis.  
Analysis was done on log transformed data, which then met the 
assumption of normality. There was evidence of a main effect of group, 
F(1,57) = 4.56,  p = .037, np2 = .07. The high anhedonia group required a 
higher concentration of sucrose to detect its presence compared to the 
low anhedonia group, see Figure 3.6. Removing one outlier strengthened 
the evidence of a main effect of Group (p = .015, np2 = .10). 
Interestingly, further investigation of this outlier revealed that this 
participant scored the highest on the apathy scale in the low anhedonia 
group (AES score = 38). The evidence of a main effect of group did not 
differ when run on non-transformed data (p = .020) or using a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U test with the covariate excluded (p = .016). 
There was no evidence of a main effect of smoking status, F(2,57) = .41, p 














Figure 3.6. Difference between the high and low anhedonia group in the 
Sweet Taste Test. Individual points represent individual participants. N = 31 




3.3.3. Exploratory Analyses  
3.3.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In total, 101 participants were included in the analysis. There was missing 
data for some self-report measures, see Table 3.2. For correlations 
between self-report measures, see Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.2. Distribution of scores on self-report measures. 
 
Table 3.3. Correlations between self-report measures. 
  
Variable  Number Mean SD 
SHAPS 101 21.4 5.6 
CPAS 100 12.6 7.3 
TEPS – Anticipatory 100 45.6 7.2 
TEPS – Consummatory  101 36.6 7.0 
Beck Depression Inventory-II 100 8.9 6.8 
Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES)  100 28.6 6.1 
 
SHAPS CPAS TEPS-A TEPS-C  BDI-II AES 
SHAPS 
 
.43** -.58** -.58** .29** .49** 
CPAS 
  
-.52** -.67** .28** .48** 
TEPS – A 
   
.65** -.26** -.42** 
TEPS – C 
    
-.27** -.53** 
BDI-II 
     
.47** 
Spearman’s rho, N = 99 - 101, *<.05, **<.01. Anhedonia scales: SHAPS, CPAS, TEPS (A, 
anticipatory; C, consummatory). Depression scale: BDI-II. Apathy scale: AES. 
 
  
Abbreviations: SHAPS, Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale; CPAS, Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale; 
TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale. Note: missing data (N = 1) for CPAS, TEPS-
Anticipatory, BDI-II and AES where a participant either recorded more than one response to a 






3.3.3.2. Correlations between tasks and self-report measures  
In line with the original findings of the EEfRT, there was evidence of a 
negative correlation between trait anhedonia (CPAS) and proportion of 
hard-task choices (r(100) = -.29, p = .003; see Table 3.4), which was 
observed across all probability levels (ps ≤ .028). On low probability 
trials, there was also evidence of a correlation between hard-task choice 
and the anticipatory scale on the TEPS (r(100) = .21, p =.039) and the 
SHAPS (r(101) = -.21, p = .036). 
In the Sweet Taste Test, there was evidence of a positive correlation 
between mean detection threshold and symptoms of depression (BDI-II; 
r(92) = .27, p =.010), anhedonia (SHAPS: r(92) = .27, p = .008; CPAS: r(91) 
= .22, p = .033), and apathy (AES; r(91) = .23, p = .026; see Table 3.4), 
and weaker evidence with the TEPS-CON (r(92) = -.19, p = .076). 
Participants who had higher symptoms of depression, apathy and 
anhedonia required a higher concentration of sucrose to detect its 
presence, see Table 3.4.  
In the JORT, to facilitate correlation analyses, individual slopes (force 
exerted across the four reward magnitudes) were extracted for each 
participant (Pfister et al., 2013). There was no clear evidence of a 











3.3.3.3. Correlations between tasks  
There was evidence of a positive correlation between proportion of hard-
task choices on the EEfRT and average force slopes on the JORT, r(101) = 
.21, p = .039, participants who were more willing to choose the high 
effort/high reward option exerted more force for higher compared to 
lower reward magnitudes on the JORT. There was no evidence of a 
correlation between the EEfRT and Sweet Taste Test (p = .84) or JORT 
and Sweet Taste Test (p = .49).  
3.3.3.4. GEE models for the EEfRT 
The first model examined the main effect of reward magnitude, 
probability, expected value and trait anhedonia (measured using the 
CPAS). This model found evidence that reward magnitude and expected 
value were positive predictors of hard-task choice and trial number was a 





 SHAPS R -.09 -.14 .27** 
p-value .38 .16 .008 
CPAS R -.03 -.29** .22* 
p-value .79 .003 .033 
TEPS–A R .001 .16 -.15 
p-value .99 .12 .17 
TEPS–C R -.07 .09 -.19 
p-value .50 .39 .076 
BDI-II R -.04 -.06 .27* 
p-value .70 .55 .010 
Apathy 
Scale 
R .01 -.04 .23* 
p-value .91 .66 .026 
Abbreviations: STT, Sweet Taste Test - mean detection threshold; EEfRT, Effort Expenditure for 
Reward Task – overall proportion of hard task choices; JORT, Joystick Operated Runway Task – slope 
of average force across the four reward magnitudes; SHAPS, Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale; CPAS, 
Revised Chapman Physical Anhedonia Scale; TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (A, 
Anticipatory; C, Consummatory); BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory II; Apathy Scale, Apathy 





negative predictor of hard-task choice. There was also some weak 
evidence that the CPAS was a negative predictor of hard-task choice and 
probability was a positive predictor of hard-task choice. These findings 
are consistent with Treadway et al. (2009), who reported all parameters 
to be predictors of hard-task choice. 
Models 2, 3 and 4 tested for an interaction between trait anhedonia 
(CPAS score) and: probability (model 2), reward magnitude (model 3) 
and expected value (model 3). There was no evidence that any of these 





Table 3.5. GEE models for the EEfRT. 
  
  Β SE 95% WALD CI P QIC 
MODEL 
1 
     4560.96 
 Trial Number -.013 .00 -.022 to -.005 .002  
 Probability 1.099 .62 -.114 to 2.312 .076  
 Reward 1.061 .35 .381 to 1.740 .002  
 Expected Value 2.597 .45 1.718 to 3.477 <.001  
 CPAS -.031 .02 -.064 to .002 .063  
MODEL 
2 
     4563.03 
 Trial Number -.014 .00 -.022 to -.005 .002  
 Probability 1.003 .74 -.445 to 2.452 .174  
 Reward 1.066 .36 .369 to 1.763 .003  
 Expected Value 2.60 .46 1.705 to 3.494 <.001  
 CPAS -.037 .02 -.071 to -.002 .036  
 CPAS x 
Probability 
.009 .03 -.058 to .076 .797  
MODEL 
3 
     4559.79 
 Trial Number -.013 .00 -.022 to -.005 .002  
 Probability 1.063 .58 -.067 to 2.193 .065  
 Reward 1.173 .49 .218 to 2.127 .016  
 Expected Value 2.638 .41 1.826 to 3.450 <.001  
 CPAS -.018 .04 -.102 to .065 .666  
 CPAS x Reward -.013 .03 -.066 to .040 .625  
MODEL 
4 
     4748.22 
 Trial Number -.005 .00 -.012 to .002 .152  
 Probability 1.043 .62 -.164 to 2.251 .090  
 Reward .657 .35 -.026 to 1.340 .059  
 Expected Value 3.890 1.09 1.749 to 6.031 <.001  
 CPAS -.011 .03 -.074 to .052 .734  
 CPAS x Expected 
Value 





Using a battery of tasks, this study found that different components of 
reward may be dissociable in people, as demonstrated by the lack of 
correlations between tasks. In relation to anhedonia (measured using the 
SHAPS), there was no clear evidence of a difference between the high 
and low anhedonia group in physical effort exerted for reward (JORT). 
However, compared to the low anhedonia group, the high anhedonia 
group displayed marginal differences in effort-based decision-making 
(EEfRT) and reduced reward sensitivity (Sweet Taste Test). Importantly, 
whilst there was no evidence of a difference between groups on the JORT, 
there was a correlation between the JORT and the EEfRT which suggests 
that these tasks may tap into a similar construct (motivation). The 
sensitivity of the EEfRT to detect changes related to anhedonia may be 
due to the additional cognitive decision-making component involved in 
this task, which is not present in the JORT. 
3.4.1. Reward motivation and anhedonia 
In the JORT, there was no clear evidence of a difference between the high 
and low anhedonia group (Figure 3.3). Both groups exerted more physical 
force for higher reward trials. This suggests that people with higher levels 
of anhedonia, at least in a non-clinical population, do not display deficits 
in their exertion of physical effort for reward. Using a human PRT, 
Hershenberg and colleagues (2016) found that people with depression 
displayed reduced motivation (i.e., a lower breakpoint) compared to 
healthy controls (Hershenberg et al., 2016). However, the PRT task used 
in this study required cognitive effort (not physical effort) and requires 
explicit decision-making (i.e., whether to accept or reject a trial). 
Additionally, the translational validity of the PRT has been questioned due 
to the rodent version failing to find a reduced breakpoint in some models 
of depression (chronic mild stress and maternal separation; Barr & 
Phillips, 1998; Shalev & Kafkafi, 2002). Nevertheless, Clery-Melin (2011) 
found that compared to healthy volunteers, people with depression 
exerted less physical force to maximize their monetary rewards on a 




in a button pressing task, where higher levels of anhedonia in depressed 
adolescents (TEPS – anticipatory score) was associated with reduced 
number of button presses for chocolate (Rzepa & McCabe, 2019). 
However, this finding was not found in a similar experiment (Rzepa et al., 
2017). Whilst these studies may seem to conflict the findings presented 
here, it is important to note that this study included a non-clinical 
population, measuring anhedonia as a continuous trait, as opposed to 
clinical depression. 
In the EEfRT, the high anhedonia group displayed a reduced proportion of 
hard-task choices, compared to the low anhedonia group (Figure 3.4). 
However, the evidence for this result was weak when an outlier was 
removed, and there was no evidence of a clear difference between groups 
on 50% probability trials, as predicted in the pre-registration. Whilst 
there was no robust difference between the high and low anhedonia 
group (based on the SHAPS) on the EEfRT, the exploratory analysis did 
replicate the original Treadway et al. (2009) finding that higher trait 
anhedonia (measured using the CPAS) was associated with reduced hard-
task choices on the EEfRT (Tables 3.4 and 3.5; Treadway et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, both this study and the Treadway study found an 
association between the EEfRT and CPAS, but failed to find a robust 
association between the EEfRT and SHAPS (Subramaniapillai et al., 2019; 
Treadway et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2014). As these anhedonia 
questionnaires vary in a number of ways (e.g., format, temporal scale 
and content; see section 1.3.4), it is difficult to pin down why the EEfRT 
may correlate more reliably with the CPAS than the SHAPS. One 
possibility is that the SHAPS focuses more on consummation of reward (“I 
would enjoy my favourite meal”) whereas the CPAS also includes 
questions on desire for future reward (“I have had very little desire to try 
new kinds of foods”), with the latter being more related to the EEfRT 
(although see Tran et al., 2020)(Leventhal et al., 2006; Rizvi et al., 
2016). Overall, this finding highlights the value of employing multiple 
anhedonia questionnaires and suggests that these measures should not 




There was a positive correlation between the JORT and EEfRT, which 
suggests that these tasks may involve overlapping behaviours related to 
motivation. However, only the EEfRT was related to anhedonia. A clear 
difference between these tasks is that the EEfRT examines decision-
making (Treadway et al., 2009; similar to the rodent choice-based tasks), 
where a participant must weigh up the value of two alternative options, 
whereas the JORT (more similar to the PRT) measures physical effort 
exerted for a reward without explicit decision-making. Speculatively, 
anhedonia may not be related to reduced exertion of physical effort for 
reward when engaged in an activity, but rather in the explicit choice to 
engage in an effortful activity for reward (decision-making; Halahakoon et 
al., 2020). Further support for this may come from the finding that there 
was no clear evidence of a difference between groups in button pressing 
speed on the EEfRT. This suggests that participants were just as willing to 
exert effort once engaged in an effortful task. The sensitivity of the EEfRT 
to detect changes related to anhedonia may be due to the additional 
cognitive demands of this task (J. A. Cooper et al., 2019), which are not 
present in the JORT. In relation to the rodent literature, these findings 
suggest that effort-based choice tasks may provide a more sensitive 
measure of the motivational impairments related to anhedonia than the 
physical effort-for-reward tasks (such as the PRT). Nevertheless, it is 
important to consider alternative explanations which may account this 
finding such as the methodological differences between tasks (e.g., 
presence of probabilistic cues, reward sizes).  
3.4.2. Reward sensitivity and anhedonia 
In the Sweet Taste Test, the high anhedonia group displayed a reduced 
sensitivity to sucrose compared to the low anhedonia group (Figure 3.5). 
As mentioned in section 1.4.5.2, the majority of studies using this task 
have compared people with a clinical diagnosis (such as depression) to 
healthy controls, and found conflicting results (Amsterdam et al., 1987; 
Berlin et al., 1998; Dichter et al., 2010). In relation to anhedonia, 
Bedwell (2019) reported that sucrose sensitivity did not relate to 
anhedonia measures in a non-clinical population (Bedwell et al., 2019). 




sensitivity is measured. Many previous studies have measured sweet 
taste intensity on a point scale (i.e., rate the intensity of a given sucrose 
solution; Bedwell et al., 2019; Dichter et al., 2010). In contrast, this 
study examined detection threshold (i.e., the point at which sucrose could 
be detected; similar to Berlin et al., 1998). It has been suggested that 
point scales may not be sensitive enough to reliably detect subtle 
impairments in the sweet taste test (McCabe, 2018). Future studies 
should examine whether this effect is specific to pleasant stimuli (e.g., 
sucrose), or whether it could also be observed using negative stimuli 
(e.g., bitter tastes). This will allow us to address whether a dysfunction in 
sensitivity is specific to rewarding stimuli, or whether it reflects a general 
reduction in sensitivity. In sum, this study provides evidence that 
anhedonia in a non-clinical population is related to reduced reward 
sensitivity.  
Taken together, using a battery of translational tasks designed to probe 
different components of reward, this study supports and extends 
preclinical findings by revealing that these components may also be 
dissociable in people. This is demonstrated by a lack of correlations 
between tasks: individuals who were less willing to choose the hard-task 
choice on the EEfRT did not display reduced sensitivity on the Sweet 
Taste Test. This extends preclinical finding of dissociable components of 
reward by observing a dissociation in humans using tasks translated from 
preclinical research. In this study, anhedonia was related to reduced 
motivation on effort-based decision-making task and reduced reward 
sensitivity. However, this does not seem to reflect a general reward 
deficit, indexed by the lack of correlation between tasks. Instead, these 
findings support the idea that anhedonia may be a heterogenous 
symptom. Specifically, there may be sub-groups of individuals who have 
dysfunction in different components of reward (e.g., consummatory, 
decisional) (Thomsen et al., 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2013). Whilst this 
hypothesis has been proposed before, to my knowledge it has not been 
directly tested. This is because most studies employ a single reward 
processing task alongside an anhedonia questionnaire. Further studies 




learning) and self-report measures in a clinical population are needed to 
directly address this question.  
3.4.3. Limitations 
There was a higher proportion of males in the high anhedonia group 
(53%) compared to the low anhedonia group (21%), which may have 
influenced the differences between groups. However, including sex as an 
exploratory covariate in all analysis did not change the overall findings. 
Interestingly, few studies have investigated sex differences in anhedonia, 
and thus it is unknown whether the higher proportion of males in the high 
anhedonia group reflects a real sex difference in anhedonia (Chan et al., 
2012; Yang et al., 2020) or whether this is a result of sampling.  
Second, the data in the current study did not always meet the ANOVA 
assumptions such as normality of residuals and homogeneity of variances 
between groups, which could reduce the confidence in our findings. 
Nevertheless, ANOVA is relatively robust to slight violations to the 
assumption of normality provided it is not due to the presence of extreme 
outliers (Field, 2005).  
Third, I was not blind to participant group (high or low anhedonia). This is 
a limitation because if an experimenter is not blind to the participant 
group, it can result in the observer-expectancy effect (i.e., my 
expectations may have unintentionally influenced the participant’s 
behaviour). Whilst I did employ standardised instructions and procedures 
across all tasks to reduce biases, to eliminate the possibility of this bias 
would have required blinding to group (high or low anhedonia).  
Fourth, it is possible that differences in behaviour on these tasks may not 
reflect differences in reward processing per se. For example, performance 
on these tasks could be due general impairments in perception (sweet 
taste test) or working memory deficits (EEfRT). Future studies would 





3.4.4. Future Directions 
Based on these findings, there are benefits to employing this battery 
approach and therefore using a battery of translational tasks in a clinical 
population such as depression (Chapter 5) is needed. This study 
examined anhedonia symptoms in a non-clinical population. Whilst there 
are benefits of examining anhedonia a non-clinical sample (e.g., reduced 
likelihood of cognitive deficits, medication use and comorbidity), 
anhedonia levels in the clinical population are higher and may be 
qualitatively different.  
Another area for future research is to incorporate a translational reward 
learning and memory task. Whilst this study focused on two main 
components of reward (motivation and sensitivity), another component of 
reward which may be compromised in anhedonia is reward learning and 
memory (Thomsen, 2015). Examining reward learning and memory in 
relation to anhedonia is important as it may help to inform recent debates 
on the conceptualisation and definition of anhedonia (i.e., whether there 
may be a sub-group of anhedonia patients with reward learning deficits; 
see section 1.3.2).  
To conclude, this study found a dissociation between different 
components of reward (effort-for-reward, effort-based decision-making 
and reward sensitivity) using a battery of behavioural tasks (based on 
rodent tasks) in humans. Symptoms of anhedonia were related to 
reduced reward sensitivity and altered effort-based decision-making. 
Interestingly, as performance on the effort-based decision-making 
(EEfRT) and reward sensitivity (Sweet Taste Test) tasks did not correlate 
in this study, this could suggest heterogeneity within anhedonia 
(Thomsen, 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2013). Specifically, it is possible that 
some people with anhedonia may display impairments in their sensitivity 
to reward, whilst others may display impairments in decision-making to 
maximize reward. If this finding is also found in clinical populations, it 
could have important implications for the assessment and treatment of 





 Chapter 4: Developing a 
translational reward learning and 
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Chapter Aim: Develop a reward learning and memory task in a non-
clinical population based on a rodent task: the reward learning assay 
(RLA).  
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Depression and its symptoms are poorly understood and often resistant 
to available treatments (DeRubeis et al., 2005; Fava & Davidson, 1996; 
Trivedi et al., 2006). Despite large investments from pharmaceutical 
companies, the overall success rate of novel antidepressants in clinical 
trials remains low (Belzung, 2014; Garner, 2014). Specifically, most 
drugs (~90%) that appear promising in preclinical trials fail to show 
efficacy in clinical trials (referred to as the "translational gap"; Belzung, 
2014; Garner, 2014). This is important because it has not only resulted in 
poor drug discovery for depression, but it has also led pharmaceutical 
companies to divert investments away from drug development for 
psychiatric conditions (Insel et al., 2013). Although several factors may 
contribute to this failure, a critical one is the discrepancy in how 
depression and its symptoms are measured in preclinical and clinical 
research (see section 1.4.5). To bridge this translational gap, there is a 
need for objective measures of symptoms of depression that can be used 
in both human and rodent research.  
One promising candidate biomarker of depression, which may be 
particularly relevant for the symptom of anhedonia, is reward learning 
and memory (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Thomsen, 2015). In recent years, 
there has been exciting progress in translational research on reward 
learning using tasks such as the response bias probabilistic reward task 
(Der-Avakian et al., 2013; Pizzagalli et al., 2005), probabilistic reversal 
learning task (Bari et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2002), and the probabilistic 
stimulus selection task (Frank et al., 2004; see section 1.4.5.3). These 
have been referred to as “implicit” learning tasks because although 
participants are consciously aware of their choices on these tasks, they 
are not consciously aware of the underlying rules of the task such as the 
relationship between cues and their associated feedback (Frank et al., 
2004). Studies using these tasks have shown that people with 
depression, and particularly those with higher levels of anhedonia, show 




Although these human paradigms have provided critical insights, there is 
a need for new reward learning and memory tasks in humans. One 
reason for this is that most assays have focused on “online learning”, 
examining learning and memory over a short period of time (usually 
minutes; Wimmer et al., 2018). However, this contrasts preclinical tasks 
which often examine learning over several days or even weeks. This is 
important for translational research as it may result in different 
mechanisms underpinning the human and rodent tasks. Second, recent 
work has shown that reward learning over short time frames could, at 
least in part, be underpinned by working memory (Wimmer et al., 2018; 
Wimmer & Poldrack, 2020). This is an important potential confound in 
clinical studies given that many clinical populations have impairments in 
working memory (Christopher & MacDonald, 2005; Lee & Park, 2005; 
Nikolin et al., 2021; Rose & Ebmeier, 2006; Wang et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, most reward learning paradigms have focused on 
probabilistic learning. However, rewards in everyday life also vary in their 
value (i.e., the quality or quantity of the reward). To my knowledge, 
there are no translational tasks that measure learning and memory of 
different reward values (i.e., memory of different reward magnitudes). 
Based on this, there is a need for human studies to examine reward 
learning and memory over longer time frames and of different values of 
reward. This may improve translation between human and rodent work 
and provide a more in-depth understanding of the precise reward learning 
deficits in clinical populations.  
Here, I focus on developing a novel human task based on a rodent reward 
learning and memory task: the reward learning assay (RLA; Robinson, 
2018; Stuart et al., 2019). In this assay, typical rats show an intact 
memory for the absolute value of reward (i.e., prefering cues that have 
previously been associated with a high value reward than those 
associated with low reward values; Hinchcliffe et al., 2017; Stuart et al., 
2013, 2019). However, several rodent models used to study depression 
(e.g., chronic pro-depressant drugs, chronic corticosterone and early-life 
adversity) display a blunted or reduced bias; which has been interpreted 




Given these promising findings in preclinical studies, the critical next step 
is to develop a human version of this task. This is necessary to examine 
the predictive validity of the rodent task (Robinson, 2018) and may 
provide an objective measure that can be used in clinical research, 
bridging the translational gap. 
The rodent RLA takes place over five consecutive days and comprises four 
training days followed by a test day (see Figure 4.1). During training, rats 
choose between two bowls containing different digging substrates. They 
learn that one digging substrate is paired with reward (contains sucrose 
pellet/s) whereas the other substrate is paired with no reward (blank). On 
each day, learning is operationalized as six consecutive “correct” trials, at 
which point the session is terminated. Importantly, on some days (e.g., 
days 1 and 3) the rewarded substrate is associated with a high reward (2 
pellets) whereas on other days (e.g., days 2 and 4) a different rewarded 
substrate is paired with a low reward (1 pellet). On the test day (day 5), 
rats are given a choice between the two substrates that have previously 
been associated with a high or low value reward. The main outcome of 
interest is choice bias, that is the tendency of rats to choose the substrate 
previously paired with a high or low reward. To ensure that the test day is 
examining memory for reward (and not new learning), a random 
reinforcement schedule (1 in 3 probability of reward) is used.  
Figure 4.1. Rodent reward learning assay: digging substrates are paired with high reward (A: 
2 pellets), low reward (B: 1 pellet) or no reward (Blank). On the preference test, rats are 
presented with substrates previously paired with a high or low reward (A versus B). Typical rats 
show a bias towards the high reward substrate, whereas rats subjected to models of depression 




4.1.1. Study Aim 
The aim of this study was to develop a human version of the rodent RLA 
to enable the study of similar reward learning and memory deficits in 
depression. The initial task design recapitulated the main details of the 
rodent task and was run over five consecutive days. During the 
associative learning sessions (days 1 – 4), participants perform a two-
alternative choice task whereby they learn to associate different stimuli 
(images) with a high or low reward (points exchanged for money). On the 
test day (day 5), participants are given a choice between images that 
have previously been associated with a high or low value reward. Based 
on the rodent task, we predicted that on the test day, participants will 
have a bias towards choosing the image previously associated with a high 
value reward. Different versions of this basic task design were piloted 
using an online platform (Prolific Academic) to recruit healthy volunteers. 
4.2. General Methods 
Ethics statement. Ethics approval was obtained from the Faculty of Life 
Science at the University of Bristol. All participants provided informed 
consent using an online consent form.  
Power calculation. The studies included here are proof-of-concept studies 
and there was limited information that enabled the estimation of an effect 
size. Given that the purpose of this study was to replicate the large effect 
reported in the rodent task, we planned to recruit a target sample size of 
35 participants to studies, which would provide us with sufficient power 
(.8) to detect a more conservative medium effect (Cohen’s d = 0.5) at 
alpha = .05 for a one-sample t-test against chance performance 
(G*Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2007). However, due to drop-out, the achieved 
sample sizes varied across experiments: Experiment 1 (N = 30), 
Experiment 2 (N = 33) and Experiment 3 (N = 28). To try to account for 
drop-out in Experiment 4, we recruited more participants (N = 50) and 
achieved more than the target sample size (N = 37). Experiment 5 was 
part of a larger study and given that the effect size of interest was 
unclear, we recruited the maximum number of participants based on the 




Data collection. All versions of this task were programmed in JavaScript, 
with the use of plugins from the jsPsych library version 5.0.1 (de Leeuw, 
2015). All studies were conducted online using Prolific Academic 
(www.prolific.co). This platform enables participants to take part in 
experimental research from their own homes (Palan & Schitter, 2018; 
Peer et al., 2017). On Prolific Academic, participants are given a unique 
ID number to ensure anonymity and are then asked to complete 
screening questions about themselves (e.g., demographic information, 
mental and physical health). Researchers can then use these screening 
questions to recruit a specific population. Compared to traditional 
laboratory experiments, this online approach enables researchers to 
recruit more diverse populations, larger sample sizes within a short period 
of time and allows easier administration of longitudinal designs.  
Eligibility criteria. aged 18 – 45 years, current country of residence: UK, 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision (i.e., reported “yes” to the question: 
you can see colour normally, and if you need glasses, you are wearing 
them or contact lenses), no diagnosed mental health condition (i.e., 
reported “no” to Prolific Academic screening question: “Do you have – or 
have you had – a diagnosed, on-going mental health/illness/condition?”), 
nationality: UK. Following the first experiment, subsequent studies also 
included a block-list (participants who had taken part in previous studies 
were not invited to take part in subsequent studies).   
4.3. Experiment 1 
4.3.1. Method 
Participants. Thirty-nine participants were recruited from Prolific 
Academic. Four participants were excluded on Day 1 due to: fast reaction 
times indicating a lack of attention on the task (< 500 ms; N = 2), non-
compliance on the task by failing to make a choice on trials (N = 1) and 
failure to meet the screening criteria (aged over 45; N = 1). In total, 35 
participants were invited to take part in the full study. All participants 
were reimbursed based on the estimated time taken to complete the task 
at a rate of £10/hour. All participants who completed the full study also 




Design. Consistent with the rodent task, this study took place over five 
consecutive days: four training days (Days 1 to 4) followed by a test day 
(Day 5), see Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Example of the 5-day reward learning task. During training, 
participants learn that different images are associated with a high or low absolute 
value of reward. On the test day (Day 5), images previously associated with high 
and low reward are presented together. 
Stimuli. A total of 48 images of inanimate stimuli were used, see Figure 
4.3 for some example images. All images were obtained from the Bank of 
Standardized Stimuli (Brodeur et al., 2010), converted to greyscale and 
were of equal size (280 x 280 pixels). Images were then pseudo-




randomly assigned to one of three groups: high reward (N = 16), low 
reward (N = 16) and no reward (N = 16). The high and low reward 
images were counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Feedback. On high reward days, rewarded images had a higher 
probability of high reward: 5p (16 trials), 10p (24 trials), 50p (40 trials), 
£1 (48 trials). In contrast, on low reward days, rewarded images had a 
higher probability of low reward: 5p (48 trials), 10p (40 trials), 50p (24 
trials), £1 (16 trials). This was done so that the maximum amount of 
money that could be won on the high reward day (£71.20) was 
approximately double that of the low reward day (£34.40). The sequence 
of the feedback was randomised (using random.shuffle in python) but the 
same for all participants. To encourage participants to attend to the 
different monetary amounts, feedback was presented in different colours: 
+5p (purple), + 10p (blue), + 50p (orange), + £1 (yellow), 0p (red), see 
Figure 4.4. At the start of the study, participants were informed that they 
would be paid a proportion of their total winnings (up to £5). 
Reward learning and memory task 
Training days. On each trial, participants are given a choice 
between two images: one image is associated with reward, the other is 
not, see Figure 4.4. Participants are asked to learn which image will win 
them money. They must press “S” key on the keyboard to choose the left 
image or “L” key to choose the right image. Participants have four 
seconds to make a choice, or they are timed out. Each day contains 16 
pairs of images (16 rewarded images, 16 non-rewarded images). Each 
pair is presented eight times, resulting in 128 trials in total. Images are 
presented in a pseudo-random order within each block of trials (8 blocks). 
During training, some days provide high reward feedback (high reward 
days), others provide low reward feedback (low reward days). Days 1 and 
3 always provide the same reward feedback and images, this is also the 
case for days 2 and 4. Therefore, participants learn that one set of 16 
images is linked to one reward amount (day 1 and 3), whereas a different 




Similar to the rodent task, counterbalancing is done by day (whether days  
1+3 or days 2+4 are the “high reward days”) and image set (which 








Figure 4.4. Experiment 1: Schematic of a single trial on the reward learning task (training day). Participants are given a choice between 
two images. Participants have to choose one of the images (one is rewarded with money, the other is not; 4 s), participants are then 




Choice test. On each trial, participants are presented with a pair of 
images: one image has previously been paired with higher a value reward 
(high reward day), the other has previously been paired with a lower 
value reward (low reward day). There are 16 pairs of images presented 8 
times, resulting in 128 trials. The primary outcome in this task is choice 
bias (i.e., bias towards choosing the image previously associated with a 
higher value reward). This is calculated as: (the number of choices made 
for the high reward image / total number of trials) x 100, to provide a 
percentage. Consistent with the rodent task, a value of 50 is subtracted 
from all values. This is done so that any value above 0 indicates a 
positive bias (i.e., a bias towards choosing the high reward image) 
whereas any value below 0 indicates a negative bias (i.e., a bias towards 
choosing the low reward image).   
Data Analysis. MATLAB and GraphPad Prism 9.0 were used to extract and 
visualize the data, respectively. SPSS v24 was used to conduct statistical 
analysis. The primary outcome of interest was bias on the choice test - 
whether participants display a bias towards images previously associated 
with high or low value reward. One-sample t-tests were conducted 
against no bias (0%). The secondary outcome is reaction time and 
learning during the training days (the percentage of correct trials on each 
day). This was checked to rule out the possibility that a lack of bias could 
be due to failure to learn during training.  
4.3.2. Results and Discussion 
Five participants were excluded for the following reasons: not completing 
all 5 days which meant that these participants did not have data on the 
choice test (N = 3), malfunction saving data due to a technical error (N = 
1), incorrect Prolific Academic ID resulting in incorrect counterbalancing 
(N = 1). The final exclusion was necessary because these participants 
would have incorrectly been exposed to the wrong reward-image 
association during one of the training days. In total, 30 participants were 




Training days. During training, most participants demonstrated learning 
the image-reward association, indicated by the mean percentage of 
correct responses during training days: day 1 (M = 74%), day 2 (M = 










Choice test. There was no evidence of a positive bias on the test day, t(29) 
= 1.27, p = .21, M = 3.93, 95% CI -2.39 to 10.25: participants did not 
show a bias towards choosing the images previously paired with a higher 
value reward, see Figure 4.6. To check whether this could be due to 
failure to learn during the training days, the analysis was re-run only 
including participants who scored > 70% correct on all training days. This 






Figure 4.5. Results from training (Experiment 1): overall percentage of trials 














Overall, there was no clear evidence of a positive bias on the choice test. 
Given that some participants did not show strong learning of the reward-
image associations during training (~ 37% did not achieve > 70% correct 
on all training days), the next study aimed to increase learning of the 
reward-image association. 
4.4. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, changes were made to encourage learning of the 
reward-image associations during the training days: (1) reward amounts 
for high and low reward days are now fixed amounts of points (i.e., no 
longer probabilistic), (2) there are now two sets of non-reward images 
(i.e., two blanks; N = 32 non-rewarded images) and (3) on each day, 
rewarded and non-rewarded images are randomly mixed during learning 
(previously they were presented in fixed pairs). To further motivate 
participants on the test day, participants were informed that only the final 
day counted towards their bonus-payment (up to £5).  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Choice bias on the test day (Experiment 1). Scores above 
zero indicate a positive bias (i.e., a bias towards choosing the image 
previously associated with the high value reward). Points represent 





Participants. Forty-four participants were recruited from Prolific Academic. 
Based on a priori criteria, participants who failed to achieve > 60% 
accuracy on Day 1 were not invited to take part in the study (N = 9). 
Thirty-five participants were invited to take part in the full study. All 
participants were reimbursed based on the estimated time taken to 
complete the task at a rate of £10/hour. All participants who completed 
the full study also received an additional bonus-payment of £5.  
Stimuli and Feedback. For details on the stimuli, see Experiment 1. The 
only difference in the stimuli used between this experiment and 
Experiment 1, is that this experiment included another set of non-
rewarded images (N = 16). In Experiment 1, the same non-rewarded 
images were presented on all training days (N = 16). The simplest 
strategy on the previous version would therefore be to avoid the 
unrewarded image (N = 16 images), as opposed to learning which images 
are rewarded (N = 32 images). Here, two sets of unrewarded images are 
used to encourage participants to learn the image-reward associations 
during the training days. In this experiment, feedback is now fixed: high 
reward (+100 points), low reward (+25 points). 
4.4.2. Results and Discussion 
Two participants did not complete all five days and were excluded from 
the analysis. In total, 33 participants were included in the analysis (mean 
age = 29; 25 females). 
Training days. During training, participants demonstrated learning, 
indicated by the mean percentage of correct trials: day 1 (M = 77%), day 












Choice test. There was no evidence of a bias on the choice test, t(32) = 




Figure 4.7. Results from training days (Experiment 2): percentage of trials 
correct. Error bars represent SEM. N = 33. 
Figure 4.8. Choice bias on the test day (Experiment 2). Scores above zero 
indicate a positive bias (i.e., a bias towards choosing the image previously 
associated with high value reward). Points represent participants. Error 





Overall, whilst participants displayed learning during the training days, 
there was no clear evidence of a positive bias on the choice test. One 
possible reason for this could be the difficulty of the task (e.g., too many 
images to learn), which may have made it difficult for participants to 
recall which images are associated with high versus low points.  
4.5. Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, changes were made to reduce the difficulty of the task. 
This involved halving the number of images (16 images in each set was 
reduced to 8 images in each set). This meant that there were: 8 high 
reward images, 8 low reward images, two sets of non-rewarded images 
(i.e., two blanks; N = 16 non-rewarded images in total). Additionally, the 
instructions on the final day explicitly asked participants to try to 
maximize their points by choosing the image associated with high reward 
(+ 100 points) on previous days. This makes the effect of interest an 
explicit memory bias, rather than an implicit bias. Given the possibility 
that rodents are employing an explicit memory on the RLA, the focus of 
this task was to assess explicit memory for higher reward images.  
two sets of non-reward images (i.e., two blanks; N = 32 non-rewarded 
images) 
4.5.1. Method 
Participants. Fifty participants were recruited from Prolific Academic. 
Fifteen participants were excluded on Day 1 due to not obtaining > 60% 
accuracy. Thirty-five participants were invited to take part in the full 
study. All participants were reimbursed based on the estimated time 
taken to complete the task at a rate of £10/hour. All participants who 







4.5.2. Results and Discussion 
Seven participants did not complete the full study and were excluded 
from the analysis. In total, 28 participants were included in the analysis 
(mean age = 31; 17 female). 
Training days. Participants demonstrated learning of the image-reward 
associations during the training sessions, indicated by the percentage of 
trials correct on each day: day 1 (M = 79%), day 2 (M = 81%), day 3 (M 









Choice test. There was weak evidence of a positive bias (M = 6.14, 95% 
CI = -.01 to 12.29) on the choice test, t(27) = 2.05, p =.050: participants 
exhibited a memory for the images previously associated with a higher 






Figure 4.9. Results from training days (Experiment 3): overall percentage of trials 





Overall, there was weak evidence of a positive reward-induced bias on 
the choice test. As we aimed to include this task in a clinical study 
(Chapter 5), the next experiment was designed to increase the strength 
of this positive bias. 
4.6. Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4, two changes were made to the task. First, the number 
of repetitions of each image was increased from 8 repetitions to 12 
repetitions (96 trials in total) to enhance learning of the image-reward 
association in participants. Second, the final day instructions informed 
participants that they must choose the high reward image on at least 
60% trials to receive the bonus payment. This was done to further 
motivate participants to use their memory of the value of rewards on the 
final day. 
4.6.1. Method 
Participants. Fifty-four participants were recruited from Prolific Academic. 
Four participants were excluded on Day 1 due to not achieving > 60% 
accuracy. Fifty participants were invited to take part in the full study. All 
participants were reimbursed based on the estimated time taken to 
Figure 4.10. Choice bias on the test day (Experiment 3). Scores above 
zero indicate a positive bias (i.e., bias towards images previously 
associated with high value reward). Points represent participants. Error 




complete the task at a rate of £10/hour. All participants who completed 
the full study also received an additional bonus-payment of £5. 
Data Analysis. This was similar to previous experiments, although the 
calculation of accuracy was adjusted: (number of trials correct image was 
chosen / number of trials responded) x 100.  
4.6.2. Results and Discussion 
Thirty-seven participants completed the full study (mean age = 31 years; 
26 females) and were included in the analysis. 
Training days. Participants demonstrated learning of the image-reward 
associations, indicated by the percentage of trials correct during the 
training days: Day 1 (M = 86%), Day 2 (M = 87%), Day 3 (93%), Day 4 










Choice Test. There was evidence of a positive bias on the choice test (M = 
12.83, 95% CI = 5.90 to 19.77), t(36) = 3.67, p = .001: participants 
exhibited a bias towards choosing the image previously paired with the 
higher value reward, see Figure 4.12.  
Figure 4.11. Results of training days (Experiment 4): percentage of trials correct 





Overall, there was evidence of a positive bias on the choice test. Whilst 
the mean bias is comparable to that reported in the rodent version of this 
task (~ 5 – 10%), the distribution of scores is not similar to the rodent 
task. Specifically, in the rodent task, all rats show a small but consistent 
positive bias. However, here there is large variability in the bias scores, 
with some participants achieving ceiling effects (i.e., demonstrating a 
strong memory of the images and their associated values). It is possible 
that explicitly asking participants to remember the high reward images 
resulted in them using different cognitive strategies to solve the task, 
with some participants employing higher cognitive strategies than would 
be used in rodents. In support of this concern, at the end of the study, 
participants were asked how they chose between different images on the 
choice test. Participants reported a range of different strategies (e.g., 
guessing, verbal rehearsal of images, choosing based on yesterday’s 
images, employing a “memory map”). To try to replicate the pattern of 
findings similar to the RLA, a new task was developed (Experiment 5), 
which was designed to tap into an implicit memory bias. 
 
Figure 4.12. Choice bias on the test day (Experiment 4). Scores above zero 
indicate a positive bias (i.e., a bias towards choosing the image previously 
associated with high value reward). Points represent participants. Error bars 




4.7. Experiment 5 
Given the higher cognitive strategies being used by some participants in 
the previous experiment, which cannot be being used by rodents, a novel 
task was created. This task was designed to assess a person’s implicit 
memory for the value of reward (“feeling towards a better stimulus”), 
rather than explicit memory. To do this, we used two different cues: a 
primary cue (letters) which participants used during training to solve the 
task and a secondary cue (colours) which was present during training but 
was not used to solve the task. The final day, which involved random 
feedback, assessed whether participants would show a bias towards the 
secondary cue (colour) which was present on high reward days. 
4.7.1. Method 
Participants. One-hundred and fifty-three participants took part in the 
screening session (day 1). However, participants who failed to achieve 
the a priori learning criteria (75% trials correct; N = 41) or whose data 
did not save due to technical errors (N = 9) were not invited to take part 
in the full study. As this task is an implicit task, I decided to use a stricter 
learning criteria to ensure participants were paying adequate attention to 
the stimuli and task. In total, 103 participants were invited to part in the 
full study. All participants were reimbursed £7.50/hour for their time. All 
participants who completed the full study also received an additional 
bonus-payment (£5 based on this task).  
Design. The design was the same as previous studies, there were four 
training days (Days 1 – 4), followed by a test day (Day 5).  
Stimuli. The images used in this study were arrays of letters, see Figure 
4.13 for examples. The images differed in their proportion of letters and 
colours. During training, there were four sets of images that contained 
different proportions of letters: set A (80% letter S:20% letter J), set B 
(20% letter S: 80% letter J), set C (80% letter C: 20% letter I) and set D 
(20% letter C: 80% letter I). All images contained half of the letters in 
the colour blue, and half of the letters in a different colour: set A and B 
(brown) and set C and D (purple). The test session included two sets of 




images, half of the letters were blue, the other half of the letters were in 
a different colour: brown (set E) or purple (set F). 
Feedback. The feedback was presented as: high reward (+100 points), 
low reward (+25 points) and no reward (+ 0 points). The rewarded 
feedback was presented in white font, the no reward feedback was 
presented in red font. 
Reward Learning and Memory Task 
Training Days. In this task, participants have to learn which images 
are associated with reward (points). On each trial, participants are 
presented with two images which vary in their proportion of letters 
(80:20). For example, one image would contain the letter S > J (80:20), 
whereas the other image would contain the opposite: J > S (80:20). 
Participants have to learn that one image gives them points (e.g., the 
image which contains the letter J > S). As in previous experiments, days 
with high or low reward feedback are alternated. On the high and low 
reward days, the letters (primary cue) and colours of the letters 
(secondary cue) vary. On each day, participants completed 40 trials. 
Counterbalancing was the same as previous experiments, by both day 
and image set. The aim here was to get participants to learn the task 
during training using a primary cue (letters), but to test if they display a 
bias for the secondary cue (colours) on the test day. Participants had 10 
seconds to make a choice. This was followed by feedback (1.75 s) and an 
inter-trial interval (1 s). For example stimuli see Figure 4.13. 
Choice test. On the choice test, participants are presented with 
novel letters (E and T). On each trial, the images differ in their proportion 
of each letter (E>T versus T>E) and in their colour (one image 50% 
brown, other image 50% purple). Similar to the rodent task, participants 
are provided with random reinforcement on this final day (1 in 3 
probability of reward). Half of the rewarded feedback is low value reward 
(+25 points) and half is high value reward (+100 points). The aim of this 
experiment was to see whether participants would have a small bias 
towards choosing the colour (secondary cue) that has previously been 





Figure 4.13. Example stimuli on a low reward day (A), high reward day (B) and choice test (C). During training, participants learn to solve the task 
using the letters (primary cue): choosing J > S on the low reward day, and C > I on the high reward day. The arrays presented on the high and low 
reward days also differ in their colours (secondary cue). On the choice test, participants are presented with novel arrays of letters which differ in their 
letters and colour. Critically, in this example, a positive bias on the choice test would be a bias towards the image containing purple (which was 
presented on the high reward day). On the final day, feedback was randomly reinforced (1 in 3 probability). Note: this is an example, participants 




Data Analysis. The data is analysed similar to previous studies, except 
learning during the training days is not shown. This is because a high 
learning rate (> 75%) of the primary cue was already a requirement for 
inclusion in this study.  
4.7.2. Results and Discussion 
Eighty-four participants completed the full study (mean age = 31, 41 
Female, 32% student status) and are included in the analysis. 
Choice test. There was some weak evidence of a positive bias (M = 2.18, 












Overall, whilst there was weak evidence of a positive bias on this task, 
this effect was not robust. Nevertheless, an advantage of this version 
compared to previous versions is the reduced number of people achieving 
ceiling effects, which was an aim of this study. 
  
Figure 4.14. Choice bias on the test day (Experiment 5). Scores above zero 
indicate a positive bias (i.e., a bias towards choosing the colour previously 
associated with high value reward). Points represent participants. Error bars 




4.8. General Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a reward learning and memory 
task in humans, based on a procedurally and conceptually similar rodent 
task, the RLA. We run 5 versions of this task, all sharing the basic 
structure of the rodent RLA. The task took place over five consecutive 
days. During training, participants learnt that different images were 
associated with different values of reward (high reward, low reward, no 
reward). On the final day, images that were previously associated with a 
high or low value reward were paired together for the first time. Based on 
the rodent task, it was predicted that participants would display a positive 
bias towards the images previously associated with a high value reward, 
demonstrating an intact memory for the value of rewards. There was no 
robust evidence of a positive bias in Experiments one, two and five. 
However, there was evidence of a positive bias in Experiments three and 
four. Therefore, based on a rodent task, we provide a novel multi-day 
reward learning and memory task in humans.  
Some experiments demonstrated evidence of a positive bias (Experiments 
three and four; see Figures 4.10 and 4.12), whereas others did not 
(Experiments one, two and five; see Figures 4.6, 4.8 and 4.14). There are 
several factors that differed between versions that could account for 
these results. One key difference is the extent to which the task provided 
explicit instructions on the choice test. The experiments that did show 
evidence of a bias on the choice test (Experiment three and four) 
explicitly asked participants to use their memory to try to choose the high 
reward images, making the task an explicit memory task. In contrast, the 
instructions in other versions (Experiment one, two and five) were less 
explicit and may have, to some extent, been tapping into an implicit 
memory bias (i.e., the participants may have not consciously recalled the 
images and their associated values; Squire, 2004). Another difference 
between versions is the task difficulty. For example, some of the 
experiments (Experiment one and two) were more cognitively demanding 
– containing a larger number of images - which could have made it too 
challenging to remember the image-reward associations on the choice 




of using a secondary cue and random reinforcement on the test may have 
made this task too difficult. Taken together, these differences show that 
whilst the description of the RLA appears straightforward, the translation 
of this task into a human version requires careful consideration of various 
parameters. 
Examining the face validity of this task (Experiment 3 and 4) as a human 
version of the RLA, the mean bias in the human task appears similar to 
that observed in the rodent task (see Figure 4.10 and 4.12). Specifically, 
participants displayed a small mean bias on the choice test (~ 5-10%), 
providing some face validity for this task. However, a critical difference 
between the human and rodent data is the distribution of the individual 
bias scores: there was a larger distribution of scores in the human version 
compared to the rodent data, with some participants achieving ceiling 
effects. This is an important consideration, as it may suggest that 
participants are using fundamentally different mechanisms to solve the 
task. For example, when participants were asked how they chose 
between images on the choice test, they reported a range of strategies, 
such as choosing based on yesterday’s images, verbal rehearsal of the 
images during learning, guessing, using a “memory map”. This reveals 
that participants were using very different strategies to solve the task, 
with some participants employing higher cognitive strategies. In turn, this 
may have resulted in high variability and ceiling effects. Therefore, whilst 
we have developed a novel multi-day reward learning and memory task 
in humans, caution should be taken at this early stage in interpreting this 
task as analogous to the RLA.  
4.8.1. Strengths and Limitations 
A key strength of this study is its translational approach, which is 
important for several reasons. First, it may help to bridge the gap 
between animal and human research (Aylward et al., 2019). Second, it 
may allow us to leverage one of the important strengths of preclinical 
research – its ability to gain insight into the causal neurobiological 
mechanisms underpinning behaviour; which is critical for the 
development of rationalised new antidepressants (Robinson, 2016; 




research, there is a burgeoning need to develop cross-species behavioural 
assays (Barron et al., 2020; Der-Avakian & Pizzagalli, 2018; Pike et al., 
2021). 
Second, this task assessed learning and memory over multiple days. This 
is in contrast to the majority of studies used in the literature, which 
assess learning and memory within a single session (Wimmer et al., 
2018; Wimmer & Poldrack, 2020). This is an important consideration 
because learning within a massed session may recruit different cognitive 
and neural mechanisms compared to longitudinal paradigms (see 
Wimmer et al., 2018). This has crucial implications for (1) translational 
research, as most rodent reward learning tasks are conducted over 
several days or weeks and (2) understanding the precise reward learning 
and memory deficits present in clinical populations (Collins et al., 2014; 
Wimmer & Poldrack, 2020) 
Third, this study included a more diverse sample compared to most 
laboratory studies (Henrich et al., 2010). Psychology studies often recruit 
opportunity samples from within the university. A limitation of this 
approach is that the samples are less representative of the typical 
population (e.g., younger age, higher educational attainment, 
predominantly female), which limits the external validity of the findings 
(Henrich et al., 2010). In contrast, recruiting participants from online 
platforms such as Prolific Academic enables a more diverse demographic 
(geographical, socio-economic, ethnic) which is vital for improving the 
generalizability of the results (Peer et al., 2017). 
One limitation of this task is that whilst it is procedurally similar to the 
RLA, there are several elements that differ between the two. For 
example, one difference is the presence of random reinforcement on the 
choice test. In the RLA, rats receive random reinforcement (1 in 3 
probability of reward) on the choice test. This is done only to encourage 
the rats to respond and is not considered to be a critical component of the 
task. As humans can be asked to respond on the final day, random 
reinforcement was not used (in the first four versions). However, it is 




important role: speculatively, healthy rats may learn the cue-reward 
association during training and use this to guide behaviour in the face of 
misleading negative feedback on the test day. In contrast, rats with 
depressive-like phenotypes may learn the cue-reward associations but 
abandon their memory when given incorrect feedback on the test day. 
Therefore, depressed-like phenotype rats may have a memory for the 
substrates and their associated value, but may abandon this memory 
upon receiving negative feedback. Accordingly, the human literature has 
shown that people with depression are more likely to discount past 
reward history when given misleading negative feedback (Dombrovski et 
al., 2010; Murphy et al., 2003; Tavares et al., 2008). Therefore, in 
hindsight, it may have been advantageous to create a procedurally 
identical paradigm to increase the likelihood of translation between tasks. 
A potential confound of this task is the use of language. This 
encompasses two aspects of the task: the stimuli (images of objects that 
can be verbally encoded and rehearsed) and the explicit written 
instructions provided to participants (Haaker et al., 2019). Both of these 
factors may have resulted in participants employing different, and higher, 
cognitive strategies to solve the task. For example, some participants 
reported using language to solve the task (e.g., verbal rehearsal of 
images during training, employing a “memory map”). To encourage 
translation between rodent and human studies, it may be advantageous 
to use stimuli that cannot be easily rehearsed (e.g., abstract images or 
sounds that are not easily verbalised; see Golubock & Janata, 2013) and 
to limit the use of verbal instructions in the task (Der-Avakian & 
Pizzagalli, 2018; Haaker et al., 2019).  
Whilst there are advantages of conducting online behavioural experiments 
(e.g., diverse larger samples, efficiency), a limitation of this approach is 
the inability to conduct the experiment in a controlled, distraction-free 
environment (Palan & Schitter, 2018). Although studies have replicated 
findings from laboratory behavioural paradigms online (e.g., Stroop task, 
flanker task, attentional blink), there are concerns regarding tasks that 
assess cognitive-learning (see Crump et al., 2013). Consequently, it is 




influenced by reduced attention from online participants. This could also 
explain the poor learning rate in Experiment 5 (which resulted in a high 
exclusion rate). Given the increasing number of studies being conducted 
online, it is critical that future studies demonstrate comparable findings in 
online studies using cognitive tasks typically used in the laboratory.  
4.8.2. Future Directions 
Future studies are needed to further develop this task as a translational 
assay. Based on the findings presented here, a promising approach could 
be to replicate this task using identical parameters to those used in the 
rodent task (Der-Avakian & Pizzagalli, 2018). The only exception to this 
being the modality (it may be beneficial to consider stimuli that are not 
easily verbalised) and reward (it is not possible to give food rewards 
online). To automate this task and enable flexibility in its administration 
(e.g., online or in the laboratory), one could employ a 3D virtual 
environment. Enhancing the similarity between the human and rodent 
tasks across all parameters may aid the translation across species (Der-
Avakian & Pizzagalli, 2018; Haaker et al., 2019). In support of this 
approach, the use of almost identical paradigms (including virtual 
environments to simulate the rodent tasks) has enabled successful cross-
species translation of a number of behavioural tasks (Aylward et al., 
2019; Barron et al., 2020; Der-Avakian et al., 2013; Wooldridge et al., 
2020).  
Examining reward learning and memory in clinical populations using 
longitudinal paradigms may also be promising. Previous studies have 
proposed that patients with clinical disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, 
depression) or symptoms of these disorders (e.g., anhedonia) show 
deficits in reward learning (Frank et al., 2004; Pizzagalli et al., 2005, 
2008; Waltz et al., 2007). However, more recent studies have suggested 
that reward learning deficits in some patient populations, such as 
schizophrenia, could be better explained by working memory deficits 
(Collins et al., 2014). To gain a better understanding of the precise 




should also consider reward learning and memory using longitudinal 
paradigms (Chapter 5).  
In summary, this study provides a novel multi-day reward learning and 
memory task in humans, and demonstrates the feasibility of running this 
longitudinal task on an online platform. Whilst this chapter does provide 
some face validity of this assay as a translational measure of the RLA, the 
findings do not provide convincing evidence that this version is tapping 
into the same mechanism as the rodent task. Based on this, further 
studies are needed to develop this assay in humans and provide evidence 





 Chapter 5: Depression and Reward 
Processing 
 
Chapter Aim: Examine the three main components of reward processing 
(reward sensitivity, reward motivation and reward learning and memory) 
using a battery of tasks in a population of people who meet criteria for 
major depressive disorder. 
 
Acknowledgements: Professor David Kessler for providing input into the 
recruitment and running of the study.  
 
Note: Due to COVID-19, this study had to be stopped before reaching the 
pre-registered sample size. Here, I present the data collected so far as a 
preliminary data set. Given that the study is not powered to detect the 








Depression is a highly prevalent and debilitating condition. Although 
effective treatments do exist, there are a large proportion of patients who 
do not adequately respond to these treatments (DeRubeis et al., 2005; 
Fava & Davidson, 1996; McManus et al., 2009). One major hindrance in 
the development of novel rationalised treatments is our poor mechanistic 
understanding of depression and its symptoms, at both the behavioural 
and neurobiological level (Kaltenboeck & Harmer, 2018). Dysfunctional 
reward processing has been proposed as a promising mechanism involved 
in the development of depression, which may be particularly relevant for 
the symptom of anhedonia (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Kaltenboeck & 
Harmer, 2018; Nielson et al., 2020). However, the precise impairments 
remain elusive (section 1.4.5) as most studies do not attempt to measure 
different sub-components of reward processing within the same study 
(Nielson et al., 2020). Moreover, it is unclear whether reward processing 
deficits in depression are moderated or mediated by the symptom of 
anhedonia (measured using anhedonia questionnaires), or if they are 
related to other symptoms of depression (Keren et al., 2018). Gaining a 
clearer understanding of the relationship between depression, anhedonia 
and reward processing is important as it may provide a potential 
biomarker and treatment target for depression (Nielson et al., 2020).  
Dysfunction in one or more of the following components of reward may 
underpin depression and its symptoms: reward motivation, reward 
sensitivity and/or reward learning and memory (see section 1.4.3). There 
has been exciting progress in the field using translational behavioural 
paradigms in people with depression (Berlin et al., 1998; Pizzagalli et al., 
2005; Treadway et al., 2009), but there are gaps in the current literature 
that need to be addressed. First, few studies have examined multiple 
components of reward processing using a battery of tasks in the same 
patient population. This is unfortunate because it may result in erroneous 
conclusions being drawn (Nielson et al., 2020). For example, it is unclear 
whether people with depression have a generalised reward deficit (people 
with poorer reward motivation also have poorer reward learning and 




a battery of tasks in the same individuals instead may enable us to 
dissociate between reward processes and provide a more holistic 
understanding (Husain & Roiser, 2018; Nielson et al., 2020). Second, few 
studies have directly assessed anhedonia and its severity using anhedonia 
questionnaires (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Keren et al., 2018; McCabe, 
2018; Thomsen et al., 2015). This is important because it has made it 
difficult to decipher whether reward deficits are specifically related to the 
symptom of anhedonia, or if they are related to other symptoms of 
depression (such as fatigue; Nielson et al., 2020) 
This study extends the findings reported in Chapter 3 in two crucial ways. 
Firstly, it employs a battery of tasks in a depressed population. It is still 
unclear whether higher levels of anhedonia in the typical population are 
quantitatively (matter of degree) or qualitatively different from anhedonia 
in a clinical population. Thus, we aimed to assess these tasks in a 
depressed population to examine if the results replicate (which may 
suggest that anhedonia varies quantitatively along a continuum) or 
appear qualitatively different. Secondly, it includes a paradigm designed 
to assess the third main component of reward processing: reward 
learning and memory (Berridge et al., 2009). This is important because 
there is accumulating evidence that people with depression may have 
deficits in reward learning (Halahakoon et al., 2020; Pizzagalli et al., 
2008), and it may help to inform recent debates on the conceptualisation 
and definition of anhedonia (i.e., whether there may be a sub-group of 
patients with reward learning impairments; see section 1.3.2). Therefore, 
this study is designed to help develop a more holistic understanding of 
the precise reward processing deficits in people with depression. 
5.1.1. Study Aim 
The aim of this study was to examine different components of reward 
processing using translational behavioural tasks in people with and 
without symptoms of depression (assessed using the Mini 
Neuropsychiatric Interview; M.I.N.I; Sheehan et al., 1998). Participants 
either did (MDD+) or did not (MDD-) meet the M.I.N.I. criteria for a Major 




assessed: reward motivation (Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task 
and Effort Expenditure for Reward Task: JORT and EEfRT), reward 
sensitivity (Sweet Taste Test) and reward learning and memory (Reward 
Learning and Memory Task). All tasks are based on procedurally similar 
rodent tasks, see Figure 5.1. Participants also completed questionnaires 
that measure symptoms of depression, anhedonia, apathy and anxiety. 
Based on previous literature (section 1.4.5), we predicted: 
H1: In the JORT, the MDD+ group will not exert more force for higher 
reward magnitudes, when compared to the MDD- group (i.e., there will 
be an interaction between reward and group).  
H2: In the EEfRT, the MDD+ group will make fewer high effort/high 
reward choices compared to the MDD- group.  
H3: In the Sweet Taste Test, the MDD+ group will have a higher 
detection threshold (i.e., reduced sensitivity) compared to the MDD- 
group.  
H4: In the Reward Learning and Memory Task, the MDD+ group will show 
a reduced bias towards the image previously associated with a high 
reward, compared to the MDD- group. 
Exploratory regression-based mediation and/or moderation analyses were 
also planned to examine whether anhedonia (measured using the SHAPS 
and CPAS) moderates (i.e., influences the strength or direction of a 
relationship) or mediates (i.e., explains why a relationship exists) any 



















The protocol was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/qrc8w/). As this is an interim analysis and data collection 
may be continued in the future, the protocol is currently embargoed. 
5.2.1. Participants 
A total of 30 participants (mean age = 25; 18 Female) were included in 
the study (15 MDD+, 15 MDD-). Participants were recruited using 
advertisements (emails via university mailing lists, posters, volunteer 
databases) both within the University of Bristol and in the local 
community. Two advertisements were created which asked for (1) people 
who were currently experiencing symptoms of depression or (2) people 
who had no current or previous psychiatric illness. Recruitment was done 
in blocks (e.g., recruiting ~ 10 from the MDD+ group followed by ~ 10 
MDD- group). 
Eligibility criteria were: aged 18 - 45 years, fluent in English, normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, access to a PC (desktop or laptop), no current 
physical injuries, no allergy or intolerance to sugar, no disorder of taste 
or smell, not diabetic, not previously participated in a study using the 
JORT, no recreational drug use in the last 2 weeks (self-report), no 
change in psychotropic medication within the last 4 weeks, never taken 
an antipsychotic or dopaminergic medication, no first degree relative with 
bipolar disorder or schizophrenia.   
For the MDD+ group, all participants were required to meet the M.I.N.I. 
criteria for a current Major Depressive Episode (MDE) and not meet 
criteria for severe alcohol or substance use or a psychotic episode.  
For the MDD- group, participants were excluded if they met any M.I.N.I. 
criteria for a current or previous mental health condition (except mild or 
moderate alcohol or substance use) or if they had a high anhedonia score 
(≥ 25 on the SHAPS). This is based on a previous study (Chapter 3) 
showing that elevated anhedonia scores in a non-clinical population are 
associated with altered performance on some of the reward processing 




Participants who completed the full study were reimbursed £60 (£40 for 
their time plus a £20 task-specific bonus payment). Participants who did 
not meet the M.I.N.I. interview criteria (and therefore did not complete 
the additional study visit measures) were reimbursed £30 (£20 for their 
time, £10 bonus payment for the online reward learning task). Whilst 
participants were informed that the bonus-payment was related to their 
performance, all participants were given the bonus-payment in full. 
Ethics approval was obtained from the Faculty of Life Sciences Ethics 
Committee (reference: 93402) at the University of Bristol. All participants 
provided written informed consent.  
5.2.2. Screening  
This study had a two-stage screening process: (1) telephone pre-screen 
and (2) an in-person neuropsychiatric interview (M.I.N.I. 7.0.2 at the 
study visit). 
During the telephone pre-screen, participants were asked questions to 
check their eligibility for the study. Participants who responded to the 
depression advertisement (MDD+ group) completed the MDE subscale on 
the M.I.N.I. and were invited to take part in the study if they met criteria 
for a current MDE. Participants who responded to the healthy volunteer 
advertisement (MDD- group) completed the screening questions of the 
MDE subscale on the M.I.N.I. and the Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale 
(SHAPS). Participants in the MDD- group were invited to take part in the 
study if they had never experienced an MDE (M.I.N.I.) and did not score 
≥ 25 on the SHAPS.  
At the study visit, all participants completed the full screening interview 
(M.I.N.I.), with the exception of two modules (Suicidality and Antisocial 
Personality Disorder). For the MDD+ group, participants met the M.I.N.I. 
screening criteria if they: (1) met criteria for a current MDE and (2) did 
not meet criteria for psychotic features, severe alcohol use, or severe 
substance use. This is different to the pre-registration which had 
“moderate” alcohol or substance use and manic episode as exclusion 




substance use was changed to severe. This is because the study was 
recruiting a predominantly student population, for which the M.I.N.I. 
criterion for alcohol and substance use disorder (based on the number of 
symptoms present in that module) was rather inclusive, and a more 
lenient approach was required. Due to the study’s early suspension, it 
was also decided to analyse the data with participants who met the manic 
episode criteria included in the MDD+ group. This was done to increase 
the study’s power given the small sample size.  
5.2.3. Design 
This study was a between-participants design. It examined differences 
between people who were experiencing symptoms of depression (MDD+) 
and those who were not (MDD-).  
5.2.4. Sample Size Calculation  
The intended sample size was 82 participants (41/group). An a priori 
power calculation using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that 82 
participants provides sufficient power (.8) to detect a medium-to-large 
effect (Cohen’s d = .62) at alpha = .05 (independent samples t-test). 
This effect size was chosen based on our previous study investigating 
anhedonia and reward processing in a non-clinical population (Chapter 3). 
For the Sweet Taste Test, there was evidence of a difference between the 
high (M = 1.58, SD = .99) and low (M = 1.05, SD = .68) anhedonia 
groups (based on the SHAPS; Cohen’s d = .62, N = 61). In relation to the 
other behavioural tasks, this sample size should enable us to detect the 
EEfRT effect size reported in Chapter 3 (Cohen’s f = 0.27; required 
sample size = 74; ANOVA: Repeated measures, between factors). There 
was no clear evidence of a difference between groups on the JORT. 
However, it is possible that a difference may be observed in a clinical 
population based on a previous study using a physical effort for reward 
task (Cléry-Melin et al., 2011; Cohen'ss d = 1.21 indicating a large effect 
size). To my knowledge, there are no previous studies in a similar 
population that enable us to estimate an effect size on the reward 




Due to COVID-19, this study was stopped and therefore the achieved 
sample size (N = 30) was less than the target sample size (N = 84).  
5.2.5. Behavioural Measures 
Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task 
This task has been described in Chapter 3. Briefly, this is a multi-trial 
game whereby participants must push on a joystick to move an onscreen 
cursor. Trials vary in the reward on offer (0, 10, 100 or 1,000 points) and 
effort required to win (50, 80, 100, 120% max calibrated force). 
Participants must chase and catch-up with an onscreen target to win the 
points on offer (displayed by a cue in the top left-hand corner of the 
screen). This task differed from the JORT reported in Chapter 3 in two 
ways: the error trial was corrected for here (i.e., the trial in which no 
target was presented due to experimenter error now had a target) and 
participants were informed that they could win up to £5 based on their 
performance on this task alone. See chapter 3 for more details.  
Effort Expenditure for Reward Task  
The task is identical to that used in Chapter 3. Briefly, participants have 
to choose between a high effort/high reward and low effort/low reward 
option across many trials. Effort is exerted through button presses. Trials 
vary in the probability of winning money on a given trial (if they managed 
to complete the trial): 12%, 50% or 88%. See chapter 3 for more details. 
Participants were informed that they could win up to £5 based on their 
performance on this task. 
Sweet Taste Test  
This task is identical to that used in Chapter 3. Participants are given 
different concentrations of sucrose (0%, 0.5%, 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 
5% w/v) in 15 mL water. On each trial, they report if they can detect the 
presence of sugar. A staircase method is used including five reversals. 
The detection threshold is the mean of the five boundaries. See chapter 3 
for more details.  




This task is identical to that used in Chapter 4 (Experiment 4). Briefly, it 
takes place over 5 consecutive days (~ 5 - 10 minutes/day). Days one to 
four are training days where participants learn that different images are 
associated with a different value of reward (high reward, low reward, no 
reward). Day five is the choice test, where previously learnt high vs low 
reward images are paired together for the first time. Participants must try 
to remember and choose the images which were associated with a high 
reward (“+100 points”). For more details, see Experiment 4 in Chapter 3. 
Participants were informed that they could win up to £10 based on their 
performance on this task. 
5.2.6. Self-report measures 
All participants completed self-report measures of anhedonia: Snaith-
Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS; Snaith et al., 1995), Temporal 
Experience of Pleasure Scale (TEPS; Gard et al., 2006) and Chapman 
Physical Anhedonia Scale (CPAS; Chapman et al., 1976). Depression and 
anxiety symptoms were measured using the modified Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; suicidality question removed; Beck et al., 1996) and 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006), respectively. 
For more details, please see Chapter 2 and 3.  
Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) 
The GAD-7 was used to measure severity of anxiety symptoms. This is a 
7-item self-report questionnaire which asks participants to report how 
often they have been bothered by symptoms of anxiety over the last 2 
weeks. All items are rated on a 4-point scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 3 
(“nearly every day”). Total scores range from 0 to 21. Higher scores 
indicate higher symptoms of anxiety. In a heterogeneous patient sample 
(N = 1,201), the GAD-7 had good internal consistency (α = .88) and good 
convergent validity with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = .69; Beck & 
Steer, 1990; Johnson et al., 2019). It had some discriminant validity from 





All participants provided demographic information (age, sex) and 
answered questions about: current smoking status (3 levels: yes daily, 
yes less than daily, not at all), income band (3 levels: low, medium, high) 
and financial worries (2 levels: yes or no). Participants were also asked to 
report if they were currently (and previously) taking any prescribed 
medication to treat a psychiatric or neurological condition (2 levels: yes 
or no). If the participant responded “yes”, they were asked to report the 
name(s) of the medication and their time and duration of use. The 
questions also had the option “prefer not to say”. 
5.2.7. Procedure 
Interested participants were sent the information sheet via email and 
were invited to take part in a brief telephone screen (~ 15 minutes) to 
further check their eligibility for the study. All participants provided verbal 
consent prior to completing the telephone screen. Participants who met 
the telephone criteria were invited to complete the online reward learning 
and memory task over 5 consecutive days (Monday – Friday; 
approximately one hour in total) followed by a single study visit. 
Upon arrival at the study visit, all participants were given the information 
sheet, had the opportunity to ask questions and provided written 
informed consent before completing the M.I.N.I. screening interview (20 
– 60 minutes). Following this, participants who met the criteria for the 
study completed the additional behavioural tasks (order: EEfRT, JORT and 
STT) followed by self-report measures (SHAPS, CPAS, TEPS, BDI-II, AES, 
GAD-7; ~ 1.5 – 2 hours). Participants who did not meet the screening 
interview criteria were reimbursed for their time. Upon completion, all 
participants were verbally debriefed and provided written final consent.  
5.2.8. Data Screening  
Prior to data collection, a priori exclusion criteria were chosen. For the 
questionnaire data, the AES questionnaire included an attention check 
question “We would like to check that you are paying attention to your 
answers, so please select ‘slightly true’ for this question” to ensure 




who incorrectly responded to this question would have all of their 
questionnaire data excluded. Additionally, participants who had 
incomplete data (e.g., missed an answer on a questionnaire) would have 
their data excluded for that measure. For the Sweet Taste Test, any 
participants who reported detection of sugar on 0% sucrose 
concentrations would be excluded from the analysis for this task as an 
adequate detection boundary would not be possible. For the JORT, any 
participants who achieved over 75% trials, and therefore must have 
achieved one of the 120% effort trials (which were designed to be 
impossible), would be excluded from the JORT analysis.  
5.2.9. Data Analyses 
5.2.9.1. Primary Analyses 
For the JORT, a 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA examined differences between 
groups (MDD- and MDD+) in relative average force, maximum force and 
reaction time. The between-subjects factor was group (2 levels: MDD+ vs 
MDD-). The within-subject factors were reward (4 levels: 0, 10, 100 or 
1,000 points). The primary outcome was relative average force.  
For the EEfRT, a 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA examined differences between 
groups in mean proportion of hard-task choices and reaction time. The 
between-subjects factor was Group (2 levels: MDD+ vs MDD-). The 
within-subjects factor was Probability (3 levels: 12%, 50%, 88%). The 
primary outcome was hard-task choices. 
For the Sweet Taste Test, an independent samples t-test examined 
differences between groups (MDD+ and MDD-) in detection threshold.  
For the Reward Learning and Memory Task, an independent samples t-
test examined between groups (MDD+ and MDD-) in choice bias.  
Data were extracted using Python 3.6 and MATLAB R2020a. Analyses 
were performed in SPSS 24 (IBM). Data were checked for normality 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov), homogeneity of variances (Levene’s test) and 
potential outliers (z-scores > 3). Where Mauchly’s test of Sphericity was 
violated (p > .05), Greenhouse-Geisser statistics are reported. Where 




where possible, or the data were transformed (only if this corrected for 
the assumption and did not worsen other assumptions). Data are 
presented with all participants retained in the analysis. Where removal of 
outliers substantially affects the findings, the results are also presented 
with the outliers excluded. Bonferroni corrections were applied to any 
post-hoc tests. Analyses were also re-run with exploratory potential 
covariates included in the models (main effects of sex, medication status 
and finance concerns).  
5.2.9.2. Exploratory Analyses 
Regression-based moderation and/or mediation analyses were planned to 
be conducted to examine whether anhedonia (measured using the SHAPS 
or CPAS) moderates or mediates any effect of group on primary 
outcomes. Additional correlations between performance on reward 
processing tasks and self-report measures were run using Spearman’s 
correlation.  
5.3. Results 
For details on recruitment, see Figure 5.2. As this is an interim analysis, 
and further data may be collected, the data are not yet available online.  
5.3.1. Demographics 
In total, 15 MDD+ and 15 MDD- met the M.I.N.I. criteria. For 
demographic data and potential co-morbidities based on the M.I.N.I., see 
Table 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.  
All participants were asked if they had ever received a clinical diagnosis of 
MDD. In the MDD+ group, 12 participants reported that they had 
received a diagnosis of MDD (an additional participant reported also 
receiving a clinical diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder). In the 
MDD- group, none of the participants had received a clinical diagnosis of 
MDD. Of the 15 participants in the MDD+ group, 8 were taking an 
antidepressant medication at the time of the study (7 SSRI alone, 1 SNRI 
alone; time on medication range = 2 months to 4 years). Additionally, 9 
of the 15 participants in the MDD+ group met criteria for co-morbid 























Recruitment No symptom group  
(N = ~ 130) 
Symptom group  
(N = ~ 170) 
No symptom group  
(N = 34) 
Symptom group  
(N = 53) 
Emails expressing 
interest in study  
(N = ~ 300) 
Telephone 
screened  
(N = 87) 
Met telephone 
screen criteria  
(N = 53) 
No symptom group  
(N = 23; 67.6%) 
Symptom group  
(N = 30, 56.6%) 
Attended Study 
Visit  
(N = 38) 
Started study 
(online task) 
(N = 45) Reason for not 
attending study visit: 
COVID (N = 5) 
Other (N = 2)   
Reason for not 
starting study: 
COVID (N = 6) 
Other (N = 2) 
MDD+ Group (N = 23) 
Excluded from analyses (N = 8), reasons: 
• Did not meet current MDE criterion 
at study visit (N = 2) 
• Met one of the M.I.N.I. exclusion 
criteria (N = 6).   
 
Analysed for JORT (N = 13) 
Analysed for EEfRT (N = 15) 
Analysed for STT (N = 15) 
Analysed for reward learning task (N = 14) 
MDD- Group (N = 15) 
Excluded from analyses (N = 0) 
Analysed for JORT (N = 12) 
Analysed for EEfRT (N = 15) 
Analysed for STT (N = 13) 
Analysed for reward learning task (N = 13) 
Figure 5.2. Flow diagram of study recruitment. 
Abbreviations: COVID, some participants withdrew from the study or did not start the study due to concerns of COVID-19; JORT, 






Table 5.1. Demographic data and questionnaire scores for participants in the MDD- (N = 15) and MDD+ group (N = 15). 
 
 MDD- Group MDD+ Group Group Difference 
 Mean SD Mean SD F p-value Post-hoc 
Age 25.2 6.0 25.5 7.4 .018 .89 n/a 
Males (N) 5 33% 7 47% X2=.56 .46 n/a 
Smoking Status 2.7 0.5 2.6 0.6 X2=1.05 .59 n/a 
Income 2.4 0.7 2.3 0.6 X2=1.31 .52 n/a 
Money Concern  1.2 0.4 1.7 0.5 X2=6.65 .01 MDD+ > MDD- 
SHAPS 17.3 2.9 31.9 6.1 68.84 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
SHAPS – D 0 0 5.1 3.0 44.01 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
CPAS 10.5 6.1 21.5 8.9 15.69 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
TEPS – A 47.3 7.7 32.7 6.1 33.15 <.001 MDD+ < MDD- 
TEPS – C 38.8 5.8 26.9 7.6 23.07 <.001 MDD+ < MDD- 
BDI-II 3.5 2.8 31.1 8.1 154.19 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
Apathy Scale 23.9 5.2 41.9 8.52 48.63 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
GAD-7 1.7 1.1 12.8 3.3 151.88 <.001 MDD+ > MDD- 
Abbreviations: smoking status (1=yes daily, 2= yes less than daily, 3=never); income (1=high, 2=medium, 3=low); money concern (1=no, 2=yes); SHAPS, Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale; TEPS, 
Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (A, anticipatory; C, consummatory); BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; GAD-7; Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7; n/a, not applicable. Welch’s ANOVA and Chi 
Square run to compare groups. MDD+ (N = 15), MDD- (N = 15). 
 
Abbreviations: smoking status (1=yes daily, 2= yes less than daily, 3=never); income (1=high, 2=medium, 3=low); money concern (1=no, 2=yes); SHAPS, Snaith Hamilton 
Pleasure Scale; TEPS, Temporal Experience of Pleasure Scale (A, anticipatory; C, consummatory); BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory; GAD-7; Generalised Anxiety Disorder-7; 









5.3.2. Primary Analyses 
5.3.2.1. Joystick-Operated Reward Runway Task  
Five participants achieved over 75% of trials and were excluded from the 
analysis: 25 participants (MDD+ = 13, MDD- = 12) were included in the 
analysis.  
Data Assumptions. For reaction time, homogeneity of variances (ps < 
.052) was violated (ps < .052) and 0-point trials did not meet normality 
(p = .069). Log transformations improved the assumption of normality 
M.I.N.I. criteria MDD+ Group MDD- Group 
Major Depressive Episode (MDE) 15 0 
MDE – Anhedonia Question 14 0 
Mania (manic episode, hypomanic 
episode, or hypomanic symptoms) 
4 0 
Panic disorder  current = 3 0 
 lifetime = 3  
Agoraphobia 3 0 
Social Anxiety Disorder 5 0 
OCD 5 0 
PTSD 3 0 
Alcohol use  mild = 4 
moderate = 2 
mild = 1 
 
Substance use mild = 3 mild = 1 
Psychotic features 0 0 
Anorexia 0 0 
Bulimia 2 0 
Binge eating disorder 0 0 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder 9 0 
Antidepressant use 8 0 
Abbreviations: MDE, Major Depressive Episode (all MDD+ participants met criteria for a current MDE, 
none of the MDD- group met criteria for current or past MDE); MDE – Anhedonia Question, responded 
“yes” to the anhedonia question on the MDE subscale of the M.I.N.I; OCD, Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder; PTSD, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; Antidepressant use, currently taking antidepressants. 
 
Abbreviations: MDE, Major Depressive Episode (all MDD+ met criteria for a current MDE, none MDD- 
met criteria for current or past MDE), MDE – Anhedonia Question, responded ‘yes’ to the anhedonia 
question on the MDE subscale of the M.I.N.I; OCD, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PTSD, Post 




but worsened homogeneity of variances, and so analysis is done on non-
transformed data. 
Average force. There was evidence of a main effect of reward, F(1.15,26.49) 
= 25.32, p <.001, np2 = .52. Participants exerted more force for higher 
reward magnitudes: 0 points (M = 50.19, SE = 3.11), 10 points (M = 
57.26, SE = 2.21), 100 points (M = 61.01, SE = 1.96) and 1,000 points 
(M = 64.37, SE = 1.85). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
revealed differences across all reward magnitudes (ps ≤ .006). There was 
no evidence of a main effect of group (F(1,23) = 1.48, p = .24, np2 = .06; 
see Figure 5.3) or reward x group interaction (F(1.15,26.49) = 0.67, p = .44, 
np2 = .028). Re-running the analysis with potential covariates revealed 
evidence of a main effect of sex, (p = .003), sex x reward interaction, (p 
= .021), and reward x finance concern interaction (p = .025). Including 
these covariates did not qualitatively change the findings. 
Maximum force. There was evidence of a main effect of reward, F(1.22, 28.08) 
= 28.49, p < .001, np2= .55. Participants exerted more force for higher 
reward magnitudes: 0 points (M = 72.77, SE = 4.70), 10 points (M = 
83.90, SE = 3.59), 100 points (M = 89.70, SE = 3.23) and 1,000 points 
(M = 93.93, SE = 3.19). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons 
revealed differences across all reward magnitudes (ps ≤ .003). There was 
no evidence of a main effect of group (F(1, 23) = .09, p = .77, np2 = .004; 
see Figure 5.3) or reward x group interaction (F(1.22, 28.08) = 1.71, p = .20, 
np2 = .07). Re-running the analysis including the potential covariates: 
there was evidence of a main effect of sex (p = .031), reward x sex 
interaction (p = .011) and reward x finance concern interaction (p = 
.022). Including these covariates did not qualitatively change the 
findings. 
Reaction time. There was evidence of a main effect of reward, F(3, 69) = 
9.19, p < .001, np2 = .29. Participants were quicker to respond on higher 
reward trials: 0 points (M = 518, SE = 18), 10 points (M = 487, SE = 
14), 100 points (M = 486, SE = 16) and 1,000 points (M = 477, SE = 
16). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed slower reaction 




.019). There was no evidence of a difference between other reward 
magnitudes in reaction time (ps = 1.0). There was no evidence of a main 
effect of group (F(1,23) = 2.56, p = .12, np2 = .10; see Figure 5.3) or 





Figure 5.3. Differences between the MDD- and MDD+ group on the JORT: relative average force (A) maximum force (B) and reaction time 






5.3.2.2. Effort Expenditure for Reward Task  
Consistent with Treadway (2009), only the first 50 trials were used. Trials 
in which the participant did not make a choice within the time limit were 
not included in the analysis (M = 49.9, SD = 0.3, range = 49 to 50).  
Data assumptions. For proportion of hard-task choices, there was 
evidence of non-normality for all trial types except medium and high 
probability trials for the MDD+ group (ps ≤ .037). For reaction time, 
there was evidence of non-normality for low and high probability trials for 
the MDD+ group (ps ≤.029). Transformations did not improve normality 
and so analysis was done on non-transformed data. 
Proportion of hard task choices. There was evidence of a main effect of 
probability, F(2,56) = 83.55, p <.001, np2 = .75. Participants chose the 
hard-task choice more often when the probability was higher: 12% (M = 
11.57, SE = 2.95), 50% (M = 45.83, SE = 3.68), 88% (M = 67.19, SE = 
3.01). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed differences 
across all probabilities (ps < .001). There was no evidence of a main 
effect of group, F(1,28) = .73, p = .40, np2 = .03, or group x probability 
interaction, F(2,56) = 1.83, p = .17, np2 = .06, see Figure 5.4. 
Reaction time. There was evidence of a main effect of probability, 
F(1.63,45.64) = 6.35, p = .006, np2 =.19. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons revealed participants were quicker on 12% trials (M = 1.50, 
SE = 0.74) compared to 50% trials (M = 1.70, SE = .09; p =.004); and 
quicker on 88% trials (M = 1.59, SE = .07) compared to 50% trials (p = 
.051). There was no evidence of a difference between reaction time on 
12% and 88% trials (p = .54).  There was no evidence of a main effect of 
group (F(1,28) = .78, p = .39, np2 =.03) or a probability x group interaction 









Finger tapping speed. There was no evidence of a difference between the 
MDD- and MDD+ in finger tapping speed prior to the task, t(24.09) = .34, p 
= .73. Additionally, there was no evidence of a difference between groups 
in mean button pressing rate (i.e., button pressing speed) for the easy or 
hard-task choices (ps ≥ .73).  
Trials completed. The mean number of trials completed was 98.2% (SD = 
4.80, range = 76 – 100%). There were no participants that only chose 
the easy or hard task. There was weak evidence that the MDD+ group 
completed fewer trials (M = 96.7, SD = 6.4) than the MDD- group (M = 
99.73, SD = 1.03, p = .089). 
5.3.2.3. Sweet Taste Test  
One participant was excluded due to reporting sucrose in 0% sucrose 
concentrations and another participant was excluded as only four 
boundaries were available due to experimenter error. In total, 28 
participants (MDD+ = 15, MDD- = 13) were included in the analysis.  
There was no evidence of a difference between groups on mean detection 
threshold, t(26) = .36, p = .73, see Figure 5.5. As the data did not meet 
Figure 5.4. Differences between the MDD- and MDD+ group on the EEfRT across 
different probability levels: (A) mean proportion of hard-task choices and (B) reaction 
time (seconds). Bars represent mean and SEM. Points represent participants. N = 15 






the assumption of normality, analysis was re-run using a Mann Whitney U 
test: this did not qualitatively change the findings (p = .56). Re-running 
the analysis with potential covariates included, there was weak evidence 
of a main effect of medication use, F(1, 23) = 3.31, p = .082, np2 = .13; N 
= 8): people taking medication had higher detection thresholds (i.e., 
poorer detection; M = 1.93, SE = .41; N = 8) than people not taking 











5.3.2.4. Reward Learning and Memory Task  
Three participants did not complete all five days of the task, resulting in 
27 participants (14 MDD+, 13 MDD-) being included in the analysis.  
Choice Test. There was evidence of an overall positive bias, t(26) = 2.76, p 
= .011, mean bias = 12.47), demonstrating learning and memory for the 
high reward images. There was no evidence of a difference between 
groups, t(25) = .13, p = .90, see Figure 5.6. Re-running the analysis with 
potential covariates, there was evidence of a main effect of finance 
concerns (p = .033): participants who reported “yes” to finance concerns 
had higher bias scores (M = 23% bias, SE = 8; N = 12) than individuals 
who reported “no” (M = -1% bias, SE = 8; N = 15). 
Figure 5.5. Difference between the MDD- and MDD+ group in the Sweet Taste 








5.3.3. Exploratory Analyses 
5.3.3.1. Correlations between tasks and self-report measures.  
Correlations were explored for each group separately. In the EEfRT, there 
was evidence of a positive correlation between anxiety (GAD-7) and 
proportion of hard-task choices (r = .76, p = .001), suggesting people 
with higher levels of anxiety chose the hard-task choice more often in the 
MDD+ group. In the Sweet Taste Test, there was weak evidence of a 
positive correlation between mean detection threshold and symptoms of 
depression (BDI-II; r = .49, p = .065) and anhedonia (SHAPS_D; r = .50, 
p = .058) in the MDD+ group. In the reward learning and memory task, 
there was a positive correlation between choice bias and symptoms of 
depression (BDI-II; r = .59, p = .025) and anhedonia (SHAPS; r = .59, p 
= .027) and weak evidence of a negative correlation with anxiety (GAD-7, 
r = -.47, p = .09). There was no clear evidence of any other correlations, 
ps ≥ .10). Given the small sample size and that these correlations were 
not corrected for multiple comparisons (due to them being exploratory), 
these results should be considered as hypothesis-generating, not 
confirmatory.  
Figure 5.6. Difference between the MDD- and MDD+ group in the reward learning 
and memory task – choice test. Bars represent mean and SEM. Points represent 






5.3.3.2. Correlations between tasks.  
There was no evidence of a correlation between tasks (ps ≥ .16). 
5.4. Discussion 
This study supports and extends previous findings showing that different 
components of reward may be dissociable in people (Chapter 3), 
indicated by the lack of correlations between tasks. In relation to 
depression, there was no clear evidence of a difference between the 
groups (MDD+ vs MDD-) on any of the reward processing paradigms. As 
this study did not recruit to the pre-determined sample size, we must be 
cautious in the interpretation of these findings. Nevertheless, I will briefly 
discuss these findings in relation to current literature before discussing 
possible future directions of this work. Given the exciting potential of 
reward processing as a biomarker and therapeutic target for depression 
(Nielson et al., 2020), it is crucial that we gain a clearer understanding of 
this relationship.  
5.4.1. Reward motivation  
In the JORT, there was no clear evidence of a difference between the 
MDD+ and MDD- group (Figure 5.3), both groups exerted more physical 
force for higher reward trials. To my knowledge, only one study has 
previously examined physical effort exerted for reward in depression 
using a similar task (Cléry-Melin et al., 2011). Clery-Melin et al. (2011) 
found that, in contrast to healthy controls, patients with depression did 
not exert more physical force on a handgrip apparatus for high compared 
to low reward trials (i.e., they showed a blunted response), suggesting 
that people with depression have dysfunctional incentive motivation. 
However, the preliminary results of the present study do not support this 
finding. It is important to note that we included a predominantly student 
population, whereas Clery-Melin et al. (2011) included a hospitalised 
population. Speculatively, it is possible that reduced incentive motivation 
may be related to general functioning, and may not be as apparent in a 
high functioning population (despite experiencing symptoms of 






effort for reward in depression (Halahakoon et al., 2020), additional work 
is required to clarify whether reward motivation can be dissociated in 
depressed vs healthy controls in a non-hospitalised population.  
In the EEfRT, there was no clear evidence of a difference between the 
MDD+ and MDD- group (Figure 5.4). This contrasts with previous studies 
which have reported fewer hard-task choices in people with depression 
compared to healthy controls (Treadway et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2014), 
suggesting that depression is characterised by impaired effort-based 
decision-making to maximize rewards. One notable difference between 
the current study and previous clinical studies is the proportion of hard-
task choices in the healthy control group: in this study, the healthy 
control group had a lower proportion of hard-task choices (40%) 
compared to previous studies (~ 55 - 61%; Barch et al., 2014; Treadway 
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2014). This is important because the mean 
proportion of hard-task choices in our MDD+ group is consistent with the 
original Treadway et al. (2012) study (both 43%), suggesting that 
differences in the control groups could, in part, contribute to the 
discrepancy between studies (Treadway et al., 2012). The reason for this 
difference is unclear, but the mean proportion of hard-task choices in the 
present study are comparable to our previous study in a non-clinical 
population (Chapter 3) and other studies (37% in a community sample in 
Addicott et al., 2020). Therefore, performance in the healthy control 
group is an important consideration for future studies using this task.  
5.4.2. Reward sensitivity 
In the Sweet Taste Test, there was no clear evidence of a difference 
between the MDD+ and the MDD- group (Figure 5.5). This supports the 
findings reported by Dichter et al. (2010), who found no clear evidence of 
a difference between depressed and non-depressed participants in 
sensitivity to sucrose (Dichter et al., 2010), but it contrasts with other 
studies that found poorer sucrose sensitivity in people with depression 
compared to healthy controls (Amsterdam et al., 1987; Berlin et al., 
1998). However, it should be noted that we did find weak evidence of a 






depression (BDI-II) and anhedonia (SHAPS) in the predicted direction 
(i.e., people with higher symptoms had poorer detection of sucrose). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Dichter et al. (2010), caution should be 
taken in the interpretation of their findings given the small sample size (N 
= 30) and small-to-medium effect sizes (Cohen’s D = 0.37 to 0.51; 
Dichter et al., 2010). Thus, whilst there does not appear to be a robust 
difference between the groups on the sweet taste test, larger studies are 
needed to further interrogate this finding.  
5.4.3. Reward learning and memory  
In the reward learning and memory task, there was no clear evidence of 
a difference between groups (MDD+ and MDD-; Figure 5.6). Whilst this 
may appear to disagree with previous studies reporting reward learning 
deficits in people with depression (Halahakoon et al., 2020), a possible 
difference between the present paradigm and other tasks used in the 
literature is the extent to which they measure implicit versus explicit 
learning and memory: our study explicitly asks participants to try to recall 
the high-value reward images (in exchange for money) making this an 
explicit memory task. Conversely, many of the reward learning tasks 
used in the depression literature are designed to assess implicit learning 
about a cue-reward relationship (Frank et al., 2004; Pizzagalli et al., 
2005). Therefore, we found no evidence of an explicit reward memory 
deficit in people with depression, when compared to healthy controls.  
Taken together, we did not find any clear evidence that people with 
symptoms of depression differ from those without symptoms of 
depression on a battery of reward processing tasks. However, it is 
important to note that this interim analysis includes a small sample size 
which increases the likelihood that there are Type II errors (i.e., stating 
that this is no effect when there is a true effect) and Type I errors (i.e., 
stating that there is an effect when there is no true effect)(Button et al., 
2013). Given the important link between depression and reward 
processing, there is a clear need to continue this work to the pre-






the potential moderating or mediating effect of anhedonia on this 
relationship. 
5.4.4. Limitations 
One limitation of this study is that it was not conducted to its planned 
sample size (N = 84), which makes interpretation of null results 
problematic. Specifically, it is likely that we would only be able to detect 
very large effects between groups and cannot refute the possibility of 
smaller effects (which may be expected).  
Secondly, many MDD+ participants were taking an antidepressant 
medication (7/15; mostly SSRIs). Due to the well-documented difficulty 
of recruiting participants in depression research (Hughes-Morley et al., 
2015), we decided not to have antidepressant use as an additional 
exclusion criteria. However, SSRIs may affect performance on 
behavioural tasks (Godlewska et al., 2016; Harmer et al., 2009), and 
could have masked potential differences between groups. Although this is 
a crucial consideration, it is important to note that: (1) previous studies 
using similar tasks (EEfRT, handgrip task, sweet taste test) have reported 
that people with depression show deficits on these tasks despite taking an 
SSRI medication (Berlin et al., 1998; Cléry-Melin et al., 2011; Treadway 
et al., 2012); (2) all participants in this study had been taking their 
medication for a period of at least 2 months, so it is likely that these 
participants had not adequately responded to their medication; (3) 
theoretically, if reward processing tasks are related to anhedonia, we may 
predict that SSRIs would not improve performance given that 
serotonergic antidepressants are not very effective in the treatment of 
anhedonia (Nutt et al., 2007).  
Thirdly, most participants were recruited from within the university, which 
limits the generalisability of these findings to the broader population. 
Whilst the aim of this study was to initially advertise within the university, 
and then to advertise within the local community (online Bristol 
newspapers, support groups), there was a larger response rate (~ 300 






anticipated. Consequently, advertisements outside the university were 
not yet widely distributed. Further continuation of this study should focus 
recruitment efforts outside the university to enhance the ecological 
validity of the findings. 
5.4.5. Future Directions 
There is a need for studies to employ a battery of tasks in a larger 
population of people who meet criteria for anhedonia. Specifically, it may 
be useful to investigate anhedonia across different clinical populations 
(Lambert et al., 2018; Thomsen et al., 2015). Whilst we focus on 
depression in this study, it is possible that anhedonia reported in other 
clinical disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, PTSD) is qualitatively different. 
Examining anhedonia across disorders is in line with the RDoC (Insel et 
al., 2010), and may enable further insight into the multifaceted nature of 
this condition. 
Another area for future research is to triangulate across different 
methods. For example, this study focuses on dissociating components of 
reward using translational behavioural tasks. One clear advantage of this 
approach is that it promotes cross-species research (Thomsen et al., 
2015). However, there are other methods that may also help to improve 
our understanding of the reward processing abnormalities in depression 
and anhedonia, such as neuroimaging and computational modelling 
(Robinson & Chase, 2017; Rzepa et al., 2017). For example, given the 
excellent temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG), future 
studies could try to investigate the temporal signature of different reward 
components within a trial (Chen et al., 2018; Glazer et al., 2018; Keren 
et al., 2018). On the other hand, computational psychiatry may enable us 
to tease apart multiple parameters (e.g., learning, sensitivity) within a 
single task, providing more specific insights into the underlying deficits 
(Huys et al., 2013; Robinson & Chase, 2017). This is important because 
whilst we have tried to dissociate these components using different 
behavioural tasks, it is often difficult to rule out the involvement of other 






less effort for reward because they are less sensitive to the reward, more 
sensitive to the effort or both (Bonnelle et al., 2015). Computational 
modelling is well suited to addressing this question (Pessiglione et al., 
2018). Triangulating across these different methods may enable more 
robust conclusions to be drawn about the relationship between depression 
and reward processing. 
To conclude, using a battery of translational reward processing tasks in 
people with depression, this preliminary study found further evidence that 
different components of reward (effort-for-reward, effort-based decision-
making, reward sensitivity, reward learning and memory) may be 
dissociable in people, replicating the findings of Chapter 3. However, 
there was no clear evidence that depression affected performance on any 
of these reward processing tasks. As this is an interim analysis, 

























6.1. Thesis aims  
The overarching aim of this thesis was to develop a more complete 
understanding of the reward processing deficits related to anhedonia. 
Specifically, it aimed to address three gaps within the literature: (1) the 
lack of objective measures of components of reward (particularly, tasks 
that could be applied in both humans and rodents); (2) the lack of studies 
measuring multiple components of reward in the same population of 
people; (3) the lack of studies directly assessing anhedonia and its 
severity using anhedonia questionnaires (instead most studies examine 
clinical populations without directly measuring anhedonia).  
Here, I contribute to the first gap by developing two simple behavioural 
tasks designed to measure reward motivation (JORT; Chapter 2) and 
reward learning and memory (Chapter 4). I address the second and third 
gaps by examining multiple domains of reward alongside anhedonia 
questionnaires in a non-clinical population with higher levels of anhedonia 
(Chapter 3) and in a depressed population (Chapter 5). In this Chapter, I 
will provide a brief overview of these methods and findings, discuss the 
implications and limitations of this work, and suggest possible future 
directions.  
6.2. Overview of findings  
6.2.1. Development of reward processing tasks  
There are few behavioural tasks that measure specific domains of reward 
processing in humans (section 1.4.5). Given that preclinical studies have 
provided compelling evidence demonstrating that reward processing can 
be fractionated into at least three dissociable sub-components 
(motivation, consummation, learning; Berridge & Robinson, 2003), this is 
a key limitation in the human literature. Consequently, and in line with 
one of the key objectives of the RDoC (Insel et al., 2010), there is a need 
for behavioural tasks that measure “purer” psychological constructs. This 
thesis contributes to this endeavour, by providing proof-of-concept for 
two behavioural tasks designed to measure reward motivation (effort-






rodent task). Critically, both of these assays were designed to be simple 
in order to encourage easier interpretation of their findings, reduce the 
possibility of confounds (e.g., working memory deficits, cognitive effort), 
and to enable cross-species translational research. 
6.2.1.1. Reward Motivation 
Reward motivation has previously been measured using effort-based 
decision-making tasks such as the EEfRT (section 1.4.5.1; Treadway et 
al., 2009). Although this task has demonstrated interesting findings in 
clinical studies (Lawn et al., 2016; McCarthy et al., 2016; Treadway et 
al., 2012), and is the only reward motivation task currently recommended 
by the RDoC (Insel et al., 2010), the complex nature of this task makes it 
difficult to rule out potential confounds such as cognitive ability or 
reduced cognitive effort (Bonnelle et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2019; 
Dean, 2019; Whitton, Merchant, et al., 2020). Consequently, deficits on 
this task, at least for some people, could be explained by impairments in 
cognitive ability such as working memory or impaired cognitive effort 
(i.e., reduced willingness to make cognitive decisions) as opposed to 
reduced willingness to exert physical effort for reward. As an alternative, 
we introduce the JORT (Chapter 2), where motivation is operationalized 
as the exertion of physical force for reward.  
We provide proof-of-concept for the JORT as a basic measure of reward 
motivation across three studies, replicating the primary outcome in both a 
non-clinical and clinical study (volunteers exerted a linear increase in 
physical force for higher compared to lower rewards) and demonstrate 
some construct validity (performance on the JORT positively correlates 
with another reward motivation task: the EEfRT). The key advantage of 
the JORT is that it is less likely to be confounded by cognitive functioning 
and may provide a “purer” measure of reward motivation. In relation to 
other paradigms reported in the literature, the PRT and handgrip task 
(Roane et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2008) are also promising simple 
effort-for-reward tasks. However, they have either been criticised for 
their failure to control for important potential confounds (Chong et al., 






therefore they are not currently recommended by the RDoC. For example, 
one potential confound on the PRT is delay discounting: effort is also 
associated with an increased delay (time taken to obtain the reward; 
Pessiglione et al., 2018). An advantage of the JORT is that time spent on 
trials is kept roughly the same thus performance is less likely to be 
influenced by delay discounting.  
6.2.2.2. Reward Learning and Memory  
Reward learning and memory tasks in humans (section 1.4.5.3) focus on 
“online learning” over short periods of time (~ 15 minutes; Wimmer et 
al., 2018). This markedly differs from preclinical research which often 
assesses learning and memory over longer time frames (Der-Avakian et 
al., 2013; Hinchcliffe et al., 2017; Stuart et al., 2013), and may therefore 
be underpinned by different biological mechanisms (Wimmer et al., 
2018). Additionally, all translational paradigms assess the subject’s ability 
to learn the probability that a cue will provide reward. To my knowledge, 
there are no translational paradigms that measure learning and memory 
of different reward values. 
Here, based on a promising rodent task which has reported consistent 
deficits across multiple putative models of depression (Robinson, 2018), 
we developed a procedurally similar assay in humans (Chapter 4). In 
contrast to other reward learning paradigms (Frank et al., 2004; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2005), this assay measures learning and memory of cues 
and their associated reward value across five consecutive days. We 
provided initial face validity for this task in a non-clinical population, with 
volunteers showing a positive bias (i.e., an intact memory and choice for 
the high reward images), as predicted. Whilst promising, potential 
confounds exist, such as the use of higher cognitive strategies to solve 
the task, which could imply that the task does not tap into the same 
underlying mechanisms as the rodent version. Therefore, at this stage, 
caution should be taken in interpreting this task as analogous to the 
rodent version. Further development of this assay is therefore warranted, 






possibility of participants using language to encode and rehearse the 
stimuli (i.e., by using stimuli that cannot be easily verbalised).   
In summary, this thesis provides proof-of-concept for two novel methods, 
contributing to the need for objective measures of reward components 
that could be applied across species. Going forward, these tasks will 
require more rigorous testing of their validity (e.g., predictive and 
construct validity) and reliability (e.g., test-retest reliability). 
6.2.2. Anhedonia and reward processing 
Dysfunctional reward processing has been proposed as a promising 
possible mechanism underlying anhedonia (Halahakoon et al., 2020; 
Nielson et al., 2020), with increasing evidence supporting an association 
between the two. However, preclinical research suggests that reward 
processing is not a unitary construct (Berridge et al., 2009), and 
accordingly the precise sub-components compromised in anhedonia is 
unclear. Specifically, whilst people may appear similar at the self-reported 
symptomatic level, they may have different underlying impairments 
(Husain & Roiser, 2018). In support of this idea, there is some evidence 
to suggest that anhedonia in different clinical disorders relate to different 
aspects of reward-related behaviour (Thomsen et al., 2015). We attempt 
to address this question in two studies: in a non-clinical population with 
higher symptoms of anhedonia (Chapter 3) and in a clinically depressed 
population (Chapter 5). We used a battery of behavioural tasks designed 
to measure different components of reward processing alongside 
anhedonia questionnaires to explore this. 
In both studies, there was limited evidence of a correlation between 
behavioural tasks, suggesting that different components of reward 
(effort-for-reward, effort-based decision-making and reward sensitivity) 
may also be dissociable in people. Additionally, despite debate in the 
literature (Amsterdam et al., 1987; Bedwell et al., 2019; Berlin et al., 
1998; Dichter et al., 2010), both studies found evidence that anhedonia 
(measured using the SHAPS) was related to reduced reward sensitivity on 






In the non-clinical population (Chapter 3), higher levels of anhedonia 
(measured using the CPAS) was also related to reduced motivation on an 
effort-based decision-making task (EEfRT), which replicates the original 
findings by Treadway et al. (2009). This was not found in the depressed 
population (Chapter 5), although this could be due to the small sample 
size, resulting from study termination due to COVID-19.  
Interestingly, performance on these two tasks (sweet taste test and 
EEfRT) did not correlate (individuals with reduced sensitivity to detect 
sucrose did not display aberrant effort-based decision-making) which 
lends support for the proposal of heterogeneity within anhedonia (sub-
groups of people with different reward-related behaviour), as opposed to 
a generalised reward impairment. This is an important finding because 
few studies have assessed multiple domains of reward processing using a 
battery of tasks in the same sample, and therefore could not adequately 
address this question.  
A key finding in both studies is that there was no evidence that anhedonia 
was related to reduced motivation on a simple effort-for-reward task 
(JORT). This is an important contribution, given the dearth of studies 
examining physical effort exerted for reward in anhedonia (Halahakoon et 
al., 2020; Pessiglione et al., 2018) and recent definitions of anhedonia 
proposing a motivational deficit (Thomsen, 2015; Treadway & Zald, 
2013). Speculatively, this could suggest that anhedonia is only related to 
reduced motivation when explicit decision-making involving cognitive 
effort is required (e.g., explicitly weighing up the cost and benefit of an 
action; although see Rzepa & McCabe, 2019). Further studies will be 
required to directly assess this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the discrepancy 
between these two different types of tasks (decision-making versus actual 
effort expenditure) highlights the need for researchers to carefully 
consider their choice of reward motivation assay in future studies given 
that they could be tapping into slightly different aspects of behaviour. 
Finally, we did not see the same pattern of results in the non-clinical 
(Chapter 3) and clinically depressed population (Chapter 5). In fact, there 






depressed group on any of the behavioural tasks. Whilst we must be 
cautious in the interpretation of this outcome given the small sample size 
in the clinical study, if this result replicates in a large sample it could 
question the extent to which studying a non-clinical population with 
higher levels of anhedonia can inform us about clinical anhedonia.  
In summary, higher levels of anhedonia was associated with tasks 
designed to measure effort-based decision-making and reward sensitivity. 
Given the lack of correlations between assays, anhedonia does not appear 
to reflect a generalised reward impairment.   
6.3. Implications for research 
6.3.1. Anhedonia questionnaires: similar but not the same  
Researchers that have assessed anhedonia have often used a single 
anhedonia questionnaire such as the SHAPS (Halahakoon et al., 2020 
includes examples of studies). However, the present findings indicate that 
anhedonia questionnaires are not interchangeable. For example, in 
Chapter 3 the EEfRT was related to the CPAS with less robust evidence for 
an association with the SHAPS; whereas the sweet taste test was 
consistently associated with the SHAPS in both the clinical and non-
clinical study (although there was weaker evidence in the clinical study). 
As these anhedonia questionnaires vary in a number of ways (see section 
1.3.4), it is not clear why some questionnaires may more robustly 
correlate with a given behavioural task.  
One possible explanation is that the SHAPS focuses more on the 
consummation of reward (“I would enjoy a cup of tea or coffee or my 
favourite drink”) which is more relevant to reward sensitivity; whereas 
the CPAS also includes questions on desire or interest (“I have had very 
little desire to try new kinds of foods”) which is more relevant to decision-
making (Leventhal et al., 2006; Rizvi et al., 2016). In support of this, 
Leventhal et al. (2006) reported that the CPAS failed to load (.07) onto a 
“hedonic capacity factor” when included in a confirmatory factor analysis 
with the SHAPS and FCPS (which both demonstrated a high loading on 






SHAPS, the CPAS does not appear to show high construct validity as a 
measure of hedonic function (Leventhal et al., 2006). Therefore, 
researchers should be careful when choosing which self-report measure 
to use. Failure to do so may result in what appears to be conflicting 
findings within the field or incorrect null results. Future studies may 
benefit from employing multiple anhedonia questionnaires to provide a 
more thorough examination of this symptom and to include newer 
anhedonia scales to examine their validity (Rizvi et al., 2016).  
Although not the focus of this thesis, another interesting finding is that 
anhedonia scales correlated with each other just as much as they 
correlated with an apathy scale (Chapter 3). Given that anhedonia and 
apathy are thought to be distinct conditions, one would expect that 
anhedonia scales would correlate less with an apathy scale and more with 
each other (i.e., they would display discriminant validity). This highlights 
the overlapping nature of these conditions and their assessment (Husain 
& Roiser, 2018). As proposed by Husain & Roiser (2018), there is a need 
to dissect these heterogeneous conditions into sub-groups with distinct 
behavioural deficits (using behavioural tasks). This may help to better 
decipher the precise impairments experienced by a patient and more 
appropriately inform treatments (Husain & Roiser, 2018).  
6.3.2. Reward motivation: effort exerted versus decision-
making. 
Reward motivation tasks can broadly be divided into those that assess 
effort-based decision-making (i.e., explicit choice) or the amount of 
physical effort exerted for reward. The dissociation between the EEfRT 
and JORT in relation to anhedonia (Chapter 3) could suggest that these 
tasks are not tapping into the same underlying mechanisms. This is an 
important and potentially useful consideration for future studies 
examining reward motivation because dissociating between these two 
different types of tasks in the same population of patients who have 
motivation impairments (e.g., apathy, fatigue, anergia, avolition) may 







Nevertheless, other methodological differences between tasks (such as 
the presence of a probabilistic cue, type of force exerted), invoke caution 
in this interpretation. More convincing evidence that these different types 
of tasks are dissociable may come from a study that matches these 
paradigms on most other parameters. For example, this could be 
incorporated into the JORT by additionally asking participants to perform 
explicit decisions between low and high effort/reward options to examine 
the relationship between choice and force exerted. By doing this, we will 
be able to examine whether these tasks measure different aspects of 
motivated behaviour (or if differences between tasks is only attributable 
to other task features such as the presence of probability cues). 
6.3.3. Conceptualisation of anhedonia 
Traditionally, anhedonia has been seen as a unitary construct (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). More recently, however, researchers have 
proposed that the definition of anhedonia should be expanded to reflect 
its possible heterogeneity (section 1.3.2). Our findings lend support for 
this theory, as in a non-clinical population we found evidence that 
behavioural tasks probing different sub-components of reward (reward 
sensitivity and effort-based decision-making) were associated with higher 
levels of anhedonia, whilst performance across tasks did not correlate. 
This suggests that people with higher levels of anhedonia in a non-clinical 
population may present various profiles of reward-related behaviour. 
Going forward, further research demonstrating this within a clinical 
population is needed. For example, a double dissociation in patients - 
similar to what has been done in the field of memory - may arguably 
provide more convincing evidence of “sub-groups” within anhedonia; for 
example, showing that some patients have markedly reduced reward 
sensitivity, but relatively intact reward motivation, and vice versa 
(Temple & Richardson, 2004; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997).  
Recently, two definitions of anhedonia have been proposed (Thomsen et 
al., 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2011; section 1.3.2), which both highlight 
the heterogeneity of anhedonia, but differ in the precise reward 






motivational and/or consummatory impairment, but differ in their third 
component: a decisional impairment in the Treadway and Zald definition 
and a learning impairment in the definition by Thomsen and colleagues 
(Thomsen et al., 2015; Treadway & Zald, 2011). In this thesis, the 
working definition of anhedonia was: diminished self-reported pleasure, 
which may be driven by reduced appetitive motivation, consummatory 
experience and/or learning. Pertaining to these definitions, we did find 
evidence that higher levels of anhedonia in a non-clinical population was 
associated with altered effort-based decision-making (albeit weak) and 
reduced consummatory experience, as suggested in the Treadway and 
Zald definition. Interestingly, we did not find clear evidence of reduced 
motivation (using a simple motivation paradigm), as proposed by both 
definitions. Future studies will be necessary to further interrogate this null 
finding using other reward motivation tasks (e.g., PRT and handgrip 
task), and within clinical populations. Finally, we did not adequately 
address the possibility of altered reward learning, and so this remains an 
open and essential question. Based on the findings obtained from this 
thesis, the working definition of anhedonia could be more narrowly 
defined as: diminished self-reported pleasure, which may be driven by 
reduced motivational decision-making, sensitivity to reward and/or 
learning. This definition focuses the motivational impairments on 
decision-making (as opposed to actual effort exerted) and more narrowly 
defines the consummatory impairments as reduced sensitivity to detect 
rewards (as opposed to reduced liking of reward). 
In sum, the data presented here do not provide compelling evidence in 
favour of either definition, but they do support the claim that anhedonia 
measured using self-report scales is heterogeneous (Treadway & Zald, 
2011). It is critical to also note that the findings presented here are 
predominantly based on a non-clinical population with higher levels of 
anhedonia (i.e., individuals who report less interest or pleasure). It is 
unclear whether higher scores on anhedonia scales in a non-clinical 
population qualitatively (or just quantitively) differs from anhedonia 






to thoroughly examine anhedonia across multiple psychiatric populations 
using a battery of tasks in the same individuals.  
6.3.4. Preclinical anhedonia research  
Based on the earlier definition of anhedonia as a loss of pleasure, 
anhedonia research in rodents has concentrated on consummatory tests 
(such as the sucrose preference test; Admon & Pizzagalli, 2015). 
However, the findings in this thesis support the theory that symptoms of 
anhedonia are associated with broader reward deficits, including effort-
based decision-making (Treadway & Zald, 2013). Thus, effort-based 
choice tasks may provide an additional useful tool in preclinical anhedonia 
research (Salamone et al., 2018). Interestingly, given that we did not find 
any evidence of reduced motivation on a basic motivation assay (amount 
of force exerted for reward) in relation to anhedonia, this could suggest 
that effort-based choice tasks are more sensitive to the motivation 
impairments present in anhedonia, than basic effort-for-reward tasks 
such as the progressive ratio task - which is more commonly used in 
animal research.  
Going forward, the heterogeneity of anhedonia in clinical research 
highlights the critical need to measure other aspects of reward-related 
behaviour in anhedonia research (Admon & Pizzagalli, 2015). Given the 
promising findings of the reward learning assay in many putative models 
of depression (Robinson, 2018), this provides a great example of a 
paradigm that could be used. Other promising examples are the RBPRT 
(Der-Avakian et al., 2013; Wooldridge et al., 2020), probabilistic reversal 
learning task (Bari et al., 2010) and the judgement bias test (Hales et al., 
2016). Moreover, a key advantage of these assays is that many of them 
also have procedurally analogous human versions (Aylward et al., 2019; 
Cools et al., 2002; Pizzagalli et al., 2005) enabling the possibility for 
translational research.  
6.4. Implications for clinical practice 
Our findings support the hypothesis that people with higher levels of 






domains of reward processing are suggested to differ neurochemically 
and neuroanatomically (Berridge & Robinson, 2003), this line of research 
could have important implications for treatment (Treadway & Zald, 2011). 
For example, patients with reduced reward motivation on an effort-based 
decision-making paradigm may respond better to a dopaminergic drug 
than patients who have a reduced consummatory experience of reward 
(Soder et al., 2020; Treadway & Zald, 2011; Wardle et al., 2011). 
However, future research will need to demonstrate similar findings to 
those presented here in clinical populations and show evidence that 
altered reward processing plays a causal role in the development and 
maintenance of clinical anhedonia (section 6.6).  
6.5. Limitations and Challenges 
6.5.1. Methodological  
6.5.1.1. Potential confounds 
One limitation of this thesis is the presence of potential confounds, and as 
a result it is possible that altered performance in some tasks is not 
related to changes in reward processing per se. Specifically, it could be 
due to other impairments or reflect a general blunting (regardless of 
valence). For instance, the sweet taste test is used in the human 
literature as a measure of reward sensitivity. However, differences on this 
task could be due to a simpler impairment (e.g., altered sensory 
receptors), as opposed to a higher-order reward deficit in the brain 
(although see Han et al., 2020; McCabe, 2016). Interestingly, there has 
been very little work on the mechanisms which may underpin the 
relationship between affective state and taste and so this remains an 
open question (Heath et al., 2006). Another possibility is that reduced 
sensitivity on this task could reflect a general impairment that is not 
specific to reward. To address this, future studies would benefit from 
including additional negative controls such as an aversive taste test (e.g., 
quinine). Including negative controls could also provide an appealing 
approach to help distinguish between similar but putatively different 






6.5.1.2. Sample size and power 
The sample size chosen for most of the experiments in this thesis were 
based on power calculations to detect a medium-to-large effect size (e.g., 
Cohen’s d =.63 in Chapter 5). However, for many of the included studies, 
there was limited previous research to determine the effect size of 
interest and so these studies were calculated taking into consideration 
resource availability. Consequently, it is possible that any null findings in 
this thesis could be because the true effect size is smaller than the effect 
size we were powered to detect. This means that the studies are 
underpowered to refute a smaller effect size (if one is present). 
Additionally, some experiments failed to reach the planned sample size 
and therefore caution must be taken when interpreting these findings 
given that they are underpowered to detect the effect size of interest. 
This was predominantly driven by drop-out during the experiment or a 
priori exclusion criteria. To account for this, the number of participants 
who drop-out or meet exclusion criteria should be estimated and 
incorporated into the chosen sample size to ensure the target sample size 
is still met.  
6.5.1.3. Type of reward  
Consistent with most human reward processing studies, I have primarily 
used money as a reward. Although there are advantages of using money 
(universally valued and easily manipulated), there are some inherent 
limitations of over-reliance on money in the human literature. First, there 
is evidence that primary (e.g., food, drink) and secondary rewards (e.g., 
money) recruit at least partially dissociable brain systems (Sescousse et 
al., 2013). This is an important consideration for translational research 
because preclinical studies use primary rewards such as food. Second, 
financial concerns may be a potential confound in reward processing 
studies. For example, we found evidence that concerns about money 
influenced performance on the reward learning and memory task: people 
with higher finance concerns demonstrated “better” performance. 
Interestingly, self-reported income level did not influence performance, 






money may serve as useful controls in studies using monetary rewards. 
As a result, future research would benefit from also looking at other types 
of rewards, or at least controlling for this potential confound in their 
research.   
6.5.1.4. Translational validity  
Some of the tasks used in this thesis are based on rodent measures. 
There are many advantages of this approach such as increasing the  
likelihood of tapping into similar components of reward and the increased 
potential for translating findings across human and rodent studies 
(Aylward et al., 2019). However, it is crucial to note that the translational 
validity of these paradigms is still sparse (Der-Avakian & Pizzagalli, 
2018). This means that whilst these tasks attempt to measure similar 
constructs in humans and rodents, it is possible that they are not 
recruiting the same cognitive and neural systems. Further studies are 
needed to further interrogate their translational validity not only in terms 
of face validity, but also predictive and construct validity (Pike et al., 
2021).  
6.5.2. Conceptual  
6.5.2.1. Terminology  
There is inconsistent and often overlapping terminology in the reward 
processing literature (Calabrese et al., 2014; Nielson et al., 2020). Whilst 
I have based my definitions on those used in preclinical research, the 
terminology within the field varies. For instance, I have referred to the 
EEfRT as a measure of reward motivation (Thomsen, 2015), whereas in 
the RDoC the EEfRT is now located under the label “reward valuation” ( 
Insel et al., 2010). This is a fundamental obstacle because it makes 
dissection of reward processing components, and comparison across 
studies, very challenging (Nielson et al., 2020). Convergence in 
terminology would therefore be beneficial to ensure consistency and 






Inconsistent terminology likely stems, in part, from the fact that most 
components of reward (e.g., motivation) and paradigms designed to 
assess them are complex and likely require many aspects of behaviour. 
Future work using computational modelling (Husain & Roiser, 2018; Huys 
et al., 2013; Nielson et al., 2020; Pessiglione et al., 2018; Robinson & 
Chase, 2017), carefully designed behavioural assays, and the inclusion of 
behavioural controls within studies, may help to elucidate the precise 
behavioural impairments present in some paradigms and guide 
terminology appropriately. As well as inconsistent terminology, there is 
also overlapping terminology whereby the same term is used to describe 
potentially different behaviour (Nielson et al., 2020). Nevertheless, it is 
possible that broad terms such as “reward sensitivity” could become 
parsed (e.g., reward detection versus hedonic response) with further 
research efforts demonstrating dissociations. 
6.5.3. Generalisability  
As mentioned in previous chapters, many studies in this thesis recruited 
student populations (except Chapter 5). This is a limitation because 
students are not representative of the general population, which limits 
the external validity of these results (Henrich et al., 2010). This means 
that the findings reported in many of these studies may not generalise to 
other populations (e.g., older age, lower education attainment, lower 
socioeconomic status). However, mental health problems are a pressing 
concern in student populations (Storrie et al., 2010) and thus the findings 
of these studies are still highly relevant and important. It could also be 
argued that including a more diverse population with the same sample 
sizes used here may mask potentially important findings which are 
relevant to some sub-groups.  
6.6. Future perspectives  
One key area for future research is to invest effort into the rigorous 
validation of reward-processing tasks. Specifically, this involves 
optimising and standardising task parameters, checking the assays 






and removing other potential confounds where possible. This is crucial yet 
often over-looked, which may partly be due to demands on researchers to 
provide exciting findings with novel techniques (e.g., fMRI, optogenetics ; 
Niv, 2020). This is unfortunate, as it reduces confidence in the 
behavioural output (which is often a key element of those study designs 
anyway) and hinders our ability to conduct valid translational research.  
Another area for future research is to address whether dysfunctional 
reward processing plays a causal role in the onset of clinical anhedonia 
(Nielson et al., 2020). One way to tackle causality may be longitudinal 
studies that measure components of reward processing and anhedonia 
(using anhedonia questionnaires) across multiple time points (Nielson et 
al., 2020). This would enable us to investigate whether dysfunctional 
reward processing early in life increases future risk of anhedonia in 
clinical populations. It is also possible, however, that deficits in reward 
processing are not a cause but rather a correlate (exists alongside) or 
consequence (emerges due to) of clinical anhedonia (Nielson et al., 
2020). Although in these cases reward processing may not be a 
promising treatment target for anhedonia, it could still provide a useful 
biomarker of treatment response (Nielson et al., 2020). It is also 
important to note that although a transdiagnostic approach is valuable 
(Reilly et al., 2020), it is possible that the relationship between clinical 
anhedonia and abnormal reward processing may differ depending on the 
disorder. There are excellent longitudinal birth cohorts which could help to 
address this question (such as Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and 
Children; ALSPAC)(Boyd et al., 2013). However, to my knowledge, there 
are currently very few reward processing and anhedonia measures 
included in these birth cohorts - inclusion of these measures in cohorts 
such as ALSPAC would be fruitful. 
To complement the methods used here and to provide ecological validity 
of the reward motivation tasks (JORT and EEfRT), it would be useful to 
investigate reward motivation in a naturalistic environment (Frey et al., 
2019; Moran et al., 2017). One way to do this would be to use Ecological 






affect and/or behaviour in their natural environment (Moskowitz & Young, 
2006; Stone & Shiffman, 1994). For example, one could examine whether 
poorer motivation on a laboratory task (JORT or EEfRT) predicts poorer 
motivation in real life (e.g., by measuring self-reported motivation several 
times a day over a few weeks) or whether motivation in everyday life is 
impaired in people with clinical anhedonia. However, this method relies on 
self-report measures which suffer numerous shortcomings (section 
1.3.5). Thus, objective measures of motivation within real-life settings 
would be fruitful, albeit challenging. An example of such an approach 
could include indirect examination of motivation within homes designed to 
monitor and assess behaviour using sensors (e.g., Sensor Platform for 
Healthcare in a Residential Environment; SPHERE)(Zhu et al., 2015). 
Finally, there is exciting research on the efficacy of rapid acting 
antidepressants (e.g., ketamine) for treatment-resistant depression, and 
in particular the symptom anhedonia (Lally et al., 2014; Rodrigues et al., 
2020). This is timely given the well-reported failure of conventional 
antidepressants in the treatment of this symptom (McMakin et al., 2012; 
Uher et al., 2012). However, the precise behavioural and cognitive 
mechanisms underpinning ketamine’s antidepressant effect remains 
elusive. Subsequent progress in this endeavour will likely benefit from 
objective behavioural tasks, such as the ones mentioned in this thesis, 
designed to measure specific behavioural constructs (Robinson, 2018). 
Indeed, this avenue is starting to be addressed in the preclinical literature 
(Griesius et al., 2020; Hales et al., 2017; Wilkinson et al., 2020; 
Wooldridge et al., 2020), which has found promising results in assays 
designed to assess reward learning and reward sensitivity (Robinson, 
2018; Wooldridge et al., 2020). This should be extended to humans 
because it may provide insight into how these drugs are effective.  
6.7. Conclusion  
Despite increasing evidence that anhedonia is related to aberrant reward 
processing, the precise deficits remain unclear. Using a battery of 
behavioural paradigms, this thesis aimed to shed some light on this issue 






higher levels of anhedonia. In line with preclinical work, we provide 
evidence that different components of reward may be dissociable in 
people (effort-for-reward, effort-based decision-making and reward 
sensitivity), and support for the theory that anhedonia (as measured 
using questionnaires) is heterogeneous. Going forward, a challenge within 
the literature will be to further refine and fractionate reward processing 
and to provide further evidence that human tasks align with preclinical 
work (by encouraging translational research), with an aim to develop new 
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